Sources:
PDF:
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610767
Archive.org back-up & transcript
Audio:
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/178994868
Video
https://youtu.be/tYvXF-rsPhA?si=gXkM-JDXmxwfmrAn
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
- MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center (ZNY)
Type of event: Interview with Mark Merced
Date: Wednesday, October 1, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8 _ .
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo. New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred R. Johnson, Jr., FAA Deputy Regional Consul,
Eastern Region
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
Merced noted to Commission staff that he was very hesitant to participate in an interview.
Commission staff received his personal statement through a request. Commission staff did not receive the
statement originally because he was directly involved with AA 11, and New York Center only provided us
with documents involving UAL 175. Merced did not have the time prior to the interview to review his
statement.
Merced began his career 1991 at ZNY. He trained and becamė a certified air traffic controller
(ATC). He has been an ATC with Area B for his full career.
AA Ii:
Merced was “working” sector 56, Kennedy Sector, on the morning of September 11, 2001. His
shift started at 6:30 am, and he was R 56 (radar for sector 56) without an RA (radar associate). Boston
Center’s (ZBW) Kingston Sector notified him of a specific primary target. The controller told Merced that
ZBW was tracing a primary target at Flight Level 290 (FL 290, or 29,000 feet), that the flight was a
possible hijack, and this it was likely AA 11. Merced physically pointed out that target to Dave Bottiglia,
and Bottiglia started to follow the track. Merced does not remember if the track was actually “marked” with
a data tag [please see David Bottiglia MFR for further details]. Merced recalls an “Eagle” flight headed
towards Boston. He descended that flight 31, 000 feet, and asked for it to look for AA 11. The “Eagle”
flight was unable to confirm a visual recognition of AA 11, so Merced directed that flight to continue on
course. He attempted to do the same with a Federal DIES flight out of Bradley that was at Flight Level
270.
Merced noted that after his second attempt to receive a visual on AA 11 by directing flights near
the primary target the target itself “disappeared”. He was “watching it the whole time”, and the controllers
were using all the methods they could to locate the target. Merced told Ivonna, who was the Controller in
Charge (CIC) of Area B, to call New York Tracon in an attempt for altitude information on the primary _
target. Merced was working with Bottiglia, but does not remember Bottiglia setting an “AA11a” data tag
UNCLASSIFIED
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
on the primary. Merced noted that Bottiglia received an “H” position once he was no longer tracking AA
11. Merced noted that Chris Tucker was assigned to the departures radar, and set that radar scope to receive
information from the floor to the ceiling to check for AA 11. Merced informed Commission staff that this
operation was very infrequently done in the past, “especially for commercial aircraft”.
Once AA 11 disappeared, “someone” called Washington Center (ZDC) and informed them of the
situation with AA 11. Merced assumed that AA 11 had continued southbound, but was flying at an altitude
below the radar sweeps. Merced noted that the controllers could tell the primary target’s approximate speed
by monitoring the distance between the lines that indicate a “hit” on the radar sweep, and that the aircraft
performed a slight turn to the southwest: Merced noted that this is all the information he received on the
target.
UAL 175:
Merced first heard of the WTC impacts after UAL 175 hit the south tower. He was actively aware
of what Bottiglia was monitoring and doing. Bottiglia noted that when he was informed of the impact of the
south tower, he had “no real doubt” that it was UAL 175. Bottiglia had told him a plane informed him that
the WTC was on fire, but he had did not know or think that the fire was caused by the impact of AA 11. He
did not which aircraft struck the different sites until after he went home around 5 o’clock that evening.
Merced noted that when he was informed iat the WTC was hit he left ZNY to attempt to contact a friend
who was in the WTC.
Merced noted that Area B personnel were “sequestered” in a conference room after the events. At
this meeting, he gave a written and a taped statement.
Prior to 9/11:
Merced informed Commission staff that prior to 9/11 he would have expected the pilot of a hijacked
aircraft to covertly communicate the situation by using a hijack transponder code (7500) or through a
verbal code.
Merced noted that prior to 9/11 it was often that an aircraft would not be in constant contact with the air
traffic controller, and that this was no reason to assume the aircraft was undergoing a hijack. He further
noted that a lost transponder signal does happen, but prior to 9/11 an air traffic controller would have
approached the problem thinking that there was something electrical wrong with the aircraft. Once the
aircraft deviates from course, Merced would have thought that there was an emergency and the pilot was
headed for the nearest airport. .
Merced informed Commission staff that Bottiglia was told by the pilot of UAL 175 that he overheard
threatening communications in a communication from AA 11. Merced that since ZBW had said that AA 11
was possibly a hijacked aircraft he took UAL 175’s news seriously. Merced had never handled a hijack in
his career.
Merced noted that an FAA ATC has no authority to notify the military or Herndon. He notes that that is the
responsibility of the supervisor for the area.
Prior to 9/11 Merced had no pete with a military scramble exercise, but had worked on military
exercises in the past through a small piece of airspace at 14,000 feet and below. Merced experienced no
difficulty coordinating the use of this airspace for military purposes, besides a few instances in which the
military aircraft “spill out” of the airspace assigned to them. He had no practice with the military on
hijacking procedures, but felt prepared to vector a military aircraft to a target.
Merced’s hijacking training was mostly annual refresher training that included hijack scenarios on a
Dynamic Simulation, called DynSim, which simulates air traffic. These exercises, as noted, involved one
aircraft, and a pilot as the participant in communication through code use. Even post 9/11 Merced has only
exercised scenarios involving single aircraft.
Merced noted that an emphasis has been placed on the importance of maintaining contact with an aircraft,
post 9/11 when the controllers experience a NORDO aircraft they do whatever can be done to communicate
with that aircraft. Prior to 9/11, Merced noted there was no standard on how or when to attempt to
communicate with a NORDO aircraft.
Video:
YouTube Transcript:
0:00
It's quarter till 2 on October 1st.
0:03
We're at the New York Center. We're
0:04
about to interview Mark Mstead. I'm
0:06
Miles Carro, 911 Commission.
0:08
John Azerella on 911 Commission.
0:11
Jeff B1 commission
0:14
supervisor attorney Eastern region.
0:16
Mark Palo National Control Association.
0:19
This is Mark Traffic Control Specialist.
0:23
And Mark, let me just start. Uh we just
0:26
found
0:28
this and that's a statement you wrote on
0:29
that day. If you get a chance to to take
0:31
a look at it, you know, we'll just leave
0:33
it in front of you. If you want to uh if
0:35
you want to look at it, that that's
0:37
fine. What we'd like to do is
0:42
to have you at first just tell us when
0:45
you first joined FAA, the position you
0:47
fell, the training you've had, and
0:49
leading up to 911.
0:52
Let's see. My EOD uh is February 15th,
0:57
1991.
0:59
I been here at New York Center the whole
1:01
time. I for when I started I was in
1:03
Oklahoma for three months at the
1:05
academy,
1:06
right? At the academy for the screen
1:09
and I s here it was all on the job
1:12
training the whole time. Uh been
1:14
certified controller for
1:18
eight years now. So, uh,
1:21
and what positions have you held here at
1:23
the New York?
1:24
I've just been a air traffic control in
1:25
area
1:27
the whole time. So, you you literally
1:29
have 13 years or more.
1:32
Well, yeah.
1:32
In in the airspace that is called sector
1:35
B here,
1:36
basically. Yeah.
1:37
And on 911, you were in area B,
1:40
correct? I was working sector 56.
1:42
Sector 56. And And what is 56? Call by
1:45
name?
1:45
Uh, Kennedy sector.
1:46
Kennedy sector.
1:49
we could Mark focus on 911 itself and if
1:53
you would just simply start with when
1:56
your shift began and your uh and how you
2:00
experienced events that day.
2:01
Okay. Well, uh the shift started at
2:03
6:30.
2:05
I got to work at 6:30. Um
2:08
I had a break pretty quickly and I got
2:10
back from break. I don't remember
2:11
exactly the time, but it was around uh
2:14
maybe 7:15, 7:30, something like that.
2:17
just just to guess on my part.
2:20
So I ended up sitting at sector 56 at
2:23
Kennedy sector.
2:26
I was there for quite a while.
2:27
You was the art position?
2:28
I was in AR cuz I was working by myself
2:30
and I had someone on my age. I was just
2:32
uh working the radar by myself the whole
2:34
time. Wasn't busy. Um
2:38
the second time I don't remember but the
2:41
boss's son calls me up
2:44
and they uh point out a primary target
2:48
and the controller tells me from what I
2:50
remember was this is American 11. His
2:53
last report anned
2:55
zero and uh he's a possible hijack. We
2:58
don't know what that aircraft is doing.
3:00
You know what Boston called you? That
3:02
was Kingston. Kingston secretary.
3:05
I believe it was Kingston.
3:07
I'm assuming it was Kingston. Actually,
3:09
I don't remember.
3:09
And the control of the culture. You
3:11
wouldn't know. It was just whoever was
3:13
on position at that time.
3:14
What do you mean?
3:15
The name of the person that culture.
3:17
No, not at all.
3:18
Not at all.
3:19
He may probably give his initials. I
3:20
don't know what they were.
3:22
About what time?
3:24
Had to be probably about 8:30, something
3:26
like that.
3:27
That was the first awareness you had
3:29
that there might be a problem of the
3:31
aircraft called American 11.
3:32
American 11, right? So, uh, I called the
3:35
aircraft radar contact because he was
3:37
coming towards my airspace. So, and he
3:39
was a primary target. We had no altitude
3:41
on him.
3:44
So, from that point on, I uh I got up
3:46
and I made a physical point out to to
3:49
Dave Digler who was on sector 42 because
3:51
it his airspace was right to the left of
3:53
me.
3:54
We got up here.
3:56
Americans coming down this way like
3:58
this. So same thing I didn't know what
4:01
the airplane was doing a possible
4:03
hijack. I just made just you know be on
4:05
the safe side not to to say the tiger
4:08
was working this
4:10
from that point we try to start a track
4:14
on the primary target to follow the
4:16
track. That way we can you know just
4:18
follow the airplane instead of just
4:19
watching a little dot moving on the
4:21
screen because it's harder to watch
4:22
that. Uh,
4:25
I don't remember if we actually got the
4:27
target the track up or to follow the
4:31
target, but I basically followed him and
4:34
then being at his last report out to was
4:37
29,000 ft. I had a uh Eagle flight that
4:40
was going to Boston Center to Boston
4:42
airport. I descended the 31 and then I
4:46
detected him to fly right over the uh
4:48
the primary target which was the
4:50
American
4:51
and uh someone when he flew over and
4:54
eagle fly reported not seeing anybody
4:58
was at 31
4:59
he was at 31,000 ft
5:00
you brought it down to 31 to take that
5:03
right assuming that maybe the Americ was
5:04
still at 29,000 ft
5:06
and pretty much passed right over the
5:08
target and didn't see him
5:10
and the vehicle was northbound so he
5:12
would have would been looking ahead of
5:15
him down there.
5:16
He didn't see anything.
5:18
He didn't see anything.
5:19
After that,
5:21
I got the Eagle Flight back on course
5:23
because I pretty much got him far off
5:25
course from there.
5:27
Now, seeing that he didn't eagle flight
5:29
didn't see him, I had no idea where to
5:30
the American was at. So, then I had a I
5:32
think it was a FedEx like going to
5:34
Bradley that I was going to try to do
5:37
the same thing. He was 27,000 ft, but he
5:39
was further down.
5:43
down here somewhere. So I started
5:45
turning him that way and uh right around
5:49
the fence is around here somewhere.
5:50
That's when he thought disappeared.
5:55
And when you say the party disappeared,
5:58
describe that for us.
6:00
Just disappeared. I was I was watching
6:01
it the whole time. I wasn't busy and we
6:03
had basically the eagle fighting on the
6:05
frequency. So I was just following it
6:08
and we were trying to do whatever we can
6:11
to find something on that American on
6:13
that target.
6:14
So we I told him to call the Treycon,
6:16
see if we can use their radar to see if
6:18
they see him. Basically, we're trying to
6:20
get an altitude on the aircraft.
6:22
Let me let me come back to to trade in a
6:25
moment. Uh, we talked to Dave yesterday
6:27
and and Dave said he was able to post up
6:30
what he thought to be the target and he
6:34
posted it as American 111A,
6:36
right?
6:37
Did when he does that, does that also
6:39
show up in your
6:40
We were working together because I told
6:41
him what was going on. So, we were like,
6:43
even though we worked two different
6:44
separate sections, we were like, we were
6:45
trying to handle this together even
6:47
though it was coming to my airspace. So,
6:48
he was helping me out with that, but I
6:51
don't remember if the data block
6:52
actually tracked the targets. that I
6:54
don't remember. I know we were trying to
6:56
do it.
6:56
You you were visible to Dave. You were
6:59
in the same
7:00
We was right next to each other.
7:01
Right next to each other. Right next to
7:02
each other.
7:03
Yeah.
7:04
So you were aware of what he was doing.
7:05
And what I he knew. Yeah. He was aware
7:07
what I was telling. So
7:09
before I forget, do you recall when he
7:11
got in each position to come help him?
7:14
That was after the emergency.
7:16
Yeah. After the emergency.
7:16
Yeah. Cuz he got pretty busy. He was
7:19
busy and uh just regular flow of traffic
7:22
and uh 55 which is where Chris Tucker
7:25
was working. He was also pretty busy. So
7:28
they were both pretty busy here. Tucker
7:29
already had an H person because he was
7:30
busy with the parts coming out.
7:33
Uh let's move them to the tradecon who
7:35
uh at what point did you call the trade?
7:37
No, I didn't call the trade call.
7:39
Basically I told them to do that. I mean
7:42
I told the CIC which was Iana Dallas and
7:45
I said like somebody called the tradecon
7:46
see if they can track them I think
7:48
because I was still trying to do what I
7:49
can do for my for my scope. So I was
7:52
playing with the uh with the settings. I
7:53
put all my shutters all the way down to
7:54
the ground, not knowing what else it was
7:57
at. And uh I put all the filters on to
7:59
see everything on the scope and um
8:04
I couldn't see anything basically.
8:07
How often would you change your settings
8:08
so dramatically to go all the way to the
8:10
ground? Have you ever done that before?
8:12
Not at that sector. It's a high altitude
8:13
sector. So I don't normally need to do
8:15
that.
8:16
And you don't recall having ever done
8:17
that?
8:20
Well, we've done that because we may
8:21
have a VF4 I check on that's real low
8:23
and try to help them get in frequency or
8:25
something like that. So, for that, yeah,
8:28
we'll do it.
8:29
But in terms of commercial aircraft, no
8:31
in route traffic.
8:32
No.
8:35
And you were trained to do that. Your
8:37
your training allows you to take those
8:38
extra steps.
8:39
Well, training partly does that, but
8:41
then you you learn a lot of stuff on
8:43
your own. So, if you you provided
8:45
service in aircraft, you do as much as
8:47
you can. Use what you know. Use it. Do
8:50
what you can.
8:54
What were your activities after the
8:57
target disappear? What you believe to be
9:00
disappear?
9:01
Okay. Uh
9:03
okay. The American target disappeared
9:05
and uh
9:07
basically uh I didn't know what the
9:10
coordinator was center because he was
9:12
basically that's the two direction he
9:13
was traveling which would have been a
9:14
coil sector. Uh,
9:17
somebody called the Washington Senate
9:19
and told him what was going on.
9:21
That wasn't you, though.
9:22
No, I didn't. I didn't know what to tell
9:24
him, so I didn't call.
9:26
What were your expectations of 11
9:28
winner? You lost him as a primary.
9:31
They said he went on the radar. People
9:32
said he went on the radar and we assumed
9:34
he just kept flying. I had no idea it
9:36
went down.
9:37
Out of your coverage perhaps into
9:39
Washington,
9:40
right? We assume they went off on the
9:42
radar.
9:43
The heads off to lower altitude,
9:45
right? That radar would have been pick
9:47
picking it up.
9:48
Did you have an indication from this the
9:50
scope presence that you were looking at
9:53
that American 11 was maintaining
9:55
altitude or slowing and descending? What
9:57
clues did you pick up?
9:59
Basically nothing. I mean just it was a
10:01
primary target and uh we really didn't
10:04
get anything on speed. Basically the
10:05
only thing on speed you can see is the
10:06
distance between the uh the target and
10:08
the histories. But uh altitude basically
10:12
I saw him turn because he did make a
10:13
slight turn.
10:16
If you look over here
10:18
yeah that's basically what he did
10:20
that that slight turn to
10:23
that's the only thing I
10:24
so as far as any more
10:31
just to clarify when you say Washington
10:33
you go to Hearnen the command center.
10:34
No no Washington center ZC. Oh, the the
10:36
actual center
10:38
which would be the next
10:41
center.
10:43
Um,
10:47
what did you learn first here that
10:49
something that impacted the World Trade
10:51
Center
10:52
after the events with the United
10:54
aircraft
10:55
and the United
10:57
about one or two minutes after that
10:59
target disappeared. And were you aware
11:01
by sitting next to Dave the what he was
11:04
dealing with 175?
11:06
Yeah.
11:06
Yeah. And you are aware that he was
11:08
following an unknown code 3321. That's
11:11
what I was like. Yeah.
11:13
And was there any doubt in your mind
11:16
that it was 175 that that hit the south
11:18
tower
11:21
having watched it sitting next to Dave
11:23
when it happened?
11:30
Well, we watched that if we watched the
11:32
story go down this Sunday. I'd have to
11:34
say there was no doubt in my mind. But
11:37
it was after that that you learned that
11:40
uh something else had hit the north had
11:41
already impacted North.
11:43
We knew yet because Dave was working
11:45
before they took over the United in his
11:46
airspace. We had he said another place
11:48
said that the gun is on fire.
11:51
But that being on fire, did you equate
11:53
that to a plane fly into?
11:54
No.
11:55
No. They we got reports I think from
11:58
somewhere we heard there was a small
12:00
plane that went in there or something,
12:02
but uh I had no idea it was American.
12:05
What did you find?
12:07
It wasn't until I got home and saw the
12:08
news around 5:00.
12:13
Um,
12:15
what time did they shut the sector down?
12:19
Excuse me. How sector area be?
12:22
Oh, when they told me that uh
12:25
the trade center was hit, that was it
12:27
for me. I basically got up. I had to get
12:29
cuz I had a friend of work there.
12:32
So, I was like I I was shocked. Did Did
12:34
you leave the sports?
12:36
No, I was on the ground. I I got up and
12:39
tried to call my friend, get in touch
12:40
with his wife and find out if what was
12:43
going on with him. So, uh pretty much
12:46
from that point on I was walking around
12:48
in shock.
12:48
Did you participate in a meeting after
12:50
that or statements were taken?
12:51
We were sequestered and uh upstairs they
12:55
kept us in a room. Everybody was
12:57
involved basically. Everybody who was in
12:59
the area at the time, they had us
13:00
upstairs
13:02
to up here somewhere.
13:04
And uh
13:06
later on in the day, yeah, we give book
13:08
statement and they tape the statement.
13:12
Yeah.
13:14
Let me let me drop back to
13:17
the generic case in a little bit for a
13:20
little bit. Excuse me. Um prior to 911,
13:24
what would be the indicators to you of a
13:26
hijacking or a plane that would appear?
13:30
Basically be a a code
13:34
sparking hijack on the data block. The
13:37
pilot may say a word
13:40
um
13:43
that's basically it. I mean I can think
13:45
of hand unless uh we got an indication
13:47
from anywhere else
13:48
and that would be a hijacking in what we
13:51
learned would have been the traditional
13:52
sense but the pilot was still
13:54
controlling the aircraft.
13:55
Yeah.
13:56
Um
13:58
the indicators on 911 in and of
14:01
themselves. Let's talk about that for a
14:03
moment.
14:04
They claim that uh you lose
14:07
communication with is that routine? Does
14:10
that happen?
14:10
It used to Yeah, it happens pretty much.
14:12
Yeah, happens quite often.
14:14
That fact in and of itself would not
14:15
cause you to be making contact with No.
14:19
How about the case of an airplane whose
14:22
transponder has turned off or is or is
14:24
no longer transponding for whatever
14:26
reason.
14:26
Well, that that that would indicate
14:28
identity. There could be something wrong
14:29
with the aircraft. It's losing frequenc
14:30
if it's losing a radio contact and the
14:32
transponder could be something
14:34
electrical on airplane or something.
14:37
And let's think those two factors now.
14:39
And then uh if you have a plane for
14:41
whatever the reason that deviates from
14:43
the course
14:45
you're you're controlling it and it
14:47
deviation is headed a direction
14:50
intended. How would that
14:53
what would you take from that
14:58
before September 11?
15:00
Yes, before September 11th probably
15:03
would thought he was
15:05
had an emergency was going to go to like
15:07
nearest airport or something.
15:09
So the combination of not transponding
15:12
and no communication gives you gives the
15:15
appearance of an electrical failure some
15:18
sort of emergency and the aircraft is
15:21
going to end this would be a pilot
15:23
attempt to land somewhere.
15:25
Yeah.
15:27
Were you made aware at all by Boston or
15:30
did you learn of at any time the
15:32
threatening cockpit communications that
15:34
were uh overheard by Boston? Well, we
15:38
heard we Dave heard a transmission some
15:42
pilot to check on his frequency said he
15:44
has some hostile transmissions,
15:47
right? That was 175 I think.
15:49
Right. But I mean check the second that
15:52
was first uh information you had that
15:55
there might have been something with
15:56
111.
15:57
I'm not sure. I don't know if it was
15:59
United. Yeah, I think it was United 175
16:00
actually said that.
16:02
Um
16:04
but I had an Yeah, I had an idea. They
16:06
settled up possible hijack. So I treat
16:08
it as such.
16:09
And and again in the pre 911 mindset of
16:15
aircraft with major mechanical problems
16:17
and headed for the three factors we've
16:19
talked about if you now add to that the
16:22
communications the threat of
16:23
communications would that change your
16:26
perception and cause you to think
16:28
hijacked as opposed to mechanical?
16:31
Well no well hearing that I knew that
16:33
the I sort of knew that the American was
16:35
hijacked. I mean just all the taking on
16:37
all the factors in it was a hijack
16:39
everything combined together then
16:41
it was a hijack so so I was like I said
16:45
the target disappeared I didn't know it
16:47
had gone into the tower so uh when they
16:50
said that they the United have said that
16:53
you know it was obviously confirmed it
16:55
was a hijack
16:56
in your several years experience as a
16:58
controller had you ever handled the
17:00
hijacks airplane was even close to being
17:04
what was the training that you had to
17:06
deal with the situation prior to 911 if
17:08
it had occurred.
17:09
Basically, anything that that occurs, we
17:12
just with a hijack. If uh it was
17:14
squawking a certain code, we just verify
17:16
squawking that code.
17:19
Uh just make sure that if we suspect
17:22
there's a hijack not to let on to the
17:23
pilot on the frequency in case that the
17:25
hijack was ill, we measured it from
17:27
there. We just told the supervisor
17:28
whatever was going on.
17:30
So your actions are really twofold to to
17:33
deal with plane in whatever way
17:34
necessary to to help her or not hinder
17:38
them and to notify the super.
17:40
Right.
17:40
Did you have any notification
17:42
responsibilities to other sectors or
17:45
Oh yeah. We that's the first thing you
17:47
do is if anything's going on to another
17:49
airspace. That's why I pointed the
17:51
aircraft out to Dave. If you think it's
17:53
going to certain objective, you don't
17:54
know what you're going to do. You make a
17:56
point out to what objectives may be
17:58
affected.
18:00
scope level. Did you have any
18:01
responsibility for notifying the region
18:03
or or hurt the control center?
18:06
No, I can't do that.
18:07
You can't do that.
18:08
It basically tell supervisor that that's
18:10
their job.
18:10
How about notifying the military?
18:13
That's not my job either. We just told
18:15
the supervisor they supposed to do
18:16
whatever they have to do.
18:18
Prior to 911, what uh training did you
18:21
have or familiarity did you have with
18:24
scrambled military aircraft to assist
18:26
whatever reason?
18:28
Never done it.
18:29
even to participate in an exercise or
18:32
simulation of any kind concerning
18:34
military.
18:35
Oh yeah, we work military all the time,
18:37
but uh because we have a restricted
18:39
airspace in airspace, we work them in
18:42
there. They're usually eight tons.
18:45
Uh okay. 56 is uh the ocean, right?
18:50
Yeah. No, we don't we don't not the
18:51
warning area. Uh it's not on that map
18:56
as we see here. So when you say you've
18:59
never done, you mean never participated
19:00
in a military scramble in real life to
19:02
respond to hydra? No.
19:03
But you have dealt with the military.
19:05
Yeah, we worked Yeah, I worked in the
19:06
military all the time.
19:07
And who do you who do you work with in
19:09
the military in terms of military
19:11
traffic if you
19:12
basically be uh uh Huntress? Is that
19:18
the call? I can't remember.
19:22
We know Huntress.
19:23
That's not No, it's not.
19:25
subjective giant killer. You think a
19:28
giant killer?
19:31
I'm not sure.
19:32
Blank here.
19:37
The only two we're aware of.
19:39
No, the little air blank. I'm sorry.
19:42
Okay. Different bases right those are
19:45
different pieces of air
19:46
and we have different call signs.
19:48
It's a smaller piece of air spaces right
19:50
there and they 14,000 ft and below.
19:52
There were eight in there and uh saw
19:55
once in a while 16 or something like
19:57
that.
19:58
Pre 911 they did that.
20:00
No, they always do that. It's training
20:01
the training. Uh
20:02
oh, okay.
20:03
Same warning area today as it was.
20:05
Yeah, it's always been Yeah, it
20:09
let me just for for a moment while we're
20:10
on that point. Is there any how's the
20:14
relationship between the FAA side and
20:16
the military side in terms of
20:19
the use of the airspace or the or any
20:21
problems dealing with the airspace at
20:23
all from their position?
20:24
Not at all. I mean they sometimes they
20:26
spill out. I mean we keep the airplanes
20:29
as much farways from there as possible
20:32
because they do spill out even though
20:33
they're supposed to stay a certain uh
20:36
limit inside the boundary but sometimes
20:37
they spill out. So just keep an eye out
20:39
for that.
20:41
radar controller dayto-day activities
20:43
the military and the civilian trying to
20:45
use the same airspace that was
20:47
manageable.
20:48
Yeah.
20:50
Long time. Yeah.
20:53
Um
20:56
you get annual refresher training.
20:59
Annual refresher training include tech
21:02
situations
21:03
describing
21:06
last time we did it. Basically we go to
21:08
uh the Dyson
21:10
And uh
21:15
training go to Dyson and they just it's
21:19
simulated traffic. So they'll have
21:20
somebody called hijack and we just call
21:23
verify score 7500
21:25
and that's basically it.
21:27
in the traditional sense to the air,
21:30
right? Where the pilot still has control
21:31
of the aircraft
21:32
and involve you,
21:35
right?
21:37
Has it ever entered your mind that
21:40
someone might take over an airplane and
21:42
use it for suicide purposes?
21:46
And in your training that was never
21:49
a million years that
21:56
He's had a chance to
22:01
reflect as we all have. I was I was
22:05
quarter mile from the Pentagon that day
22:06
and my desk not the same kind of
22:10
ultimate impact that you had that day
22:11
but we all shared it in some respects.
22:14
um in terms of recommendations
22:17
for the future, how things went that
22:19
day, how things might have done better
22:21
or how things could go better in the
22:23
future, do you have any thoughts at all
22:24
that you would uh provide to us?
22:27
I mean, the one change that we we've had
22:29
now post 911 is that uh if we do have a
22:32
Nardo
22:33
aircraft that loses frequency,
22:36
we do whatever we can to get that
22:37
aircraft back. So before it was if an
22:42
airplane lost kind of communications, it
22:43
wasn't such a big deal. We would
22:45
actually let the aircraft maybe get to
22:47
the airport and just do whatever it has
22:49
to do to get pound into the airport.
22:51
That's not the case anymore. Um and
22:53
going back for a moment at prior to
22:55
enrollment, was there a standard in
22:57
place when aircraft lost communications
22:59
that after certain amount of minutes or
23:02
No, we tried we tried uh to get the
23:05
airplane by either going to that company
23:08
or uh going to a VR V that it might be
23:13
uh tuned into.
23:15
But uh
23:17
I guess we weren't as diligent back then
23:20
as we would be now because you turn
23:22
around you tell the supervisor that we
23:24
have a Nordo whereas back then I don't
23:26
think we used to do that we used to just
23:28
take care of you know between the
23:29
controllers or whatever tell my status
23:31
guys no and
23:34
from
23:35
in terms of calling the company who
23:36
would do that would you do that
23:37
no you can actually ask another like if
23:38
it's an American aircraft that's uh no
23:41
communications and he ask another
23:43
American to go to his company
23:44
at the scope level the controller would
23:46
do that through another company in the
23:48
sky
23:49
but not to call the dispenser
23:50
no they can do that too we do I think
23:52
you can do that.
23:54
I can't do it if I'm on a position, but
23:56
with supervisor, I can't make the phone
23:58
call.
23:59
Want to come back and ask there's two
24:00
areas. Um, in your Dyson training and
24:03
pri pre 911, do you recall ever being
24:06
presented with um an exercise where
24:09
multiple hijackings occurred during the
24:11
exercise? There were always single event
24:12
hijacks. How about post 911 in your
24:16
still single events?
24:17
I might remember. Yeah. From what you
24:19
can recall. Yeah.
24:24
question.
24:28
There's one other area if I can ask you
24:31
about that is um on on the 11th when um
24:35
I apologize if I miss
24:39
I apologize. Um did you become aware at
24:42
some point in time prior to um the
24:44
impact of 175 that there's been some
24:46
impact to the one of the trade centers
24:48
from where you're sitting there? Yeah,
24:50
because one of the pilots said on day
24:52
three because they report at the church
24:53
and it was on fire, but I heard was it
24:57
was a small airplane. I don't know where
24:58
I heard it from.
24:59
Somewhere you heard them say.
25:00
I don't know if it was behind me. I know
25:02
the chief was in the area. I don't know.
25:03
Somebody said it, but they said a small
25:05
plane at the the trade center. I don't
25:07
know if there was a pilot on the
25:08
frequency or whatever whatever it was.
25:09
And that was prior to the the second
25:13
day,
25:13
right?
25:17
Um, and then did the Okay, that's at
25:19
that point. Now, at some point after
25:21
that, um, do you think differently based
25:25
on what you see or hear that it's not a
25:27
small aircraft, but a commercial
25:28
aircraft?
25:30
No, I I had no clue until, like I said,
25:32
until I got home that the American was
25:34
the one that went in.
25:36
Okay. So, you I'm sorry, that's probably
25:38
the part I missed and I apologize for
25:40
that. So, you in your mind that day um
25:44
you didn't have any inkling that it was
25:46
American 11 that hit the first time
25:47
until you got home,
25:48
right?
25:48
Okay. That was after you left the
25:49
facility.
25:50
Okay.
25:52
Okay. I don't have any uh I think you
25:54
asked a little general questions. Um do
25:57
you one one more question. You drill
25:58
with the um when I say drill, do you
26:00
practice um any exercises today with the
26:02
military practicing in other words
26:04
getting vectoring military jets to
26:05
respond to a hijack?
26:07
No,
26:07
there's no exercise. There's no live
26:10
exercises like that. How about tabletop
26:12
computer ones where you have to interact
26:13
with somebody acting as the military
26:16
pilot trying to get to a location?
26:18
No.
26:18
Okay. Do you think that you're prepared
26:20
to deal with that situation where you're
26:22
having today without the training on a
26:24
on a computer or a live train?
26:26
Yes.
26:26
Okay. Go ahead.
26:28
Uh Mark, if uh as you think about the
26:31
things you're talking with and anything
26:32
else you want, let us know.
26:37
We appreciate very much
26:42
on October 1st of March.
