Paul Thumser - 911 Interview 1 Oktober 2003

 

Sources:

Pdf:

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610769

Archive.org back-up & Transcript

Audio:

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/5954631

Archive.org back-up 

Video:

https://youtu.be/VXvlApyzPnE?si=7035_lxa3cRuSWs_

https://rumble.com/v6y515e-paul-thumser-911-interview-1-oktober-2001.html

Paul Thumser

Pdf:

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610769

Archive.org back-up & Transcript

NAID: 5954631

Produced: oktober 1, 2003

Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of the Interview of Paul Thumser (Thumser, Paul) of the Federal Aviation Administration Conducted by Team 8 - 911 - 9/11 Commission 

Commission Sensitive 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview 

with Paul Thumser . 

Type of event: Recorded Interview 

Date: Tuesday, October 1, 2003 

Special Access Issues: None 

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles Kara 

Team Number: 8 | 

Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York 

Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred Johnson, FAA General Consul 

Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown 

Background 

Thumser has extensive experience as a pilot and as an operations supervisor. He was 

chief pilot for a light commuter airlines and in October 1981 for a variety of reasons he 

left the flying world and was hired in October, 1981 as an air traffic assistant. He started 

at NY TRACON and moved to New York Center in 1989. He ultimately became an 

operations supervisor in Area B and was supervising that area on 9-11. He reported 

through the operations supervisor to the Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC), Bruce 

Barrett who ultimately reported to Mike McCormack. On 9/11 McCormack would have 

reported to the acting AEA501 at Eastern Region, Rick duCharme. 

Observations based on pilot experience 

ELT. An Emergency Locator Transmission (ELT) cannot be triggered by a pilot ina 

B767. ELTs are tested at 00-05 of each hour. On a B767 impact would be the only way 

to trigger one. The ELT heard on 9-11 could have come from anywhere--121.5 civilian 

243.0 military. A lot of times when an ELT is received outside the testing time a pilot 

will report that they set it off. 

RCC (Rescue Coordination Center). The RCC is operated by the Air Force and they are 

the contact for credible ELTs. [Staff Note:. We visited the RCC and they receive all 

ELTs; so many in fact that they are a nuisance and they have special procedures and 

software to manage that.] | 

Parameters for an ELT for that type of airplane (767) to be set off due to a hard turn or a 

hard landing aren’t credible. The sensitivity setting on those ELTs is not low. For 

example, on the Egyptian air crash into the ocean there was no ELT set off. Thumser was 

the midnight supervisor, and therefore the OMIC that night. He vectored an airplane to 

investigate, and that plane did not pick up an ELT. Based on that example and others he. 

judged it would have to be a serious impact to set the ELT off. 

Supervisory Responsibility Prior to Hijackings 

There is detection equipment when airplanes are within 5 miles horizontally or 1000 to 

2000 feet vertically of each other. An alarm goes off and a print out comes through at the - 

watch desk area. One went off that morning prior to the unfolding events of the day. 

When such an alarm goes of the controller of record has to be relieved from that position 

and an NTap - a computer printout with targets, altitudes and times — is retrieved in order 

to match the times and altitudes to check if a controller has made an error. If itis _ 

concluded that there was less than required separation, then the voice tapes are checked 

to see what the controller and the pilot said. Airways facilities checks the voice tape. 

Because of an occurrence that morning Thumser put Ivonna Dowis in charge of Area B 

and Thumser began the investigation of operational error. The Error that Sector R39 had 

that morning did not have anything to do with the events of 9-11. 

At about 0835 EDT Bruce Barrett informed Thumser of possible hijack and Thumser 

went back to Area B. 

AAI1 

Mark Merced Sector R56 controller and Ivonna briefed Thumser on what was happening. 

And Thumser retook charge of the area. Merced started tracking AA11 while having 

conversations with Boston Center. Thumser could only hear one side of the 

conversation. 

The last known altitude for AA11 was flight level 290. Everyone is aware of that and 

Thumser finds out about it. Protecting flight level 290 then becomes the controller 

objective, not allowing anyone within 2000 ft, vertically of that altitude keeping in mind 

there had been no radio contact with AA11 for 15 or 20 minutes. It was a primary target 

only with a major course deviation. 

AA11 was not supposed to come through the New York area. Although Thumser did not 

know it was destined to LAX, the AA11 flight plan was not through ZNY airspace. The 

people (other sectors, other centers) who needed to know did and New York Center was 

-tracking the primary. R42 controller, Dave Battiglia, started a track on AA11. 

In order to partially validate that track Thumser asked Merced to take Eagle936 to Flight 

Level 310. Vectored with a slight adjustment, the Eagle went just to the left of the 

American probable track 10 to 15 miles northwest of LaGuardia. The Eagle did not spot 

AA11. It was major trouble that the Eagle flight did not see AA11. They had high 

confidence if AA11 was at flight level 290 the Eagle would have spotted it. 

Thumser became extremely concerned because of the high volume of traffic at all 

altitudes in the ZNY New York City airspace. His sense of urgency translated to all in the 

area, according to his recall. 

When Thumser first got to the area had only heard of a possible hijacking-—-NORDO 

aircraft, shut off transponder, and off course. At that time he had received no information 

of the threatening communications. 

He told the Sector 68 controller, controlling departures coming down out of LaGuardia 

and Kennedy, that AA11 may enter his airspace. He also told other sectors in his area. 

He then went back to Merced and learned that the primary target was lost over 

Manhattan. Radar coverage is overlapping in ZNY so he thought the plane has gone very 

low. He told the whole area that the primary target was lost and that they didn’t know 

lat/long/altitude or anything else. 

UA 175 

At that exact point Dave Battiglia informed Thumser of the lost UAL175. The data block 

was there but it was no longer tracking altitude. The block went into coast after 4 radar 

returns (48 seconds).. The first four hits after a loss, based on history, are projected by the 

computer. Thumser noticed the UAL175 data block going to coast track. 

Dave Battiglia called a few seconds later and informed he is not communicating with 

UAL175. They then notice on Battiglia’s screen the limited data block on a different 

code. Battiglia says it is UAL17S, but it has changed altitudes. 

Mike McCormick is in the area now. UAL175 [as a limited data block] starts to descend. 

They tell Sector 39 that UAL175’s limited data block may be entering its space. That was 

10 or 13 miles before UAL 175 turns to the southeast east. They had a good fix on 

altitude, unlike AA11. The Mode C transponder was still on. 

At that point the area was informed that a “small airplane” had hit the World Trade 

Center. The information Thumser had at that time was - had a hijacked airplane (AA11) 

that lost primary directly over Manhattan so he immediately eaualee that it was AA11 

that hit the WTC. 

But now he was dealing with UAL175. Safety and control in Area B is compromised, so 

Thumser tells everyoneto stop all traffic in Area B. UAL175 is turning at this time and 

there is chaos in the Area related to the attempt to clear all traffic in UAL175’s path. At 

the point that UAL175 is 20 miles southeast of Allentown, [Note: Thumser had access to 

detailed charts depicting the flight paths of UA175 and AA11 that were posted on the | 

wall] turning southeast and descending. That was an extremely abnormal situation. 

His awareness of the UAL !75 hijack began at the beginning of the turn to the Southeast 

and told Dave LeCates to scramble McGuire. [His recall] He didn’t recall saying “I 

think this is a hijack.” McGuire doesn’t have fighters, but was thinking something was 

going to happen, and he was reaching for any possibility to get military assistance. After 

Thumser’r original statement was consulted Thumser says he told LaCates to scramble 

McGuire after the northeast bound turn of UAL175. While handling the descent of 

UAL175, he said “tell them [tower] he’s coming.” He wanted to help stop the plane, 

somehow. He even had a thought of running another airplane into it at that time. It was a 

bizarre enough situation to tell someone to scramble. 

LeCates never acknowledged or responded. He recalled conversing quietly to LeCates, he 

didn’t say loudly as he didn’t want to disturb area. Thumser also told staff, “If I had 

authority...knowing what I know...with the background I have...I would have shot that 

plane down.” 

When working at Kennedy he had worked hijacks and had used procedures in place to 

provide fighter escort. The Paine Stewart Lear jet incident is another example. Had been 

done in past. When asked if part of the procedures was the ability to shoot down aircraft, 

Thumser thought it would have to be directed by the White House. [Staff Note: Staff has 

since learned that the only possible hijack Thumser could have worked was a February 

1993 Lufthansa incident. He cited the Stewart incident only as an example, not as an 

incident that he worked. 

If there hadn’t been the preceding AA11 event, Thumser would not have thought 

UAL175 was a hijack. He would have thought it had a serious equipment problem and 

would land at Kennedy. Kennedy has a large maintenance base. In the old days would 

have treated it like an emergency and would have told Kennedy, possibly Newark to get 

ready. [Staff Note: That statement is belied by what he next said.] 

About 20 miles Northeast of Potsdam, UAL175 made its turn to the North and Thumser 

was now thinking it was headed towards the WTC. He then qualified that it was not at 

turn towards northeast, but at the point of the turn to the southeast that he understood 

UAL175 was headed towards the WTC. [This may be reconstructive on his part, in 

hindsight. | 

As Thumser looked at the transcript it was 0853 EDT when he stated American 75 hijack. 

AT that time he had information that a small airplane had hit the WTC, but didn’t have 

verification that it was AA11. UAL175 was in a high rate of descent, was traveling 350 

or 400 knots and headed towards the ground. They lost target soon thereafter and coy 

instantaneous heard of the second WTC hit. 

Area B Controller Meeting 

Thumser recalled that after it the immediate situation was over they shut down traffic and 

combined sectors on the Center floor. Other people were tasked to watch Area B’s 

scopes and Robert Ott, one of the office managers, was tasked to guide Area B 

controllers through a recall process. It is not abnormal procedure to give statements in- 

such situations. Ott gave Thumser and Area B controllers direction not to call home or 

friends. Ott sequestered everyone in a conference room. 

They went to an old operations room and Marty Fournier, with Bob Ott, recorded 

statements by controllers--Mark Merced, Dave Battiglia, Chris Tucker, Tony Palmieri 

and Thumser. For whatever reason they wanted the statements recorded That is rarely 

done. Thumser gave a verbal recorded statement. He recalled that he did not want to say 

everything because of what else was in room. [check tape] Thumser posed no objection 

to Staff listening to his statement. 

Other Comments 

Thumser had never heard of the possibility of a terrorist using a plane for a suicide 

mission. 

Assumed the chief and the deputy were on the phones relaying all the information. 

Looking at the [post-facto] hij ack profile and what they did, it seemed simple [in 

hindsight] to project where the hijacked airplanes were going. He reiterated he thought 

UAL175 was going to hit WTC about seven minutes before impact. 

It was like [watching someone]driving the wrong way down the street. 

“What I thought it was going to do was conjecture, not fact.” 

Hijackings in General 

Pre 9-11 controllers would receive communication from the pilot about the hijack--code 

words or a specific transponder code. Neither of those things happened on 9-11. Other 

ways to detect or suspect a hijack--not talking to ATC and/or extremely off course. 

Without communications nothing could be confirmed, however. 

Pre-9-11 the controller would receive the communication - pilot reports hijack — get the 

information and report to the area supervisor. The area supervisor would report to the 

watch desk and the OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) would follow up. He doesn’t 

believe anyone below the OMIC would do the follow up. 

Prior to and on 9-11, concerning NORAD and NEADS, Thumser had reasonable 

awareness and thought it would take 5 or 6 phone calls to get there and they probably 

would have called an air force base. 

He was not familiar with Dynamic Simulation training concerning hijackings and had no 

computer or other training for hijacking. Operations supervisors do not go through the 

same training as controllers. Controller were only to a) get information and pass it and b) 

do what thepilots ask to do. 

There were very few hijacks pre-9-11 for a controller to respond to in the real world. He 

recalled no exercises or drills—there was very little emphasis and drills. He had no 

knowledge of any exercises or drills sponsored by the FAA or the military and certainly 

none with multiple hijacking events. 

Post 9-11 he hasn’t personally gone through any such training, and does not believe 

controllers have gone through any either. The only review they’ve gotten is what to do in 

case of a known hijacking. He emphasized that on 9-11 they were only told of a 

“suspected hijacking”. 

Nevertheless, Area B was treating both UAL175 and AA11 asa hijacking, though not 

confirmed. No one said to Thumser don’t say it’s a hijack until it is confirmed a hijack. 

 AA11 Rebirth 

He never heard any rumors of that sort concerning AA11, but did hear within New York 

Center that it might not have been AA11 that hit the WTC. Personally, he made the 

logical assumption that it was AA11. You wouldn’t see a fire from the WTC if a small 

aircraft hit it. He didn’t hear anyone say anything about it not being AA11 hitting the 

center and doesn’t recall anything from outside the path of the AA11 track still being 

airborne. He heard nothing heard about a plane from Poughkeepsie being lost.. 

Does not believe he wrote an AA11 statement for the accident package. Usually facility 

that has control of the airspace or the airplane that is involved in the accident does the 

incident. AA11 originated in Boston; he is a little eee that they didn’t ask him fora | 

statement. 

The last known AA11 Mode C ai altitude was flight level 290. It is possible to 

transit from Boston Center air space into NY TRACON air space without passing 

through New York Center air space. 

Recommendations and other Comments 

Security at gates, security at airports (ramps, cleaners, maintenance, fuelers) is 

pmportant- that’s where access to planes is. Clamp down on security in ramp area. The _ 

Air Traffic Control perspective is that very little that can be done except cooperate with 

the hijacker. If a situation similar occurred—within minutes to New York—it would be 

very difficult without already airborne combat pilots with authority to shoot down. 

Cooperation is better now with the military, with the NEADS/NORAD direct line. There 

could be additional hotlines distributed throughout, but Thumser is not confident that 

every operational supervisor should be given that responsibility. 

Pre-9-11 military communications were very difficult. The relationship only dealt with 

aircraft in and out of warning areas. 

Thumser believes UAL175 might have had an updated transponder that could not be 

_ turned off. Here his reference is to the original UAL175 code 1470 that became 3020, 

then a minute later 3321. He posed the rhetorical question, “why turn 4 knobs when you 

could turn it off with one switch?” And then continued, “does that seem an attempt by 

United Airlines pilot to signal, hijackers to shut off, or c hijackers change code for 

confusion?” The transponder is right to the side of the pilot and in Thumser’s flying 

experience the first digit would have been changed first.. Even switching one digit would 

have caused a limited data block to display on controller scopes Transponders and codes 

are taught early in flight school. The hijackers would have known the mechanics. 

YouTube Transcript

0:00

It is Thursday, October 2nd, uh, 2003, approximately 7:40 a.m. I am John

0:06

Azerella with the 911 Commission, and we're at the New York Air Center in Rancoma, New York, about to begin an

0:13

interview with Paul Thunzer. Miles Cara 911 commission

0:18

Jeff Brown 911 commissioners supervisory attorney FA East

0:28

are operations supervisor New York and just for

0:33

your last name spelled L E R C H and what's your position here? I'm a New York center subcom rep.

0:40

basically uh I represent all the supervisors in New York Senate and I've been sitting in with all them as their representative

0:47

and Mr. Can you spell your last name for the record? T Hu Ms R.

0:54

Thank you. Can we just um sort of start by you giving us a background of when

0:59

you started with the FAA and what the various positions were that you held leading up to September 11th, 2001 and

1:06

then tell us what position you held that day. Sure. Do you just want FAA or any other aviation background?

1:12

Well, if you have any other aviation background, I have extensive aviation background. So, um well, I have um all my flying

1:22

licenses. I was a former pilot before the uh air traffic controller strike of 1981. Uh after uh college, I was a

1:30

professional flight instructor and then I moved on to commuter airlines. And uh prior to the strike, I was chief pilot

1:37

and director of operations for uh commuter airline here on Long Island. Uh I was an FAA check airman, which means

1:46

that on behalf of the FAA, I give check rides to the commuter airline pilots

1:54

um to maintain their certified flying skills, ground skills and so

2:00

forth. Um, so that involves um me having the same licenses as commercial airline

2:07

pilots. It's called an airline transport pilot certificate uh or license. And uh I have that single and multi-engine uh

2:15

flight expensive experience over uh excuse me 5,000 hours uh of flying by

2:22

the time I was 26 years old. When the air traffic controllers went on

2:27

strike in u 1981, I had already been interviewed by several airlines uh including five

2:33

interviews with United two in Colorado and uh several other airlines. So I was

2:40

just about hopefully to be hired uh my goal was to be a professional commercial

2:46

airline pilot and uh it was uh darn close to achieving those goals uh up

2:52

until August 3rd of 1981. Uh and I since I had such extensive

3:00

experience I didn't uh and and in the flying world the uh furlows were going

3:06

to continue for 3 to 5 years after the strike and I had plenty of time and the

3:11

commuter airline is not some place you get rich. Uh it's where you build experience. So, uh, in about October or

3:19

so, um, I left the flying world and in, uh, November, I was hired, um, by the

3:27

FAA as an air traffic assistant. What year was that? 1981. November of 1981.

3:35

An air traffic assistant. Uh, you familiar with that position? Is that the um RA position? The H

3:40

position? No. uh that the the H the H and the R positions are 2152s which is air traffic

3:48

control. That's our um FAA designate for the position. Um I was a 2154.

3:57

Basically, the job of an ATA is to take the flight progress strips,

4:05

put them in the appropriate holders, and put them in the appropriate positions for the controllers. That's

4:13

simplified. Uh I was uh hired at the New York Treycon. Now, I started in uh on

4:19

February 7th of 1982. I was hired in November, and I started there February 7th, uh 1982. at the Treycon.

4:27

At the Treycon, at the New York Treycon and um what they did is they hired um

4:33

many airline former airline pilots, mo some of them were retired, over 60 and

4:40

um some of us younger guys who who were out of work at the time uh because they

4:46

wanted that aviation background to to assist the controllers.

4:51

And um so we went to a class there and uh part

4:57

of my uh experience recently I had flown for you know several commuters and stuff

5:03

but flying into LaGuardia and Kennedy quite extensively so I really knew the

5:08

operation so to speak the air traffic operation the flows and things like

5:13

that. Uh so I was uh asked to go to the Kennedy area

5:19

and um in addition to just putting the flight progress strips and we formulated

5:25

clearances routes read to control towers and things like that. So we were uh can

5:32

I say junior controllers or something like that and um they encouraged me the

5:38

uh management there encouraged me strongly to become a controller and I uh never wanted to be a controller. That

5:45

was a sort of a temporary job. I had already had a uh master's degree in business and I had felt uh at this point

5:52

somewhat resigned 26 years of age that uh I had given aviation my best shot

5:58

lots of years and you know paid the dues that sort of thing and um I was ready to

6:04

move on. So I was actually going into Wall Street and taking interviews um

6:10

in the business world. Um, but that was a time in 1981 of of uh severe

6:16

inflation. Uh, maybe an economic recession to put it mildly. And they

6:22

weren't hiring. They were they were hiring, but they were hiring at like entry level versus, you know. So anyway,

6:28

uh um they convinced me the money was going to be better being a controller. So I took the task, scored very highly

6:34

on it. Got out to Oklahoma City in about November. came back um uh November of

6:41

83. This is now got back in uh uh March uh March or uh

6:48

or April of um 83. I'm sorry, it was November of 82, same year that I went

6:54

out there. I got back in March uh I think it was March or April, I can't quite remember. Um and began training.

7:01

Um, and since I had had background stuff, I went right into training, got certified um, in a very very short

7:09

period of time. I was I was FPL with a fully qualified rate and hold sectors in

7:14

about 10 months. So I was an FPL in about April of 1984

7:20

or so here at New York at the New York Trade Con. This is this is Kennedy approach control. Okay.

7:25

There's there's at the time there were four areas uh in there. There was

7:31

Kennedy, LaGuardia, Newark, and I there were four areas and I was Kevin and

7:36

FBL performance, right? Certified. That's correct. Now we call it, pardon me, my throat's a little

7:44

um CPC. CPC certified professional control and CPC meaning that they are certified

7:51

on every control position within the respective area. So at the time we called that FPL, full

7:58

performance level and that was about April of uh 1984

8:04

and um within about uh two or three years

8:11

the FA initiated a U program because of delay orient oriented called

8:18

east coast plan that they were going to redo all the departure and arrival routes and so forth. And um I was asked

8:25

to participate in that and that led to a detail where I was a training specialist over there, a staff position and that

8:32

led to a short detail at the eastern region and um all those things

8:37

cumulative. I applied to be a supervisor here in um and was selected in June of

8:43

uh 1988. In June 88 you became a supervisor here at the center.

8:50

That's when I was selected. I reported for duty 189 January 1st 89 I reported

8:58

for duty here and then uh

9:04

I was assigned to one area and uh worked there for about five or six years and participated in different uh work groups

9:11

and things like that. Um and that is that position you refer to today as an OS or operations.

9:18

Yes, it is. You held that position ever since January 1989 here at the New York

9:24

Center. Yes, I have. What areas have you supervised here at the New York? Area B is in Bravo where I am now. Area

9:30

C for um maybe three years and back to area Bravo.

9:36

Okay. So, two two different areas you supervised here in your tenure at the center. Correct.

9:42

On September 11, 2001, what area were you supervising? Area D.

9:48

And if you could briefly describe us what are the general duties and responsibilities of an area supervisor

9:54

operation supervisor during a during uh a day 7 to 3 a day

10:01

shift or or a 3 to 11 generally a night shift uh the area we're responsible for

10:06

would be control of all the airspace the ultimate authority um responsible for

10:13

the personnel on duty making sure personnel are on duty so forth their professional and personal actions.

10:21

uh in addition to that training responsibilities and um other other sort of FAA

10:29

initiatives, training, recurrent training, uh classroom training, anything that's going on, uh we would be

10:36

the authority for the area on if there is a for example today we have two uh controllers who are up in a in a

10:43

classroom going through our training program and if they had any needs or

10:48

anything that comes up I would be responsible for them as Well, but the main thing of course is I'm responsible

10:53

for the airspace. You're overseeing all of the air that air. Oh, yeah.

10:59

And that involves of course constant uh you know supervision of it.

11:05

Okay. And in the chain of command, Paul, who would you report to directly above you? I would report to the operations manager

11:13

on duty. Is that the Yeah, the one in charge, not the one that's assigned to my area because they

11:18

put guys that are there's five or six supervisors in each area and then each is assigned an operations manager. Some

11:24

operations manager have more than one area, but the person just as me who's in charge uh at the watch desk for that

11:32

particular shift is who I would report to. And that's the operations manager in charge of right

11:38

of all of the shift. That's right. on that shift. And on September 11th, that was Bruce Barrett, right? That's correct.

11:44

So, you would have reported directly to Bruce. That's correct. And um if you know, who would Bruce Barrett have reported to?

11:50

Bruce Barrett uh reports to the deputy. Who's that? Assistant manager. Dave Leates.

11:55

Assistant air traffic manager. Facility manager. Right. Assistant air traffic manager. Sorry.

12:01

And then above Dave. Mike McCormack. Air traffic manager. And how about above Mike? Is he at the top?

12:06

No. Well, the region. I mean here in New York. Yes, he is. So then Mike would report to the region.

12:11

Correct. Do you know if you know I mean this might not be a fair question. Do you know who um Mike would report to at the

12:17

region on September 11th? Who was immediate? Yes. He would report to Aea501.

12:24

Did you know who that was? It's Rick Duchon. Rick Duchon. Did you spell it right? D U

12:34

capital D U capital C H A R ME E

12:40

A R ME Yeah, he is now uh AEA 500. He is now the air traffic manager of the Eastern

12:46

region. And at that time on September 11th, he was AVA 501.

12:52

He was 501. He was acting as 500 because

12:57

Frank Hatfield was on detail in Washington. Okay.

13:05

And Paul before I'm going to do a little nonsequity here to ask you one question and that's based on your experience as a

13:11

pilot. So maybe you can uh help us out on something. I don't believe we've

13:17

interviewed anyone yet as a controller who has your extensive experience flying but we've heard about ELT.

13:23

Mhm. Um, emergency locator transmitter. Do you know from your experience, is

13:29

that um a device that could be manually set off by a pilot or not?

13:36

Not in a 767. Okay. So, not not in in American

13:41

Airlines 11 or United Airlines 175 that crashed. Not to my knowledge. Okay. In smaller airplanes, it it looks

13:49

like a um uh you know what a handheld GPS looks like or what's uh like a walkietalkie

13:57

radio, okay? Like a small walkie-talkie radio. And on the side there's like a toggle switch. The early ones it was

14:03

very easy to hit them and they used to go off like in the Cessnas and stuff like that and the smaller ones all the

14:08

time and you know set off the alerts and of course they updated those over the years. So now it was really they put a a

14:14

bar over it, a safety bar that you couldn't just like a passenger in the back couldn't just accidentally hit it.

14:19

In those airplanes, it's not even in the cockpit. I don't believe that I don't believe it's uh there's any capability

14:26

for a manual override is what you're asking, right? I know an ELT went off early, right?

14:31

I know there's that's like that's a false ELT and it's not even like a

14:37

testing ELT because that's done the first five minutes of the hour. familiar with that

14:42

that we've been told. Okay. From 000 to 05, it's a testing period

14:50

that we the government will not respond to those reports. That's so a pilot can

14:56

test it to make sure the batteries and so forth are working. And this of that was at 45 or 44, right?

15:04

844. Yeah. Let me ask you this. Um if you know on a 767 then how is an ELT set off or trip?

15:12

Is it set off generally on impact? Yeah, that's impact would be to my knowledge that the only

15:20

nothing in here that day that that correlates that ELT to either 175 or 11.

15:26

That could have come from anywhere. It could have come from anywhere. We'll get that signal over a frequency 121.5

15:31

the emergency 243.0 for the military. Um, and there's nothing that came up.

15:39

Let me ask you, and nobody, pardon me, nobody reported an ELT either. So, a lot of times the

15:46

pilots when we get an ELT off the Z5 time period, pilots will report that to

15:53

us and we'll subsequently get the procedure for me would be to get uh

15:59

couple of other reports, report it to the watch desk. Okay? And if they get a couple of reports depending upon the

16:05

altitude and things like that they may solicit lower reports they call RCC and so forth. The process starts on that

16:11

RCC uh air force rescue I forget what it stands a rescue conduct

16:17

coordination center. Yeah, it's it's there for the SARS sat the satellite and all that coordination

16:23

if you know um some it's been suggested um some people we've spoken with that an ELT on a jumbo jet or or a 767 type jet

16:32

could be um I guess set off even on a on a hard landing. Do you know if that's

16:37

true? You know the parameters for that you know um those type of airplanes

16:45

the idea of landing that type of airplane. Um I've flown in the simulator 74 and 70 and 72. The idea of that is

16:55

not is not necessarily to grease it on and the the idea and it isn't to drive

17:01

it through the through the concrete either, but the idea of landing that type of airplane is to get it on the

17:06

ground and you know really it can it can really um sustain a pretty good hard

17:13

land a rough landing for you as a passenger. Say someone say, "Oh boy, that was like a little rough kind of

17:18

thing." Um, and I've seen really rough landings and the ELTs don't go off. So,

17:24

it the sensitivity is not like that. The sensitivity is set in such a way that

17:30

it's going to be a crash. It's going to be an impact of some sort. Um, we had an we we had um I was involved, let me with

17:39

Egypt Air 989. Uh and that was um where they the plane was flown into the ocean

17:47

or crashed into the ocean without making determinations. Um and an ELT did not go

17:53

off. Now the now we didn't let me correct that. The ELT was not received

18:00

now because it was underwater, whatever, you know, but we did not have ELT reports over there. Had we gotten that

18:07

was approximately 2 a.m. that plane went down. We didn't have any verification verification that the plane was lost

18:14

until about 7:15 local because that at that time of year like now it was it was

18:19

Halloween. Um that's when daylight was and they saw debris. Now we and I had

18:25

airplanes. I was the midnight supervisor. The midnight supervisor

18:30

becomes the omic. So I had control of everything. Everything New York center

18:35

owns at that point. And I vetoed I had a a controller vector an airplane off course to go over to the area where we

18:42

thought we last had contact with Egypt there and no ELT report and that

18:48

airplane was at 41,000 which is really high. I mean you get ELTs in New Hampshire from Cape Cod at 41,000 and

18:56

they didn't have it. So that's so back you with your question it's it's it's

19:02

impact it's a big impact on a 76 for an ELT. Okay. Um, if I can take you back now uh to

19:09

September 11th, uh, you report the work and your shift is 7 to three. Is it

19:15

correct? And you go right to area B that day. Yes. Okay. Tell us about uh the events of September

19:22

11th as they unfolded that day. uh with as a general framework uh when you first

19:30

became aware that there was any problems with respect to American Airlines 11 and the same for United Airlines 175.

19:36

Okay. At the um at approximately in the time frame is um

19:42

I'm hope to get it pretty close you know uh fairly exactly. We have detection

19:49

equipment here in this facility in the centers that indicate when two airplanes are too

19:56

close to each other five 5 miles,000 ft sometimes 2,000 ft uh depending upon

20:03

where they are and what airspace and so forth. An alarm goes off on a computer that's also print out in this watch area

20:11

up here. uh when that is violated if you lose separation if if you lose separation or the the

20:18

machine it can be between a VFR and you know and an IFR it can be a number of different things that went off this that

20:24

morning uh I'm guessing about 8:00 it's not so what I have to do when when we

20:31

suspect uh that a controller has had an operational error and so forth is number

20:37

one have them relief from the position get them up we need to talk to them and so on and so forth. If they had an

20:43

error, they may not be legal to work. They may be descertified. They may have had history that's going to eventually prove them uh not qualified to work and

20:50

so on and so forth. Uh we request downstairs

20:56

an what they call an endap, which can the definition up, but what it is, it's

21:02

a print out, a computer printout with targets and altitudes and times. And the

21:08

targets will be lettered A or B. and it will have the history and you can see if

21:13

they make a turn and so forth and the altitude readouts and we literally match the times and the altitudes with a ruler

21:20

and see if somebody's had an error. If that comes back that we don't have in uh

21:26

good indications of where the airplanes were or we measure and it was 5 miles um

21:32

we're done and he goes back to work. If that is not conclusive or it indicates less than 5 miles, we then go to a voice

21:40

tape record everything of course is recorded downstairs. We literally pull the realtore about 1 in tape off. We

21:48

listen to it and see if the pilot reported leaving an altitude or something that would again eliminate the

21:54

need for us calling an operational error. Right. So about 8:00 the snitch go and then the nickname for that is a snitch

22:02

because I just said it and you're not going to know what I'm talking about. The snitch goes off at 8:00. I get the controller basically up. We we finally

22:09

get the end tap 8:15. Maybe it's not conclusive. So I get the voice tape. We request the uh airways facilities people

22:17

to send us up the voice tape. So about maybe about 8:20 or something like that,

22:23

I put another I put a controller since I was the only supervisor on duty. A controller in charge.

22:29

Remember you said you were the only supervisor on duty in area B. Yeah. Okay. So I put Avana at Dallas

22:35

in charge. I give her a briefing. I tell her what's going on, blah blah blah. The controller is already out. So I'm going

22:41

to get the tape and listen to the tape and and begin the investigation of the operational error. I'm out in the

22:46

cafeteria talking to the controller. What happened? what did you blah blah blah did he report what happened? I'm

22:51

waiting for the tape and about um 8:35 it's like 10 or 15 minutes or so. Um

22:59

that should that's about the time when you sense that okay you know the the tape should be ready and delivered back

23:05

to watch desk. So I I walk um back in to the back into the control room floor to

23:11

the watch desk and here's right here is where Bruce Barrett sits. Okay. Have you guys been out there? Yes.

23:17

Okay. Here's where I am. Here's where it was. Okay. And um so I

23:22

walked back and and he's got the the reel right there. So I said, "Great. You got it right there." I said, "I'll go

23:28

listen to it now." And Bruce said to me, "Hang on, I got something else going on. I need you back in the area." So he

23:34

said, "We have a possible hijack." So I said, "Okay." So I go back to the area and I there

23:41

map is not marked correctly. This charting uh map. Um let me turn this

23:46

around.

23:52

It's R42, D42, R 429.

23:59

I think you're going to find it. That's R56. And this 431 that's not marked would be

24:04

D36. So, it's important there is one position and it's about on this length right here

24:12

between Wolf Gang and myself. about five feet. I'm working a radar position and Wolf

24:18

Gang's working a radar position and this is a handoff position normally, but it would but it's not staffed at that time.

24:26

My handoff person sits on the You're right. So the handoff sits to the right of the controller. Both rights. Exactly. Okay. So anyway,

24:34

so I walk back in and Evana has um the area and Mark Merrced is working R56

24:43

and uh um Evana briefs me basically on what's going on. I assume responsibility

24:50

for the area again. Take watch with Mark and kind of kneel down right

24:58

to Mark's left right between both of them right here. And um we indicate the

25:03

primary target this and that he's following as a primary target. Do you know what the call sign is for it

25:08

at that point? Yeah. What? American 11. Okay. And um uh they informed me of some

25:15

conversations. Uh he's having conversations with Boston. Who is the controller?

25:21

Mark. Mark. Mark. Mark's on R56. Dave's not in it yet. Okay. Dave's on R42, but Mark's Mark's

25:28

having conversations with Boston and he has a headset on. So, I'm not hearing

25:33

I'm only hearing what Mark's saying and um it's basically okay 29. Okay. Okay.

25:39

You know, whatever. Like, we're getting one end of Mark's conversation, right? So, of course, Mark basically

25:45

the indication is the last known Well said. That's exactly right. The last

25:51

known altitude was flight level 290. Okay. So, um, everybody's aware of it.

25:59

Dave's aware of it. Check with him because it's going to maybe go through his airspace a little bit. He knows about it. And it kind of comes down from

26:06

Kingston. If you want behind you, Paul, the map. Um, and there's the American 11th path.

26:12

You Yeah. Okay. And here's the boundary. This this line

26:18

is the boundary between Boston and New York. And he's coming down like this.

26:23

And from about here over just west of like this is sector 42

26:30

where D was working and over here northeast like this with Kennedy that's where Mark's working. So we have an

26:37

aircraft. So anyway so the airplane is right about where that arrow is about when I'm in there. Everybody's aware of

26:45

it. We we we're we're protecting 29,000. In other words, we're not going to get

26:51

within 2,000 ft. 29 is when it changes to 2000. So do you know at that point that there's

26:57

been no radio communications with the aircraft and approximately how long you heard at that point that they had not

27:03

had radio 15 I think 15 minutes 15 or 20 minutes and this is now this is probably about

27:10

um probably about 8:40 this is how about the transplant they give you any information on that whe

27:16

No transplant was off and we were told it's a primary target only. Okay. So,

27:22

um, so, so anyway, everybody's aware of it. One other question. Go right ahead.

27:28

Um, do they also give you information about course deviation at that point? Yes. Yeah, he's off course.

27:34

Way off. Oh, yeah. Because he Yeah, because he's he was uh I think J49 or I don't know.

27:39

I'm not sure what his original flight plan was, but he was not supposed to come through our area. Did you know he was destined for Los

27:45

Angeles LAX? Uh, no, not at that time. I didn't. But you knew he was not supposed to even

27:50

come through your area. Correct. And a lot of the Boston Center traffic to LAX, United 175 does come

27:58

through our area. And we will have the strips on them. Okay. We did not have strips on American 11.

28:04

And therefore, our computer doesn't know American 11 from a hole in the wall because we're not supposed to know about

28:11

him. Um, so we know he's off course. They don't know where he's going. The last known was flight level 290.

28:19

And there he is. And my people who need to know.

28:25

And they're tracking the And they're watching. They're not tracking, but they're watching. Watching where it's heading.

28:30

Yeah. The R42 controller Dave

28:36

started a track on him, a computer track on a primary. We're not going to get

28:42

mode C information, altitude information. They've started to track on him just to keep an eye on the primary,

28:47

but the primary was very good, clear on Mark's scope. Everything was very clear.

28:53

So, in order to kind of validate whatever the best we could do, I asked Mark to take an airplane that was

29:01

southwest of Kennedy heading northeastbound. It was an Eagle 936, I think it was his

29:08

call sign. It was an Eagle. Mhm. and check him to flight level 310, which

29:15

we did, and kind of run him by the American to see if you can get a visual report of

29:21

where the American may be altitude wise. Absolutely right. It could be anywhere from the ground to the ceiling, right?

29:26

We It could be anywhere, right? We don't know. The last known was, which when we say last known, that we know

29:33

that it's unverified, right? So, we we're not really sure. We're protecting 29, but he could be anywhere.

29:40

Less known just means at some point in at some point in the past he was at That's right. And we're not counting him

29:46

on being at 29. We're not we're not um uh running airplanes deliberately

29:51

underneath or above him. We're going to actually stay clear because he could be at anything legally and we know that.

29:57

That's why last known is different from he's he was at. So I'm trying to run an

30:02

airplane by him at 31 to determine an altitude. So I asked Mark to do that and

30:08

he did it and he did an outstanding job. He gave a vector and then he adjusted it one time and he just went to the perfect

30:16

eagle just went to the left of the American and that was probably

30:22

um 10 or 15 miles maybe northwest of

30:27

LaGuardia approximately to best of my recollection and all that. Um, and to our shock, he

30:34

said, "I don't see him." Now, just so you know, you run an airplane by

30:40

somebody 3129, that's like a tractor. You and you driving a tractor trailer by me, you know, not even on the LE like on

30:47

Vets Highway where there you will absolutely, positively, unequivocably

30:52

see that traffic, especially a 767, any type of airplane you'll see. And he

30:58

didn't see him. So that was to major trouble, major trouble for us. So at

31:05

that point and right of course as soon as he passed the American, Mark turned him right on course and so forth and got

31:12

him got the eagle back out of there at that point. Why you say major trouble? Because he

31:17

didn't see him. Because now we don't know what altitude he's at. Now he's flying heading right

31:24

for a extremely busy air traffic part of

31:29

the world. There are lots of airplanes at lots of altitudes

31:36

all over the the myriad of Kennedy, LaGuardia, Newark's flows and

31:44

the different altitude structures would take me hours to explain to you. There's just traffic everywhere going in every

31:50

direction at different altitudes. So, it's just, you know, mindboggling as

31:57

to so where he is, what altitude, he could be high, could be low, whatever. Can I stop you one second? Ask you

32:03

another question. I'm trying to get the full understanding of your full

32:09

situational awareness. So, I want to ask you about another factor. At this point in time when Mark Massage turned back to

32:14

this Eagle flight to get a visual altitude sighting of the American 111 airline, had you up to that point in

32:21

time heard anything about either firstand or secondhand about any

32:27

threatening communications being overheard from the cockpit of American Airlines 11 by somebody up in Boston?

32:33

When we first when I got back to the area, the first thing was was no.

32:40

The first thing was we just think we have a hijacked airplane. The situation was presented as and what we knew in

32:47

that area was we have a possible hijacking because we hadn't again it

32:55

wasn't confirmed. We didn't have any voices from the cockpit or anything like that. We were they were Nordo nonradio.

33:02

Um the transponder had been shut off for some reason. So it's primary only. primary only.

33:10

We're not talking to the pilot. He's off course and we're not sure where he's going

33:16

and in a normal in an and a possible hijacking if you were not. So the answer is at

33:23

that point you weren't told about over here over here in the topic when I returned to the area

33:28

when you got back to the area when you heard about the topic during this during this time that you working with

33:34

Mark right you was it prior to or after Mark directed the uh the Eagle flight to look

33:41

for American if you remember I don't remember okay at or about that time yes

33:46

okay this all happened Um

33:51

everything from from uh from the time I got back to the area to the time they

33:57

appeared American appeared basically in our airspace about 15 northwest. The first thing we did you know made a

34:03

determination to vector somebody over this was you know everything I've told you so far is like a minute or two.

34:09

Okay fair. So the so the eagle comes up maybe like two now it's two or three minutes now the eagle goes now meanwhile

34:17

at the next sector next right where you know where Wolf gang sitting he's

34:23

telling me that he's getting reports this is Dave now from these pilots uh Delt saying there

34:29

was something going on at Boston and so on and so forth um not the United transmission yet

34:34

right but you know there was something going on at Boston and Dave was like hang on we're aware of it because Dave was right

34:40

on top of, you know, sitting right next to this with I'm looking now. We don't know what the altitude is. And now the

34:45

mindset and the um stress level and so forth in the area,

34:52

you know, right from me, uh because I generate that sense of urgency to the

34:57

area and stand out in the middle of the area and basically say, "Oh, hey, now we

35:02

don't know what altitude this guy's at." Now, I've got about three sectors now that are going to be involved that have

35:08

traffic. Just my sectors. We don't know what. I have to tell the watch desk what's going on and so forth. We don't

35:14

know what altitude he's at. So, now it's definitely our procedure. Stay away from

35:20

this target. Not under, not over, nowhere near. Turn your airplanes out of the way, avoid and

35:28

so forth. Okay. So, I'm conveying that message rather strongly and loudly and

35:35

boldly and demonstratively uh to the area.

35:40

Um, one uh detail. Um, was it it was represent

35:49

you as to I did. Okay. And which controller was it was

35:55

also 1% who uh initially tagged for primary? No, the tag.

36:00

Yeah, it was the other sector. Okay, that's I want to separate that. Now we you know the the reason um to

36:08

sort of get up close and personal on that scope is you're only following a

36:14

primary blip and it's critical that you maintain super eye contact and stuff

36:19

with that. Um we saw the just we've seen. So, and that primary stayed up pretty

36:25

well by the way for us. So, you know, we have we had pretty good returns. It was nice weather and everything else like

36:30

that that day. But after working in the Tron, you can always lose a primary and they're slow. Uh you know, in the in the

36:37

Tron you have MTI gate that you can set and what that tells the radar is to look for moving targets or look for

36:43

stationary targets. So, you can turn it down and I could show the World Trade Center and all that other type of stuff.

36:48

So that sense of keeping an eye on that primary was important. So we lose the altitude on the mode. Uh we know we

36:55

don't know what altitude Americans at. This is about 15 milesi north west of LaGuardia. And um so now I'm now in the

37:04

middle of the area telling everybody, hey, we now we don't know what he's at. Watch it. I'm telling

37:09

the 68 controller, which is right across from him, right over here. Um and it um basically

37:17

you know like he's going to come down he has departures that come down out southwest of Kennedy.

37:22

Okay. Uh right he's getting traffic that comes

37:27

out you know comes down this way and goes over you know and so forth. So tell the 55 control they have traffic that

37:33

comes out and goes approximate like this to Robinsville and then southwest or northwest like this out of there. So now

37:40

you know so now I've got four out of five sectors. The only sectors that that I not worried about is you know where

37:47

why isn't the mark it's 39 over here 55 has this here at Robinville 68 is

37:54

underneath this they go down this way. So now everybody four out of five know

38:00

and they need to know. So now so now I'm now I go right back kneeling down with Mark Merrced and we're watching the

38:06

primary. I'm like, we're keeping an eye on them and we lose the target. And we lose the target um right over Manhattan.

38:14

Disappears in the screen. We lose the primary. And I'm like, when a target goes through a normal

38:20

terminal radar, when it goes directly overhead the radar, you you lose the target. It goes into like they term the

38:26

big bang or whatever. It comes out of the radar center right over the direct top of it. Um so you lose it for a

38:32

second or two. But here, you don't lose targets here. Here is a correlation of radars that give us a return and an

38:39

average. And that's why our separation's a little more. It's not as accurate, but you you don't lose. If they go over one, you still have the other that are

38:45

hitting. So I said, I'm kneeling down. I said to Mark, Mark, that is weird. We lost them right over. That's I said,

38:51

that's Manhattan. I said, the only way you lose a target there is if they're low. No, we don't. How? Well, you don't

38:58

know. We don't know anything. Now we lose the target. So I'm like, damn, we lost it. So now I tell it 68, hey, we

39:06

lost that target. Now we don't know where he is. The whole area now, you know, I'm like not going crazy, but I

39:11

mean I'm I want everybody to know what's going on. I lost the primary target. I don't know where he is.

39:16

Totally in the blind. Right. So now I have nothing. Now this is major major trouble.

39:22

Now you don't know latitude, longitude, direction. Now we now we we have nothing. So it's

39:27

just luckily it's VFR. Tell your pilots, keep your eyes open, whatever. If you see anything, just every I want

39:32

everybody to know what's going on. It's kind of that's that's an important part of my job there to keep the controllers

39:38

informed, let them know exactly what's going on so they can make the appropriate decisions that they need to.

39:44

And um what happened next, Dave?

39:50

Okay, at that exact point, Dave says to me, I can't talk to this United. I can't I've

39:57

lost this United. So, run over. Where is he? At that point, the target the the

40:04

data block was still there, but it wasn't tracking an altitude.

40:11

Okay. So, if you look on the um Sator and you

40:16

watch it, you'll see that he's there. He is 31 with all this all 31. Then all of a sudden, boop, no altitude. Boop, no

40:23

altitude. Boop, no altitude. Boop, no altitude. Now the computer has lost the capability to track that airplane

40:29

because it's lost. Is that called coast when coast? No. Yeah, it went into coast after four

40:34

hits. Okay. And then it'll say CST on the data block coast to tell you that I can't find this

40:39

target. The first four hits it kind of figures out where based on the history

40:44

the track would be. So it so the computer says, "Okay, you're going like this, this, this." Okay, so even though

40:51

I don't have it, I'm going to guess the next one's here and I'm going to guess it. Right. And and for the record, four hits

40:56

each hit is 12 seconds. So that would be about 48 seconds. Yeah. Each hit is Yeah. five a minute.

41:04

Okay. Okay. Right. So it's So it's about like that. And um but he notices it. It goes

41:11

to coast track and then I'm going to say maybe 15 I have to look at the Sator again. A few seconds later um Dave calls

41:19

him and Dave's not getting him. So within that minute from the time that lo

41:24

he loses it and so forth, he calls him and he tells me he's not getting them. He lost it. Then,

41:31

so I run over to him and we look and it's a different transponder code that

41:39

comes up called the limited data log where we get the transponder code and the mode and the altitude uh is there

41:46

and Dave says that's United 175 and of course we look at the strip and I said he's he's on the wrong code you know

41:53

what happened Dave goes I don't know you know and he was at 31 now he's at like he went up to like 338 eight and now

41:59

he's like coming down again, you know? So he's like now I don't know what's going on almost. Now the chief and the deputy are

42:06

in the area by now. Who's the chief? McCormack. Mike McCormack and Dave Leage.

42:11

And Dave Leage is a deputy. Now they're in the area at this time. So we're watch they're in area B now.

42:17

They're right They're standing like basically like right behind me as I'm right up there with Dave. We're watching

42:23

he goes the United goes down and starts a turn. So now he's descending.

42:29

Mhm. Now Dave Sector,

42:34

if I could freeze you for one second, Paul, right up to this point. Yeah. Have you heard anything more about

42:40

I was just about to say that. Okay. Go ahead. Yep. Just a second. All right. Go ahead.

42:45

Here's 39. Forget that line. Forget that for a second. Here's 39. Just for the

42:50

record, you point to a high high sectorization map. Yeah. This is um um

42:57

this is yeah this is a ZMY high sectorization map. But what I'm saying is sector 39 goes all the way down here.

43:04

I don't want you to think that this is not sector 39 here at 55 lays over top of 39.

43:09

No no they're side by side. Oh they don't they both own up to flight level 280

43:15

28,000. Okay. and down to um about here. Right

43:21

above them and also up there, but right above them at 29 and above is sector 42.

43:30

Still on this map doesn't quite portray what you just said. 42 owns up here at above and altitude that another

43:36

departure sector owns below. They own 24 and above here. Okay. Okay. And they own 29 and above right

43:43

above 39 and 55. Okay. 39 and 55 is they they have

43:49

different bottoms starting out due to different points but essentially they own up the flight level 280 and then 42

43:55

where Dave's working above it above 280. Correct. So United 11 is coming down

44:01

this route right here J80. Okay. At 31 now he's descending. So 28

44:08

and below is another sector. So I need to tell the other So I need to tell 39.

44:13

Okay. Okay. So I'm telling so now again you know this is all within minutes now this

44:21

is probably within two minutes after we lost the primary on American 11. Now the

44:28

airplane is coming down um probably about this intersection right here is our departure fix Elliot and probably

44:35

right about Elliot now we're seeing him descending. Could you show us where it is on the UA 175 map? That track

44:44

right there. There's a triangle right there. And that's before the United 175

44:49

makes the sharp left turn. Correct. Oh yes. Okay. About probably about 10 miles 10 miles

44:57

on these maps, but um it's probably 10 or 15 miles. Right there is where he's

45:02

descending. So now my concern is this side is descending.

45:07

So I have to tell sector 39 and unlike American 11, you do have a good fix on

45:13

United. Exact. That's why I know that's This is a whole different situation

45:19

where there's a lot of unknown there and we're kind of moving airplanes out of the way here where we know

45:26

exactly where it is and we know exactly who to tell and what airplanes to move because the mode C transponder is still

45:32

on. Right. We're going to walk in a different beacon code. But right, Dave has connected that new beacon code to

45:39

United 175's call sign. He didn't have to. No, he didn't. They went on a different transponder code,

45:45

but we're going to see the limited data blocks. He had that option to look at limited data blocks on his setup on his

45:51

scope. It has we don't have any data block that says United 175. Nothing.

45:56

Just the limited. We have four digits and an altitude.

46:01

So right away I'm saying is he knew even though it didn't have the call sign on that limited data block they

46:08

associated that limited data block to be United. Oh yeah he told me that's

46:14

yeah it was clearly it was clearly him. It was not there wasn't any of like he had 50 airplanes and I think it was this

46:21

one you know it was like he was pretty well there alone. The only traffic he had he had the spot nailed exactly the

46:27

coast track and follow the coast track and what that word you used you know the computer figures out the assumption of

46:33

the next position of the projection you know and so forth so he's still on course but now he's

46:39

beginning a descent finally and of course I'm telling the sector now he begins the turn now at this point right

46:46

here someone had come back from the cafeteria and said or we had gotten a

46:52

report somehow we had found out any area right about here before the start of the

46:57

turn but after he started this like knew United was not doing what he was

47:03

supposed to be doing, right? He could have gone to another transponder code if he was level at 31.

47:09

It would have because of losing a primary would have been a little bit a lot, you know, like one thing going on

47:16

is is is kind of an accident. The two things going on is a little bit too much

47:22

irony. But when he when he started the descent there again bingo trouble and that's

47:30

when we had heard through some source that a small airplane had hit the World

47:36

Trade Center when you heard that

47:41

what thoughts that the information that I had at the time

47:47

at that time was this I had eyes there which one you

47:54

I lost the primary. Okay. I know exactly where I lost my primary.

48:01

Okay. Overhead. Okay. So therefore, I knew it was.

48:09

So at that point when somebody came back from the cafeteria and told you there's a news report of a small aircraft

48:15

crashing into the World Trade Center, you immediately equated it not to be a small aircraft but to be American 11.

48:21

That was lost. Okay, it's too there was too much coincidence

48:27

involved from for my reasoning at that point in the middle of the situation. But more importantly, now I had an

48:34

active another active airplane deviating with a lot of traffic coming out in this direction and climbing.

48:41

Okay. And that was really going to be the skill level to miss this one. So it

48:47

starts the turn. We're running. I'm running around basically. Watch him. Watch him. Watch him. Everybody's

48:53

turning airplanes. Um, he gets he gets to about here, he gets turning and

49:00

my job is also is safety and control. And at this point I am feel like that is

49:07

being compromised in my area. So I order all the controllers at this point stop all the traffic. Stop

49:14

everything you have. Don't take another airplane. Don't take them from Boston high on route. They'll take them from

49:20

the Treycon climbing out. I don't want any airplanes in the area till we get this under control basically. And um so

49:28

so anyway, I give that again fairly demonstrative, you know, sort of leadership at this point. And um

49:35

United's turning and we're doing everything we can and you know, of course it's chaos, you know, um sort of

49:41

there's a lot of yelling and screaming, vectoring and you know, turns I'm doing this turn back and forth. There's a lot of controller activity in the area. I'm

49:49

coordinating it. I'm watching the target. I'm running around. And the case is related to an effort to clear all other aircraft in the area out

49:55

of its path. That's right. And we don't know what its path is. Okay. So now that So now United gets you know

50:01

you know at this point that he's not head anywhere near the west headed to the west coast. No, he's supposed to be going down this

50:07

way and not that way. He gets to about here right between the

50:13

J6 and the J48. He gets right to this area right here. Paul, if you could just

50:18

I'm sorry. Can you give a general location? Like what part of the city or

50:23

the state would that be? Okay, that's that's New Jersey. Uh this is Allentown. He's uh 20 miles southeast

50:31

of Allentown. Okay. Turning to a southeasternly direction. Okay. Okay.

50:37

Uh and he is descending. is out of his uh and there and this is an obviously

50:43

extremely abnormal uh situation. Even if the pilot was in trouble, there is a

50:51

transponder code that he could put in even if he lost his radios or everything to tell us that he has an emergency on

50:57

board and that he could put in 7600 if he lost his radio and 7600 if he lost his radio just radio. 7,700 at the end

51:05

of emergency and if he were being hijacked 7500. Exactly. Okay. So, so we know these

51:11

things and he didn't he wasn't doing that. He was on he was on a limited data block and we couldn't talk.

51:16

What were you and your vast experience both as a supervisor controller pilot?

51:22

What were you thinking was going on at that point in time exactly what's going to be? Well, again, this is the point right

51:28

here. You know, you take the words like right out of my mouth at this exact point right between J6 and J48 when he was

51:35

making this turn after he passed out. And the city is up here. This is what I'm I'm thinking. He's going, you know,

51:42

thinking he's going for the city. Okay. This is the point right between J6 and J48. What's J48? What part is it? What

51:50

what town? Well, it's okay. It's uh it's probably Pennsylvania. This is close here, you

51:57

know. It's 20 miles uh northeast of Pottstown

52:03

is the best way to put it. Um at this point right here um you know

52:10

again the assumption of what the information we had I lost an airplane was a small crash this now I've got this

52:17

kind of deviating um I'm saying it for myself

52:22

for the city. Are you thinking at that point catastrophic mechanical failure or hijack or something else?

52:28

No, I'm thinking you're thinking I'm not thinking anytime mechanical failure at that point when when he makes

52:34

I never did. When he makes the left No. Oh, the airplane was flying. The descent, the speed.

52:40

At what point in time, if you could pinpoint, you were starting to think that United was probably just

52:45

just that. At that point when he started the turn, where was Bruce and Mike at that point?

52:51

Bruce is at the desk still and where's Mike? Mike is right with me. And Dave, that's awareness that you had

53:00

at that moment was then transmitted to Mike. You might have the same awareness at that moment.

53:06

I turned at this point. I don't know if you have my other statement, but I turned to Dave Lage. Your other statement?

53:12

Yeah. Which not this one? There's another one. There's another one. I have a copy of it. Okay. I turned to

53:18

Dave Locates and of course I'm thinking you know this at the time I'm thinking to myself this is I'm gonna say

53:25

something that's bizarre but I turned to him and I said scramble McGuire now McGuire's an air force base in

53:32

New Jersey air base now you told you said Dave or Mike

53:37

Dave Dave um

53:42

scramble okay right you ask who you saying get milary fire.

53:48

Yeah. Okay. Because I'm thinking it's a hijack like the other one. I know I know almost

53:53

positively. Um and we also have um I just didn't tell him at that point but

53:58

look I think this a hijack. No. Okay. I just said scramble maguire but the inference.

54:04

Yeah. But you know and and I have to say that you know Maguire doesn't have

54:09

fighters. They have tankers and they have you know and but who sometimes there's fighters there. There's Atlantic

54:14

City. I'm trying to think you know like I just scramble. In other words, like we got to shoot this guy down. He's going

54:19

to go for the World Trade. I didn't say that, but that was the inference. So, you're thinking of like what's the nearest fighter base? Will we get some

54:25

help? You know, and if you if you look at New York City and so forth, there is no near fighter base and so forth.

54:31

Let me ask you one other question before you continue with what happened with United 75 after you said to Dave, you

54:37

know, steam some fighters from a wire. Um, I asked you, you know, when you thought United 175 was a hijack and you

54:43

explained to us when you thought it was a hijack. If, and this may be difficult to do, but

54:49

if you can parse out American 11 and for one second make believe that American 11

54:54

didn't happen on September 11, it was a single episode. So, if you didn't have the the sort of the background history

55:00

that American 11 was lost and that you heard a report of a crash and that you thought that was American 11 that hit

55:06

the trade center, if it was a single episode, would you still have thought that United 175 was a hijack as opposed

55:12

to some sort of catastrophic mechanical failure or other explanation at that

55:18

same point in time? You're exactly right. had had not the history of American 11 gone on at that

55:24

point I would have thought there was an equipment problem with him and I would have thought he's he's gonna I would

55:30

have notified my guess would have been a 767 he's going to land at Kennedy why

55:37

because United has a big maintenance base there why because I've been there okay

55:42

so I would have thought this guy's in trouble something happened electrically lost his radio for some reason he's on a

55:49

weird transponder code and we're going to I would have in the old days treated

55:55

that like an emergency and notified everybody and told Kennedy possibly knew

56:00

it to get ready in the old days. You mean you would have done that on September 11 if American 11

56:05

had ever happened? Well, you know, again, we didn't have confirmation confirmation that we had

56:11

American 11 hitting the World Trade Center. However, you know, the in, you

56:16

know, that the information that I had to me indicated there was too many coincidences and you know, there was

56:23

like probably three of us in area B that knew that could put that together in the

56:29

world that said, you know, if you had you had to see where we lost American 11, you had to know a report that a

56:37

small airplane, forget the small airplane witness, you know, you could have a car accident right out here and there's six of us in the room and

56:44

four of us would see it one way and two would see it another way or maybe there'd be six different you know

56:49

versions of it what type of car so when you say somebody like a small airplane hit you know what's a small

56:55

airplane what does Dave do if anything he doesn't he doesn't appear to do anything

57:00

when you talk about Maguire does he leave the area he doesn't he he he just uh he turned

57:06

and walked away from me now I don't know what he did he could have done something I don't know do you know what direction he went

57:12

he may have not even heard me but I Okay. You know, I don't he he never acknowledged or responded in any way to

57:19

that statement. Okay. If if I could for sure on this very point, I've got the statement, not the

57:27

statement, excuse me, the transcript of position R55, which then Chris Tucker and Chris is communicating to R9 and

57:35

he's pointing out the uh the 3321, which is the code, the new code, the new code.

57:41

Yeah. and to RO9. He says, "That's a hijacked aircraft. It's an American Boeing 757."

57:47

Uh, based on your presence that day and Chris not being here, do you have any idea why Chris got the idea it was an an

57:55

American 757? Chris was um and he's talking about United, right? Uh, yeah. The point was

58:02

the 3321. Well, there's no beacon on American, so he had to be talking about I think that was the United's new code.

58:08

I sounds really Yeah, it was the United was it was the one you guys were watching that Dave particularly I had

58:15

equated to 175, right? Why would he say it's it's it's it's it's it's a bit spirious.

58:22

Uh you can intuitively believe that he meant it to be the other way around, but this is what they tape caught.

58:28

Okay, he is he is in the corner. He is we're over here and he's down now. It's

58:34

only, you know, it's not that far, but there's a lot of action going on in the area. Chris has a lot of airplanes. He's

58:43

not He's doing a lot of talking on his 55 was busy. He's nine.

58:48

He's 55. He's telling nine. He's telling the Robinsville guys coming out. The TWWA that came really close.

58:55

Okay. He's got a lot of traffic going out like this. He's got guys climbing that he's turning, you know, he doesn't, you know,

59:01

whatever. He's busy. He's got an age. He talks rather loudly. I'm not I'm trying

59:08

to be as polite, professional as I can here. And he said something that he

59:15

didn't know to be fact. He was listening to bits and pieces. And it appears I mean he shouldn't have made anything.

59:21

It appears to us that he's talking United and he definitely talking United and he's confusing it with the American

59:26

situation with the 11. He probably thinks the guy he didn't know. He would not have known of a

59:32

31,000 ft traffic on J80 uh that's descending. He that airplane never comes

59:37

in as sector. He would have known who it is. And you're referring to which airplane? United 175. I'm sorry.

59:43

And he would have never known about him. And since the data block, the full data block was off with the name,

59:48

right? And the data block he's looking at doesn't have U or American or anything. Yeah. It's just got 30, what is it? 3321.

59:54

It's just got 3321. And the altitudes going through there are 29 28. right where his right where he is

1:00:00

climbing all his and just just for the record as we look at the transcript with the benefit of hindsight it's A53 when um R55 makes the

1:00:08

statement that it's a hijacked aircraft it's an American Boeing 757 correctly

1:00:14

and we know now that it's been reported that the first world trade center was hit by American 11 at 846 or 7 minutes

1:00:20

before this comment yeah we look we looked on that it was it to us it looked like 4702 is when we

1:00:26

lost the hit to be honest with you when we give or take a minute to according to our timing and clocks and

1:00:31

stuff. So, but but even within that period, it's incredible how fast that information went because if they hit it

1:00:37

46 or 47, we had that information um you see um north of Potan about 20. See, and

1:00:45

that's at 53. So, um so a minute or two before that, so at 52. So, within five minutes, maybe four minutes, um we had

1:00:53

the information in the area that an airplane hit the World Trade Center. An airplane hit. Now small airplane

1:00:59

and you don't know still where American 11 is. Stop and confirm legally speaking. Absolutely right. We

1:01:08

don't we don't have verification that it's America. That's why I told you the Egypt air story. We didn't have

1:01:13

verification positive. The point being that that what is being assimilated in bits and pieces is that

1:01:19

something hit the World Trade Center. There's a fire at the World Trade Center. small plane hit the World Trade Center, but no one has on the floor said

1:01:25

it was an American 11 that hit the the trade center. And and you know, we're trying to read into Chris's mind a

1:01:30

little bit. So Chris has this image. He has the 3321 with no correlation to 175,

1:01:36

right? Uh we're just trying to gain a sense of why he said what he did. Could he have

1:01:42

been thinking 11? Yeah, I don't know what he was thinking. Okay.

1:01:47

It was tough for her to ask you that because he was I that's why I he was busy. He

1:01:53

was doing his job and and it's hard to listen to anybody even talking right next to you when you're really

1:01:58

concentrating when you're busy back and forth with the pilots. But the air but that was obviously American that was

1:02:05

obviously United 175 he was referring to because his previous statement was a reference to the 3321 and that would

1:02:11

have been that would be the operating state. Here's a copy of what um if you want it. Um

1:02:17

when did you read the statement? I want to All right. Um I did this after the fact. When we were Let me jump

1:02:24

ahead. After this was over. I cleared I I shut down all the traffic. I combined the

1:02:30

sectors up and I got people into relief the controllers on duty because everybody was really, you know, Chris

1:02:36

Chris in particular was very affected by this. Um Chris Tucker. Chris Tucker. We went upstairs. We were

1:02:43

told to go upstairs to the main conference room. We were we were somewhat sequestered um and not allowed to speak to anybody.

1:02:51

We were told don't call home. Don't say a word to anybody, you know, about anything that's going on until we come

1:02:56

in and get statements. So, who's we who's the we saying? Everybody on duty. Every all the

1:03:02

controllers that I had on duty have a copy. Who's telling you not to who? Oh, management. you know, like there

1:03:07

there was a there was a a manager, Bob, who uh was was um not an operations

1:03:13

manager, but he was one of the office managers here, and they asked him to

1:03:18

sort of guide us through this process. Did they who asked Bob to guide you

1:03:24

through the process? Is that they here or is that I would Well, it's it's I'm not uh it's

1:03:30

probably here. Uh I don't know who exactly told them, but it's not abnormal procedure. or something happens like

1:03:36

this, they we're going to give statements. If if two airplanes come too close, uh, everybody writes statements

1:03:42

and stuff. So, something like this, obviously, planes going out of the way, something hitting the World Trade

1:03:48

Center, we know this is going to be a big deal. I mean, who said, if you can remember, was it

1:03:53

one or more people? And if you remember, who who was who were the people saying, listen, don't call home. Don't do

1:03:58

anything. We have to bring you upstairs. I think that was well Babot was the one who was giving sort of u myself and the

1:04:05

group the direction. Okay. Now where he was getting that from you have to ask him kind of thing.

1:04:11

But it came to you from Bob out. Yeah it came to the group from Bob out with me there. The first place they sent us was the

1:04:17

annex outside. There's a another building out there room one we were sent out to and then they wanted us more sequest. So they got us up to the

1:04:24

conference room. Does it make sense just timewise that we sort of finish the story with what happened the the

1:04:29

ultimate fate of 175 before we go to the statement or this is uh no this is well I'm doing a

1:04:35

uh timeline and where we are in the in the 175 story is is here and again I'm

1:04:41

pointing to about 20 miles northeast of town the United has made the turn southeast

1:04:48

and that is the time again that I have made this assumption again um that

1:04:54

perhaps This is going to be another situation where an airplane sitting the World Trade Center and we have to stop this airplane from hitting the World

1:05:00

Trade Center. Are you thinking at that point he's going to head to the trade center? Yes. And what when he goes by?

1:05:06

Yes. To turn towards Manhattan when he starts turning southeast now. Not even towards Manhattan yet. And and Mike would have known.

1:05:12

He's heading to the coast. That that information would have been in Mike's head at that same time because he was near you.

1:05:18

He had that he he knew what United 175 was doing at that time. Mike did at that time. at the same time

1:05:24

he was kind of watching too and this 853 I was letting everybody know he's southeast I mean it you could have been

1:05:31

a blind man and listened to me and you would have known what was going on okay so I made so I made this so the reason I

1:05:36

want to talk about that statement was we this is like now uh 9:30 or4 to 10 or

1:05:41

whatever later and we're up in here and now it comes time for us to do the statements well now we know that the

1:05:49

buildings have been hit fallen yet and I'm around I'm a management guy and I'm

1:05:56

I'm there's, you know, 15 or 20 controllers in this room. So, what I say

1:06:02

about, you know, military events is something that I said to the deputy quietly. I'm not sure I want everybody

1:06:08

in that room to hear or know or write and I don't know who's going to see my statements and stuff like that. So, I

1:06:14

sort of turned to Bobot and I told him this and he said, "Fine, we'll we'll write it down later."

1:06:20

So what I put is, you know, during today's uh tragic events, I was asked to give an oral statement concerning my

1:06:26

actions in reference to the American 11 United 135. Let me let me jump ahead. Did you give a verbal?

1:06:33

We did a written and then we went up to the old operations man another place

1:06:38

where they had a tape recorder set up and it looked kind of like a um like a

1:06:44

karaoke machine. Mart Marty Forier who's now a supervisor recorded those with

1:06:51

Bob. We took verbal statements from the guys and like eight of eight of us

1:06:57

whatever and the the players Mark Merrced, Dave Betiglia, Chris Tucker,

1:07:03

Tony Palary, um some of the the guys who were working the positions and myself

1:07:08

these are all area B people. Oh yeah. Who were involved in one one aspect or another of American 11 or 175

1:07:15

right? So they wanted so for whatever reason you know because of the enormity

1:07:20

of the issue they wanted oral recordings as well that is rarely done. Okay.

1:07:26

Rarely done you know I don't I can't even think when they would Did you give a verbal record?

1:07:31

Yeah. Okay. But I didn't want to say because of who was in the room exactly everything I

1:07:37

felt I didn't so I wrote. Why did you think it was I mean is it sensitive or Well I felt it was sensitive. I I'm not,

1:07:43

you know, I felt it was sensitive and it was a it was uh something I said uh

1:07:48

privately, you know, as quietly as I could to Dave Leates in the area and stuff like that. And I I'm not sure I

1:07:54

wanted, you know, everybody in that room, the controllers to know that I had said something about scrambling in the

1:07:59

military. Why? I don't know. I was I was, you know, upset at the time and, you know, who

1:08:04

knew what was going on and what, you know, was going on and, you know, I was just whatever. I didn't want it to be

1:08:10

public knowledge. So anyway, there were numerous non-management personnel present during

1:08:15

the recording. Because of this, I was reluctant to repeat a statement I made to Dave Leates. After all, the

1:08:22

non-management personnel left the recording room. I stated for the record to Mr. the statement I made to Leates and all I said is Scramble Magcguire.

1:08:29

And at this time, we knew the hijacking of American 11 and further received confirmation of an aircraft crash into

1:08:34

the World Trade Center, which is where we had lost radar contact with American 11. Furthermore, United 175 was not

1:08:40

replying to air traffic control calls and it began descending and turning eastbound. That's exactly where I just showed you. As soon as he made that turn

1:08:47

eastbound, that was it. I knew it. I was frantically trying to coordinate and separate this off course aircraft from

1:08:53

other known aircraft. And u as the aircraft turned northbound along the Jersey coastline,

1:09:00

I knew what was going to happen. But I mean, just so I'm clear, there was nothing like sensitive secret of

1:09:05

information about Meguire Air Force. No. I just turned to Lease and said scramble book look he couldn't have even

1:09:12

if he had even let's talk two years ago there was no we didn't have the

1:09:18

capability the communications or or hotlines or anything like that set up that we could pick up a phone and

1:09:24

scramble fighter aircraft to shoot down commercial airplanes I mean I had I

1:09:29

asked McGuire or any place else right Magguire's a bad I know McGuire's a bad choice

1:09:34

well when you when you said that on September 11th to Bill K scrambled with why. Did you did you have a thought that

1:09:41

if they did scramble from there that that they would be shooting down the 120 at that time?

1:09:46

If I had had the authority if if and and if anybody was in my position knowing

1:09:52

what I knew at that time, seeing what I was seeing at that time and you know

1:09:58

with the background that I have and stuff like that and if I had the authority I would have I would have

1:10:03

ordered that plane shot down. Were you aware that there were procedures in place on September 11th

1:10:12

for providing for military response to reported hijacks? Yes, because I had I had worked at

1:10:18

Kennedy Approach Control and we had had hijacks over the years, particularly from Europe come over with fighter

1:10:24

escort. And what did you understand the military's role to be on September 11th if if they if they were requested to

1:10:32

assist in responding to a hijack? same same notific same procedures where they would fly above and behind the airplane

1:10:38

up and behind the tail and so forth. Sometimes a flight of one, sometimes a flight of two. Uh we had actually used

1:10:45

this procedure uh the we the FAA uh with Payne Stewart's the golfer's ljet who

1:10:51

went out um there was fighter escort on him uh the whole time we were tracking them and stuff. So um this this was not

1:11:00

um while unusual it it was not it was not it had been done in the past

1:11:05

and under those fighter escort rules and protocol yes if you know yes

1:11:10

is part of that protocol the ability to shoot down an aircraft at that particular time um

1:11:17

my guess would have been that that decision would have to probably come from the white house I don't u I would

1:11:25

have doubted sincerely that a fighter pilot would have that um

1:11:31

that that operational uh permissibility to do that on his own. I I would think

1:11:36

that that would have to be directed. Let me just show you. See this is chapter seven of the document the FA

1:11:43

provided was smart sensitive as part of the tape should be classified sensitive SSI. It's order 7610.4 special military

1:11:51

operations escort of hijacked aircraft. Did you ever um did you know I guess one

1:11:57

did you know this document existed and then two had you ever seen it prior to September 11? No.

1:12:02

No. Um we we would that's correct. We would

1:12:08

control it. Just to uh go over I guess it says the FAA hijack coordinator.

1:12:13

Mhm. And then in parenthesis, the director or his designate of the FAA office of civil aviation security on

1:12:18

duty at Washington headquarters will request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked

1:12:24

aircraft to a assure positive flight following, b report unusual observances,

1:12:30

and c aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. Yeah. And that's the FAA. That's what we're that's what our responsibilities

1:12:36

are. You need to go to the military to see what their and then it goes on as to request the service the protocol. request for

1:12:43

service. In fact, the escro service will be requested by the FA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the

1:12:49

national military command center. So, so the way that would probably go on is this our I would report to the watch

1:12:57

super the watch uh omen what's going on. He would report that to the region. The

1:13:04

region would make the call to the air traffic manager at the region. He would make that determination to call

1:13:10

Washington. Now we have through uh flow control we have more of a Washington

1:13:16

command center setup more for flow. When I say command center it sounds military in the sense that this would be a bunker

1:13:23

headquarters or something like that. It's it's for flow control but information like this everything gets

1:13:28

filtered to them and they I would suspect would be the ones to report that to the hijack office and so forth and

1:13:36

then what procedures they follow from there. There's also another document I just

1:13:41

want to see if you were aware of it September 11th. It's chapter 4 air piracy crisis management handbook.

1:13:47

No. Okay. And basically the purpose of this uh chapter 4 is supposed to be to the

1:13:52

purpose of this chapter is to establish FAA responsibilities and procedures to facilitate and coordinate new response

1:13:59

to an air piracy injury. Right. So this is not something that you were in your position as an operation

1:14:04

supervisor were making. No, my job my job would be more to relay the

1:14:12

information about what is happening operationally, altitude, direction, so

1:14:17

forth. Any any understanding on September 11th as to how your role in responding to a what

1:14:23

you believe to be a hijacking scenario would be to tell your supervisor and let them pass it up the ladder, so to speak.

1:14:29

And if I was on a midnight situation, I would I would know exactly what ladder to pass that to from that desk as well.

1:14:36

Okay. That's exactly right. See, and if there were communications from the aircraft,

1:14:42

um, you know, and I've been involved with hijackings and so before, and it's and it's more like we're going to Cuba

1:14:48

or whatever. It's like, and we are trained not only as uh controllers, but

1:14:53

as supervisors to coordinate and facilitate those requests.

1:14:59

Now, just on that note, you have participated in or or have witnessed other hijackings in the past. Um, none

1:15:05

of them obviously involved Friday November 11th crashing, taking a plane and crashing into a building. That's correct.

1:15:10

Had you ever heard of that scenario being suggested as a possibility by

1:15:15

anybody, either someone in the FAA or someone else? No. Crashing airplanes into buildings.

1:15:21

Yeah. No, we heard of terrorist hijackings, of course, but not not to use as weapons.

1:15:27

Not to use as a weapon of mass destruction. Okay.

1:15:32

I'm just taking a second to read which you just gave us. I not seen before.

1:15:57

Okay. So you're telling us now um if you bring us back in time Paul you're so I say so basically say at this point

1:16:04

back to this I say you know we are we're missing this airplane for the best part

1:16:10

I mean it's you know it's again a situation where the

1:16:15

airplane is doing something that we're we're not in control of and the typewritten statement you just gave us

1:16:21

towards the end of it it says as the aircraft turned northbound along the New Jersey coastline I knew what was going to

1:16:28

What was it that you thought was going to happen? I I even said to Mark Meret because I was back with him in 56. I said he's

1:16:33

going to go to World Trade Center. He's going to hit the World Trade Center. I was that was the first communication after Dave and I said scramble. I think

1:16:40

I think we all probably knew that in the area. I was probably stating the obvious. Uh but I was kneeling down

1:16:46

again with Mark because now he's coming down and this that now he's in 56.

1:16:52

We didn't quite get there, but that would have been like the next sector went back to Mark and then of course we watched the L2 put down and it was I

1:16:59

mean we knew we knew the last several minutes before he hit. We knew he was going there and we just felt, you know,

1:17:06

I I say it to somebody that it felt like you're you're watching like

1:17:12

a car drive off a cliff and it's floating floating and you know what's going to happen and you know what the

1:17:19

result's going to be and there's nothing you can do about it and you want to do something about it and you're watching and you're watching and you're watching

1:17:25

and you're watching and you feel so helpless and uh you know upset about it

1:17:31

and then of course by this time of course um after United did hit um

1:17:37

confirmation from the cafeteria and other sources whatever was nearly instantaneous.

1:17:43

So right after cell phones maybe you know Mike and Dave were on phones you know a lot during that and uh they got like that. Did you

1:17:51

watch the altitude on United go all the way down? Y to what point did you watch? 2200 feet was the left. I mean

1:17:58

they were flying that airplane that he was high. I mean they were very very high and at the end he really had to

1:18:04

push that nose down. I mean they were in a very high rate of descent and the speed was way up way faster than America

1:18:11

was. How many knots do you re Oh, I'd have to I'd have to guess. You know, I you mean I'd have to guess 350

1:18:19

400 knots over the ground. I mean, they they they were high and he had that nose down. The targets were just jumping. I

1:18:26

mean, they were like I've worked a Concord and all sorts of stuff like that. And uh it was like similar to a

1:18:31

Concord going out with the speed way up. And after you lost the target, soon after then, if I understand you

1:18:37

correctly, was reports came to you or you heard that the Second World Trade Center was hit nearly instantaneous.

1:18:43

So, was there any doubt in your mind what hit the Second World Trade Center? No. 17 United 175.

1:18:48

Absolutely. Um, let me ask you this. Um, you're in the area B. You're not looking at a TV.

1:18:57

Um, so you don't really know what's going on in the outside world specifically. And

1:19:03

even in the World Trade Center, correct? And you have you don't have a view as to you're not watching the fire in the

1:19:09

trade center. I don't have a visual, but I have a I have a mental picture. Is that what you mean? Yeah. You have a mental picture, but you

1:19:16

don't have a visual. You're not watching TV. You know, you can't look at the towers. But um at the point in time when

1:19:22

when you thought you and potentially, I guess you're saying others may have also been thinking he's headed right for the the trade center. Um did anybody

1:19:30

make any suggestions about maybe to get some word uh to law enforcement or

1:19:37

directly or indirectly to get word to the trade centers um that they thought the aircraft may be headed right for it.

1:19:44

We didn't do that. Had I thought it absolutely. Did we say tell them he's

1:19:50

coming? I mean when he's at Pottstown, I was like tell him he's coming and who?

1:19:58

No, I'm I'm I'm saying and I'm not suggesting that it's something that somebody should have

1:20:03

thought of because there's a lot going on. It's even if you know, you're right. There was more than a lot going on when

1:20:11

when the airplane turned. This was a deciding point for me when he made that turn, personal, whatever, early, late,

1:20:19

whatever. That's when I made the call. shoe them down, you know, help stop save

1:20:28

the people of New York. I mean, I even had a thought, you know,

1:20:33

and I'll say it for the record of running another at that time. Stop them.

1:20:39

You had that thought in hindsight today. You're saying then you did you convey that thought to anybody

1:20:46

that was in your head? Yeah. Okay. That was to your knowledge. It was already Did

1:20:53

you realize how bizarre and strange it was to me to even say like scramble me? I mean that is I mean to me that's

1:20:59

really strange and that's why I felt uncomfortable. I didn't want to say that in front of

1:21:05

privately and and Bob wanted it written down and signed because you know he

1:21:10

wanted for the record and he know initial he I have a thing from him that I gave it to him. But um but to your

1:21:18

bizarre enough to say to your knowledge um neither yourself nor anyone in your area um suggested

1:21:25

that somebody try and contact someone at the World Trade Center centers or law enforcement to get people out of there. I I know the command I know that u I I

1:21:33

would assume that the chief and the deputy on the phones were relaying everything they could to the operations

1:21:39

center and the region and the region was notifying the proper law authorities and

1:21:47

so forth. My job and I'm not trying to I know you're not even at me. No,

1:21:53

the best thing that I can do for everybody is report exactly what

1:21:59

this airplane is doing and in my use my background to tell them what I suspect

1:22:04

is going to happen. It was it was a great turn and descent and flight except

1:22:10

he was a little high there. I'm telling you, if you had me in a simulator, you know, I mean, they did a good job. I

1:22:16

mean, they turned and did it. I mean, it was all visual, but except for being a little bit high. So looking at that

1:22:22

profile what they did it was projecting ahead I mean you have you know and if

1:22:29

you could maybe I'd have flown complicated and taught complicated instrument procedures with one engine out under a hood and all that

1:22:35

kind of stuff. So looking at this and making a determination where he was going to go was rather simple. Let me ask you this then. Um you know if

1:22:42

you could if you could give us an estimate ball Yes. Um I realize it's two years ago. Um,

1:22:49

in terms of when the impact occurred, how many minutes prior to that in your mind did you think he's headed to he's

1:22:55

trying to hit the trades the other the other World Trade Center? I think he did. Were you think he was going to hit

1:23:01

the other tower? I I just One of them they're going to crash him to the World Trade Center.

1:23:06

Okay. And what how many minutes? I wasn't thinking of any particular tower. No. How many minutes before impact would you

1:23:11

say you were thinking that when I knew it or right there? I and I'm gonna say that that was um

1:23:18

seven minutes. About seven minutes before he met Okay. And it was uh a tough seven minutes

1:23:27

because you obviously have to watch. It's been a tough two years. You have to continue to watch the scope and see what he's going to do and

1:23:33

report, right? I mean I mean that's what I'm trying to say and maybe I did if I'm repeating myself, you know, whatever. But that's

1:23:41

what that's the best thing that I can do at that point is report what that airplane is doing. What I think it's

1:23:47

going to do. But you know what I think it's going to do is conjecture versus fact. And my job really is to

1:23:54

report the fact. And the fact is here he's going and make sure the guys on the cell phones are known. They're

1:24:00

communicating with hopefully the right people. And you know look for for the

1:24:06

record. Can we get you to as precisely as you can describe this point for us?

1:24:12

And is it about this time or was it even earlier in the turn? No, it was it was about this is Potbound

1:24:18

and and this would be north up here. So, I'm going to say this is about 20 miles. Just rough guesstimate.

1:24:24

But at that point, he hasn't made the turn uh northeastbound toward the city.

1:24:30

Right. That's correct. He didn't go I thought he went actually all the way to Robinsville and I saw the Sator. They

1:24:35

didn't quite make it all the way to Ryville. You got this is a departure route. I mean, these opposite direction

1:24:40

departure routes. These guys are climbing out. I mean, it was like, you know, I use this analogy in the past. It

1:24:46

was almost like a Keystone Cop movie where they're driving the wrong way down street. People are jumping out of the

1:24:52

way. It was point point to me on the map here. At what point did you think he was headed towards the trade center to crash

1:24:58

into it? Okay. Let me ask you a question. At this point, why would you be thinking the World Trade Center if

1:25:04

because he hasn't even made the turn yet northeastbound? Right. He wasn't. You're right. He wasn't exactly aimed at it. But in order

1:25:11

to make the turn to get not not that I was thinking he was going to get lined up, he's gone off course. He's

1:25:17

descending. I've already had this situation over here. I'm you know there's a maybe a handful us of us at

1:25:25

this point that know guest surmise conjecture that American 11 has hit the

1:25:31

World Trade Center hijacked the airplane now I've got another problem with an airplane

1:25:37

I just took it very early and whatever John for the for the record that point

1:25:43

that he's describing on the radar returns is at about 85436

1:25:51

854 36 854. So at 7 8 minutes a pretty good

1:25:57

guess actually. Yeah. What are we calling it? 01 or 02

1:26:02

02. Oh actually um I think the technical data shows the impact was about 03.

1:26:08

Was it 9003? We showed 02 01. But again give or take a minute. I'm

1:26:15

telling you. So you're anticipating it was chaos for the next, you know,

1:26:20

this is going to be three minutes here. This is going to be three and that's going to be like four.

1:26:26

So before he's what I'm what I'm trying to establish aimed at him before United 175 made the 180 and turned back towards

1:26:32

the northeast, even before that last hard left turn, you thought that he was going to head towards the trade center

1:26:38

and crashed the plane. Okay. Absolutely. I'm nodding. I'm sorry. We're on tape.

1:26:48

Um, okay. We are

1:26:56

you we've already gone over that. If American Airlines 11 had not occurred

1:27:01

first that morning and been reported as a hijack and lost, you probably would

1:27:07

have thought United 175 was headed for an emergency landing. Yes, I would have thought it was a an equipment problem. uh and not a

1:27:14

hijacking. And the reason I would have thought that is because he still had his transponder operating

1:27:20

little, you know, uh we were receiving a transponder beacon. So therefore, in my mind, his transponder is working. Uh why

1:27:29

it went to a different code would have been questionable and he wasn't squawking an emergency uh or radio

1:27:35

failure code or whatever. So that was it was that was a little bit unusual. on

1:27:41

September 11th and prior to that, how would a controller have detected a hijack situation?

1:27:46

All right, the number one we talked about would be the the pilot would literally tell us either through airto

1:27:53

ground communications or if he was not permitted to speak on the radio and and permitted to do that

1:28:00

there through his transponder, specifically code 7700

1:28:06

emergency. If it was specifically a hijack, right? um saying a hijack. How would you control

1:28:12

that detected a hijacked on 911? Again, the same way through communications and there are code words

1:28:17

that we use. And let me stop you there and you go through each one. But that didn't happen on either aircraft on September 11th.

1:28:24

Right. Right. Okay. What's the next way? Through the transponder 7500. And that didn't happen.

1:28:30

Correct. That didn't happen on on September 11th. And what other ways to detect a hijack?

1:28:37

Uh that's all. Okay. Communication somehow. So, but neither of those happened on

1:28:43

September 11. Correct. Would there have been any other way to

1:28:49

try to detect a hijack on September 11 given the training up to that point in time since we didn't get this since the

1:28:56

pilot didn't send the transponder signal and since the pilot didn't to uh to confirm a hijacking

1:29:03

or to suspect? We'll start with suspect. All right. Um what happened would have

1:29:09

been uh a primary target or an airplane that um full data block limited data

1:29:17

block primary target an airplane that is not following its uh course its clearance altitude route whatever that

1:29:25

we're not talking to. So you're saying that a way to possibly suspect it would be if it was Nordo

1:29:30

off course off course and had no transponder or change. Yeah. The transponder could have been anything. Could have we could have had a

1:29:36

could have left it on. Could have been a full data block. And he's and we have an airplane that's supposed to be going westbound over Hancock um coming down

1:29:44

our way. So we don't know why you're saying even two factors could lead one on September 11th to suspect a

1:29:50

hijacking. Those two factors are no radio communication and ser and deviation from course. Right. And of course transponder.

1:29:56

There's a third one. And of course, but you're saying suspect without knowing, right? Oh yeah. the plane's flying is going off

1:30:03

course and we don't know why and we're not talking to him. Um I we would lead that to BIVO.

1:30:09

Now let's stay in the preseptember 11th world. Um with that was there any way to confirm a hijack without getting either

1:30:16

the 7500 signal on the transponder or some verbal no covert or overt confirmation from the

1:30:22

pilot? No. Um what procedures would a controller have followed in a hijack situation uh

1:30:28

pre 911? The controllers's first job would be to um of course listen to the

1:30:34

communication. Say let's take the communication aspect of it. If a pilot reported a hijack, the

1:30:42

controller's first job would be to get the information and where do you want to go and so forth. The second thing they

1:30:49

would do is report it to me or whoever is in charge of the area at the time. The area supervisor. Yeah. Right. And what what who would you report it

1:30:54

to? The watch desk. We go through very similar procedures that what we do. I would report that to like a Bruce

1:31:00

Barrett. That's the OMI position. Your operations manager in charge. Right. And then would you leave the the

1:31:06

followup of that to the Yes. And who would be responsible if you know

1:31:11

within the center to request military assistance pre 911?

1:31:17

I don't know. Okay. I don't think I don't I don't believe that the operations manager uh

1:31:24

would be doing that. uh we we are some it wouldn't have been your wouldn't have been as you understood it wouldn't have

1:31:30

been your response it certainly would have been not have been the operation supervisors and I doubt it would have been the operation

1:31:36

manager maybe the chief I think it goes beyond that you seem to have some familiarity with

1:31:42

um the military is that fair enough to say yes on September 11th and prior to that for

1:31:47

that matter were you familiar with Northeast Air defense yes did you know what their role was if any

1:31:53

with respect to a reported hijack Well, they they had the quadrant much like we have the sectors and we looked

1:31:59

at the maps like that. Northeast was NORAD's, you know, this was NORAD's map,

1:32:05

if you will. And yes, they would have participated and uh they have in the past, although if uh if you had asked me

1:32:14

who Northeast is prior to that, I probably wouldn't have been able to tell you. I could tell you NORAD pretty well.

1:32:19

Uh specifically Northeast and all that, we weren't. Just curious, not that it's your responsibility, but if you had a

1:32:25

emergency situation and you needed to contact NORAD or NEADS in a pinch, would you know how to do that pre 911?

1:32:32

Well, I would have to go to the watch desk and it would have to be about five or six phone calls made. No, there's no

1:32:37

If you wanted to bypass that, would you know how to would you have a phone number in your head or that you could go find?

1:32:44

No, I could call a local Air Force base is the best I have. And the only reason I have that is because we have a

1:32:49

restricted area where the A10s go in and practice bombing. Um, we talked about I think there there

1:32:56

were exercises prior to 911 um that controllers were um actually trained I

1:33:03

guess. Were there dynamic simulated exercises that you're familiar with that controllers go through training? No. Okay.

1:33:08

Did you prior to 911 uh have any training regarding the detection of hijack any FAA training on how to detect

1:33:15

hijack? Yes. What are those? Communication. I mean training. Were there any

1:33:20

exercises? No. Tabletop computers? No. Simulations. Yeah. Simulate dynamic simulated

1:33:27

situations. No. Meaning you as a operation supervisor? How about as controllers? Do

1:33:33

controllers undergo that thing? If you know they we we undergo training. This this was I think it's probably just easier

1:33:39

for me to tell you what we had. Yeah. Tell me what you had pre 911. Pre 911 as a controller and as a soup but

1:33:45

soup goes a little bit beyond it but as a controller your your information with

1:33:51

reference hijacks was this A get the information and pass it

1:33:56

B cooperate cooperate cooperate cooperate

1:34:02

if they want to go up sit there they go wherever they want to go and we move traffic out of the way that was our pre

1:34:09

911 hijacking mentality and I think we would you agree that over

1:34:16

the last 20 years prior to 911 there weren't many interest in hydra since after the 70s after the mid70s

1:34:24

probably like through the 80s yeah the last 20 years I would agree that there were very few

1:34:30

so were there there would be if there were very few um for a controller to

1:34:36

respond to in the real world um what I'm asking is were there any exercises or

1:34:42

drills No. Okay. No, there was very little emphasis on it. It

1:34:47

hadn't happened in a long time. Most of these controllers are uh 10 years relatively and stuff like that. They

1:34:53

probably never seen them. Um so you're not aware of any pre 911 exercises

1:34:58

sponsored by either the FAA or the military or some combination of those entities related to hijackings,

1:35:05

right, that either you participate in or have knowledge of. Correct. None. Correct. Okay. Um, how about All right. So then I

1:35:12

guess that would encompass there were no exercises involving multiple hijacking scenarios, correct? Prior to 911.

1:35:19

How about post 911? Has that changed? Is there training regarding single or multiple hijacking events?

1:35:26

Uh, I haven't actually been through any myself. You haven't yourself? Do you know of any controllers there? I don't believe we haven't done any

1:35:32

exercises. We meaning we in New York. I don't believe in New York center. Okay. Do you mean like when they when

1:35:38

they have real aircraft to simulate like they're being that would be one example that's one example I mean real life

1:35:45

exercise when they have real life or and I also am including tabletop exercises computer simulated dynamic simulated

1:35:52

exercise we have the the only review we have gotten is what to do in case of a hijack

1:35:58

in case of a known hijack and what is that what we didn't have a we we never had a known

1:36:03

hijacking in all of this in what in all of United 175 and American 11.

1:36:09

What do you mean we didn't have another hijack? We were told even when American went into the World Trade Center,

1:36:14

right? Okay. That it was a suspected hijacking. Who told you were told that by

1:36:20

Boston Center? There was no confirmation. Remember Boston Center, America never told Boston Center that

1:36:26

they were being hijacked. American 11 never squawkked 7500, right? So, how do you know it's a hijack? Well,

1:36:32

do you know did you find out at any point after at any point either on STEM 11th or afterwards that there were

1:36:39

people in Boston had overheard conversations in the cockpit. They were very Yes, I knew that and pilots reported

1:36:44

that to my controllers who reported that to me threatening and even United says like bubble blah stay in your seats. So, we

1:36:51

suspected, so I want you to make sure that you know we're on the same page.

1:36:56

Reference what we suspected, what we assumed, an intelligent decision based

1:37:02

on the facts known. We New York, we me and New York. Okay. Yes. I We were

1:37:07

treating it like a hijack. America, United 175, we didn't have time to treat like a hijack. We were missing him with

1:37:14

other airplanes. We were too busy missing him to sort of treat it like a hijack. But you just said a few minutes

1:37:19

ago, Boston said it was a suspected exact, right? Unconfirmed. Unconfirmed. Okay.

1:37:26

But years the the things we were just talking about, communications, transplant codes, those are confirmed.

1:37:33

I understand that. And that's a you know, that's a difference. Somebody can say to you, I

1:37:39

have an emergency. And treat it like an emergency. Somebody can say to you, I've lost an engine. I have two engines. You

1:37:45

know, I need I'm going to land. Are you declared an emergency? No. But when we say as a soup, I say treat him like an

1:37:52

emergency. So in that So there's different ways being confirmed. Let me ask you this. After American

1:37:57

Airlines hit the first world trade. Yes. We now know in hindsight. You say as soon as you heard about this

1:38:03

the report of the small aircraft, you had your feeling was that's American. Yes.

1:38:08

And with regard to 175, it was even more definitive and more real time. And what I mean by that is almost instantaneous

1:38:14

to you losing the target on 175, you heard there was a crash at the trade center and you immediately equated that

1:38:19

175. Correct. Would it be fair to say at that point that in your mind at least those two were confirmed as having been hijacked

1:38:26

or intentionally run into those buildings? Well, not confirmed hijacking because again that that phraseology was not but

1:38:34

I treated them like a hijacking. In your mind, if I said you were those hijacks at that point, what would you have said?

1:38:40

Absolutely. Oh yeah, I would have said I'm treating it like a hijack, but I don't have confirmation. Did anybody Did anybody say to you after

1:38:48

the impact of American 11 and after the impact of 175? Did anybody say to you words to the effect, don't

1:38:55

treat it, don't call it a hijack? No. Until we confirm it's No, nobody said that. We're just

1:39:02

trained. I mean, you know, it's not like that big a deal. We were I wouldn't have done anything different if it was a

1:39:08

confirmed hijacking versus a suspected. Well, let me let I'm going to tell you why I asked why I ask you that question.

1:39:13

There are there were some reports that surfaced which you may or may not know about. I don't after

1:39:20

8:46 now 8:47 say, which is an approximate time of the impact of American Airlines 11. At some point

1:39:27

after 847 when American 11 we now know hit the trade

1:39:32

on that day later that day there was some reports within the FAA we believe or reason to believe but outside the FAA

1:39:38

based on some things we you know we've seen and heard okay that American 11 was still airing.

1:39:44

Do you know anything about those rumors or reports? I've never heard that. In the New York center based on your

1:39:50

involvement on 911. Do you recall anybody saying at any point after the

1:39:57

report of the small aircraft hitting the World Trade Center, do you recall anybody saying, "Hey, you know what?

1:40:02

That might not be American 11." Oh, yeah. I mean, the the problem is this, and

1:40:08

this is the way we're trained, and this is why I'm so, you know, like technically like it's a confirmed

1:40:14

hijacking or suspected. Now, you know, you can have eight airplanes deviating and you're gonna say like how many

1:40:19

airplanes does it take for you to realize something's going on, right? But is it confirmed? No. But logically,

1:40:26

what I mean, what's your assumption? And there's assumptions and there's confirmations.

1:40:31

We had a primary target and we lost the primary target. American America could be heading American 11.

1:40:37

Oh, okay. We lost the primary target off the radar. American, he could be heading to Bermuda for all we know. Yes. That could

1:40:44

not have been him. Yes, that was it. Yes, that was a consideration. But you know what happened?

1:40:50

United almost at the same time he hits at 8:46 and whatever time you know

1:40:56

United stops talking to us and stuff. It had to be like two minutes later. I mean, it was almost at the same time. If

1:41:03

that didn't happen, we could say, "We don't know where he is." I'd be calling the Washington Center and saying, "Hey,

1:41:09

heads up. I lost the primary. I don't know where he is." Blah, blah. But since United deviated, it was just so much put

1:41:15

together at so close a time that that I had assumed. And and let me tell you

1:41:21

something. I've seen not I've seen actual news of small airplanes

1:41:26

uh hitting buildings like there was a Cessna 172 in Tampa and stuff like that. You wouldn't see a fire from the World

1:41:32

Trade Center. The the system would bounce off the World Trade Center. You know, a small twin engine airplane, even

1:41:39

the ones I used to fly, you there'd be maybe a little bit of smoke. We had gust. There's a major fire in lower

1:41:46

Manhattan. Hello. So, you know, okay, I just wanted so this.

1:41:52

So, yes, it's possible if somebody had said that. Yeah, technically they're correct.

1:41:57

Possible. I ask you, did you hear anybody say on that day, hey, we lost another aircraft, small or large, and we

1:42:04

think that might be the one to hit the trade. Do we call here anything like that? No. So in your

1:42:09

I'm the only guy I'm the guy who said America. This is me. It was I'm the guy who said it had to be American 11.

1:42:16

But I'm talking about other people. Do you hear any other reports in the New York center that day to the effect that it was not or maybe

1:42:22

it was not American 11 that hit with the trade center but a different aircraft? No. Because I'll tell you why. Because

1:42:28

after we got within half an hour we were sequestered. We didn't I didn't even see

1:42:34

it. We went out for like 2 minutes to the cafeteria and all this stuff was on TV and they said because of the

1:42:40

traumatic effect of it, you better get these guys out of here. Do you recall hearing something from outside the FAA center being reported in

1:42:46

outside the New York center coming in to New York report from outside the center to the effect that American 11 was still

1:42:53

airborne after? No. After 846, 847? No.

1:42:58

Okay. Okay. I wasn't I didn't get any reports of any kind. Do you remember hearing anything

1:43:04

about a plane being lost off the kipsy in the New York center on September 11th? No.

1:43:09

Okay. I I'll turn it over to I just got two

1:43:16

very points. Let me go ahead on those. Let me go back to where you very first started. There was a possible error that

1:43:22

took you off the floor and and was additionally charged with CIC. the

1:43:28

position involved in that possible error. Did it have anything whatsoever to do with America 11?

1:43:33

No, that was R39. That was over here and that went only up to 28.

1:43:39

Okay. So, that that position did not play in the rest of the day except to help a little bit or in order to be

1:43:44

informed of traffic. The only uh the only uh other involvement that R39 had is as as I said when United 175 was here

1:43:52

and I'm pointing to um Elliot and when he was we were looking for him in the

1:43:58

coast track and all that was going on just about underneath was United 93 as a

1:44:04

departure. Okay. Normal departure. Uh no nothing out of the ordinary whatsoever.

1:44:10

Okay. Uh was not was position 39 closed down or was not closed? I didn't close

1:44:16

positions down in the area until

1:44:22

well I had issued the order to stop everything uh probably about 8:54 855

1:44:27

and it was probably about 15 or 20 minutes later even after United hit that all the airplanes had left the airspace

1:44:34

and when each when each air when each sector was clear of aircraft I combined

1:44:41

it and we have different combination proced Just one other uh technical point or a minor

1:44:48

point, but what are the A10 based out? Bradley. Bradley is You mean the ones that go into 5,000 R

1:44:55

50002? Yeah, they're they're up well they're not they're Bradley. Yeah, I think they're at Bradley

1:45:01

Hartford. Hartford, Connecticut. Hartford, Connecticut. Okay. So, the A10s here at Hartford, uh

1:45:07

they routinely train with armament, are they? Yes. And in addition to bombs, do they carry guns?

1:45:13

No. I don't think so. It's a bombing type. It's a bombing. Okay.

1:45:19

Um, you gave us this other document today, Paul, that is dated September 11, 2001

1:45:25

regarding the scramble McGuire statement. Are there any other statements other than the one you gave us today and the one that we already

1:45:32

had, which I'm showing you now? Yeah, I don't believe um that I wrote an American 11 statement, and we had asked

1:45:40

them, "What do you want?" um us to write about and I think to the best of my

1:45:47

recollection seriously was the fact that um they had Boston center handling going

1:45:55

to handle the American 11 accident and New York center was going to handle the

1:46:00

United 175. So therefore just fill out a United 175 statement. Let me ask you about that. Do you know

1:46:06

why they let they Boston center was going to handle the when you say handle the accident you mean take all the

1:46:12

statements regarding the accident of American 11 usually the facility that has um control of the airspace or the

1:46:20

airplane that's involved in an incident will do the paperwork reference incident

1:46:26

line accidents well the accident 11 occurred in New York City right wasn't New York center airspace

1:46:33

it was airspace was it well it would it would be New Traycon and then it would be LaGuardia Tower. I

1:46:38

mean you could say that airspace the building is actually you know below you

1:46:44

know u airspace but certainly it's closer to being New

1:46:49

York's airspace than Boston. If you you know if you go up you go through like three different people and

1:46:56

yeah then it's New York's honors but you don't understand what I'm saying but I'm saying ground level. I understand that.

1:47:01

But Boston did the took the statements on American Airlines 11 to your

1:47:07

knowledge, right? Yes. And did that make sense to you being that the accident occurred in New York

1:47:12

City, the incident? Um, it could have gone either way, but mostly so much of American 11 happened

1:47:20

in Boston. It w it didn't strike me as being totally unusual. I was I was a little surprised because I had

1:47:26

involvement and I was never asked, you know. I mean, I mean, let me be candid with you.

1:47:31

Yeah. Let's You guys are the first people that I've ever talked to in over

1:47:37

two years about what went on. Nobody Nobody has asked anything. You're the

1:47:44

first group to come here. I'm And I'm a little I'm just asking this because I'm perplexed by

1:47:49

why why they did the package. Now you say a lot went on in Boston. Well, the airplane was, you know, they

1:47:55

had communication. They lost. They lost transponder. Lost the transponder in Boston. They were making calls to New York

1:48:01

center. You know that that airplane American we never knew what his altitude

1:48:06

was. He could have he could have been. But would you agree that it entered it did enter? They knew after the accident

1:48:13

occurred. Okay. And when these statements were when they asked these statements at that time they knew that American 11 traveled through New York's

1:48:20

airspace New York center and Tron. Well afterwards they knew that afterward. Okay, fair enough.

1:48:27

Afterwards they knew that it went to New York center and Traycon space. Let me just remind the technical point is that

1:48:35

no one ever knew because you didn't have an altitude on it that it was ever in your airspace. Right. That's what I'm saying.

1:48:41

Right. I don't even know. I've never even seen any radar altitude data on American to

1:48:46

this day. But doesn't that defy the reality of the fact that you guys were treating it as if it was in your airspace and were

1:48:52

directing traffic to try to find it and we're clearing traffic as if it was in your airspace. You're absolutely correct. Okay.

1:48:58

And the reason we were is because some Boston center said the last known was

1:49:04

flight level 290. Now what and again what's the mindset of a controller

1:49:09

supervisor FAA maybe in general on a hijacking they're going to go to Cuba they're going to hold people hostage

1:49:16

they want money or something you know not they're going to crash airplanes

1:49:21

they're going to land somewhere and they'll tell us they want to land and we'll cooperate and put it a different

1:49:26

way there was a last known altitude in 29,000 ft correct and that was confirmed at some point in Boston

1:49:32

Boston center told my control of that on landline yes and it At that point there's a transponder on. So that's pretty pretty confirmed information at

1:49:39

some point that aircraft is at 29,000 ft. Probably that's what the controller was getting. It was probably his last

1:49:45

altitude that he saw and that's where they were probably in hindsight. Okay. In hindsight after

1:49:51

the accident occur, is there any way you can get from 29,000 ft in Boston

1:49:57

to hit the World Trade Center at let's say below 2,000 ft? Oh yeah. Without entering New York City. Without entering New York center? Yes.

1:50:04

Okay. very easily. I'll tell you what happens. Did you do that without hitting New York trade guns? No.

1:50:09

Okay. Which puts it in eastern region and not the New England region? Yes. And you're part of Eastern.

1:50:15

I Yes. Okay. Okay. Um, so you were never asked to give a statement specific to your

1:50:22

recollection of what happened with American 11. Correct. Did you find that to be odd involved

1:50:28

with American 11? Yes. Did you ever ask anybody, well, don't you want to hear what I have to say about 11 being crashed, too? And I

1:50:35

was involved with it. Yes. What were you told them? When they want it, they'll ask you for it. Who's they?

1:50:42

The FAA. Who will ask me for it? Who? Well, the they I mean, the FAA is

1:50:47

an empty. Somebody will come to me. In other words, it was like, we're not You don't

1:50:52

need to write a statement. You don't need to volunteer. Who did you raise? Uh, my manager,

1:50:58

Sam Shelton. Sam Shelton. Yeah. And is he still here? Yes. Okay. What position does he have today?

1:51:04

Operations manager. Okay. I said, you know, coordinating administrative, right? That's on the administrative side,

1:51:10

right? He's in charge of every big and everybody, you know, the deputy and the chief all they're all here.

1:51:17

Let me just follow up on that point. So 911's done with and now we're in the aftermath and we're trying to put the

1:51:23

pieces together. What happened? That's no longer on the op side. That's on the admin side to do all of that. Correct. Your boss at that point is Sam

1:51:31

and and your only operational uh relationship with Bruce and Mike has had

1:51:36

to do with the events that day. The aftermath is handled in the administrative change. Correct.

1:51:42

So you never did. So if they wanted So in other words, if they had wanted a statement from me reference American 11, um more than

1:51:50

likely if they followed protocol, they would have gone through Sam and had him

1:51:56

get me to write a statement. if um the verbal statement that you gave

1:52:01

later that morning when you said everybody was sort of brought up by Bob to this room. Yeah.

1:52:06

You wouldn't have any problem if we were to listen to that verbal statement, would you? No. Um I guess lastly, let me ask you Paul.

1:52:13

If you were a commissioner on the September 11th commission and you were looking at making recommendations to Congress and the

1:52:19

administration regard these are the aviation issues. Um, what recommendations, if any, would

1:52:25

you make would you suggest to make the aviation industry even safer than it is today?

1:52:31

Well, uh, you know, I could go on and on about this. First of all, um, security

1:52:37

at the gates and stuff like that, which and a lot of these obviously have been done. Um, I mean, they were more interested

1:52:44

in, you know, you playing a playing a radio when they were taxing out than if you were carrying a, you know, hunting

1:52:50

knife, you know, on you. Um, security at the gates is number one.

1:52:55

Security at the airports. Um, talking about um, you know, I've been on lots of ramps and stuff like

1:53:01

that. This goes beyond my job. Do you want to hear this? Sure. Um, security at the ramps, cleaners,

1:53:08

maintenance people, fuelers. you, you know, it was and I was just on the ramp

1:53:14

at LaGuardia last week, you know, and it's it's it it that's where you're

1:53:20

going to get access to airplanes and stuff like that. When you were on the uh ramp at LaGuardia last week, what did you

1:53:25

observe? I was with an FAA guy. Um, we were in a LaGuardia Tower van and they drove us through and to get to the tower, believe

1:53:31

it or not, you have to drive out into the ramp. Then you walk upstairs to the tower. And um, we it was uh just as a

1:53:39

you know, we were in the back of the van and it was pouring rain. So we were like, "Oh, you're going to have to get out and fill out your names." And we had

1:53:45

we had our IDs and stuff with us. Um, and it was right we just held the IDs up

1:53:50

to the window and they drove us in. So we could, you know, whatever. I mean, technically, if you really want to, now

1:53:56

we're into the post 911 mindset. You know, we could have hijacked that van in

1:54:02

the parking lot, held the gun to the guy's head, held fake IDs up, and you know, we were right out there with the

1:54:08

airplanes, you know, so whatever could happen can happen. Um, so you think even today they ought to

1:54:14

clamp down a little more on Oh, yeah. Ranberry. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Baggage, all that kind of

1:54:19

stuff. That's where the that's when I was a pilot that's what I was always worried about, you know. I mean, I always checked my own baggage locks and

1:54:26

stuff like that, you know. We'd have sometimes we'd have cargo light on and the thing was locked, but you know, um

1:54:32

it's that was kind of stuff that worried us. We were never thinking bombs or stuff like that, but now you never know.

1:54:38

Um but really from the air traffic, you know, if I was commissioner on this, um

1:54:45

I'd say look guys, I'm I'm a pilot. I've got a lot of air traffic experience. I

1:54:50

can address I can be more service to the commission, you know, in those areas. And I just told you like the piloting

1:54:56

part and now the air traffic part um about this is, you know, there's very

1:55:03

little we can do. There's very little we can do except cooperate with a hijacker.

1:55:09

It's still that mentality still basically goes on. Um, what could we do

1:55:15

if if we were in this situation with a very very close I mean if somebody really hijacks an airplane very close

1:55:23

minutes to New York City um it's going to be really hard unless you always have

1:55:29

airborne combat patrols and stuff like that and and pilots have the proper

1:55:34

authority to act. Um and all that is post 911 type of stuff. Uh um we we

1:55:43

communicate better now with the military than we did. Um there is a an open line

1:55:48

at the watch desk with Northeast um and stuff like that. So I think we'd get a

1:55:53

greater response time. But Northeast Northeast Air Defense Nor Yeah. Northeast Air Defense. Um but

1:56:01

if I'm working in this area down here, you know, I'm I either got to call them on the phone or like to me walk over

1:56:07

whatever. There's still a little bit of lag. So your suggestion would be there should

1:56:12

be some hot lines dispersed throughout. It depends on, excuse me, it depends on how much authority they want to give to

1:56:19

an operational supervisor. And and I'm not sure that I, you know, every

1:56:24

operational supervisor has my background, stuff like that. And you really, you guys really don't want

1:56:29

operational supervisor maybe making those types of calls. What you really want is the operational supervisor to

1:56:35

provide the watch desk with instant information. And we have that capability

1:56:40

with phones and stuff like that. You say the relationship the communication's better. I believe you said the military

1:56:45

to the military. Yeah. What about pre 911? What was the nature of that? It was, you know, would have been hit or

1:56:51

miss. I would have gone to the desk looked for a phone number. If we didn't have um dealings with with um an Air

1:56:57

Force base reference to 5002. We wouldn't have lines, landlines at the controller positions on the BSCS on the

1:57:04

voice panel that they have. Uh now we have northeast at only one position you

1:57:10

know and only one sector in my area you know and the h the R and the H you know both have it if he has a helper but um

1:57:17

you know like that kind of stuff that's communications how were the relationship between was the relationship between the FAA and the

1:57:23

military pre 911 in your estimation? I never you know we only dealt with airplanes going in and out of the

1:57:28

practice bombing range in area B. Yeah. And um so they were except for the

1:57:34

military office who would coordinate other activities exercises and refueling things over the

1:57:40

ocean. Uh you know I was involved in the in the Persian Gulf 11 years ago. We had you know desert storm. We moved a lot of

1:57:47

airplanes over and we really I think um through working midnights and stuff like

1:57:53

that really developed a very good relationship with the military. I mean we treated them like first class

1:57:59

citizens and uh they were extremely appreciative of it and you know we all supported their mission and uh felt

1:58:05

compassion you know for our uh people in there and so forth but even now we have

1:58:12

limited direct communication. Uh so I would look into that aspect of it if I was a commissioner.

1:58:18

Any other aspects? Um, you know, I, you know, I think, uh, the only other thing

1:58:24

that I might suggest is, um, if the, uh, uh, manufacturers of

1:58:30

transponders, uh, I mean, they've gotten better. American 11 was, you know, where you turn it off and it's off

1:58:35

and now United was in a little updated model and now it at least goes to a different beacon code.

1:58:41

You know, they could they could use they could maybe update those and maybe have something. Didn't you just say that

1:58:47

United we can code that the transporter that they could not be turned off? I believe that they had the type of

1:58:52

equipment. There's you can guys can look into this. I think some of the newer airplanes, the newer 76s or whatever

1:58:59

have the type of transponders. Let me let me just stop you on that point. We have four aircraft that three turner

1:59:04

transponders one time one changes code which is 175. Yeah.

1:59:10

One of the other two airplanes was 93 which was also a United aircraft.

1:59:16

7 what 57 757 could have been right it could have been 757 767 might have different trans

1:59:23

I think there is I think there's there's an updated transponder you can't turn off

1:59:29

and that might have been on the 767 they but then you also let American 11

1:59:35

turn his transponder off right is that imply a difference between the two companies in terms of No it implies the equipment is different

1:59:42

the transponder may be different 11. Yeah, I think they have an updated transponder that you can't turn off.

1:59:47

I'll always give you for safety reasons. We'll go to a different vehicle

1:59:53

that's told us that. Yeah, that's what I heard. But you you have more experience than anybody else cuz you you're train your

1:59:59

certified pilot. Yeah, I heard that from the pilot side of it, but they had an updated one from the pilot side. Yeah, I think you know possibly research

2:00:05

that. I mean, just you know, why would they change it? It was the the original

2:00:11

code was 40047 147 1470 147

2:00:16

and the new code was 3321. They changed all four digits. Well, they not only that changed it

2:00:22

twice. But I mean for four they made four things. They could have just turned one knob off. So what would you you know

2:00:29

we're asking you to speculate in this speculate question. I'm going to ask question.

2:00:34

I'm going to give you some facts. If that transponder on the United 175 started at 1470, meaning that was the

2:00:39

assigned transponder code, and if at some point during the flight it was changed

2:00:45

to 3020 and then to 3321 almost immediately there after one minute after,

2:00:53

asking you based on your pilot experience specul,

2:01:00

do you think that that was um either a an attempt by the United Airlines pilot

2:01:07

to try and get the code to 7500 to send a signal or do you think B it was the

2:01:14

hijackers trying to shut it off and well now and obviously if you

2:01:20

brought in this new factor that maybe they couldn't shut it off we have to look into that or C that the hijackers were potentially

2:01:27

just trying to change the code just to sort of confuse the mix right it could have been any of those it

2:01:33

could have been all of The first one, if I was flying and I want to change codes, the first code I

2:01:39

would change was the first digit. You would have got 37 right, right?

2:01:45

Okay. The first one. And you know, depending who's sitting and who's doing it, you

2:01:50

know, whatever. It's right here. So, he's reaching down and doing it right by the right to your side.

2:01:56

Right. Right. And almost adjacent to your shoulder. It's like he's going to hit us up the trail.

2:02:02

Right. I mean, if you if if I'm squawking for argument sake 0000 and you

2:02:07

tell me to squawk 42 32 4 2 3 2 in that

2:02:13

order, that's just the way you're trained to do it as a pilot. That's the way you do it. So, if you're looking at

2:02:19

a change of code like that, look at the first digit and see at the first but you but if you didn't get finished with the

2:02:24

first digit, you wouldn't really go to the second digit either, right? The first digit would have been changed. It could have been. I think

2:02:29

it's more likely that um my personal thought Yeah. is that there was no off switch

2:02:38

and they just scrambled it and an attempt to turn it off or it didn't go off and they got maybe frustrated or

2:02:44

tried to, you know, like that was on their little checklist or whatever things to do and they couldn't turn it

2:02:50

off and they got frustrated so they changed it. But you know, you you know, you change a one little digit. What was

2:02:55

it? 1470 was 147. you go to 1471 and it's going to come up a limited data bar

2:03:01

and it's the same the same effect computer is not going to recognize 147 and last report you said that might have

2:03:06

been on their checklist and in that regard um if you go to flight school and you try and take some lessons yes you

2:03:13

learn are you taught pretty early on that if that what the codes are for hijack or emergency and that there are

2:03:18

ways to yeah pretty early on so in your estimation that if the hijackers took flight lessons they probably would have learned

2:03:24

oh they would have pretty early on that the B for their level for that for even to to fly

2:03:31

manually a 767 something like that even though it's a stolen airplane with you know controls

2:03:36

and all this and that um they would have definitely known you know that that that

2:03:43

the pilots were trying to indicate something but I they never I'm sure they never got to that point

2:03:48

they would have known where the transponder was and they would have known Oh yeah and probably in school would

2:03:53

have been taught about hospital perhaps oh yeah Okay. Oh, well, if you you look at the flight track, I mean I mean it was a nice

2:04:00

descent and a nice turn. I mean, this wasn't somebody who was up there for the first time, you know, trying to maneuver

2:04:06

a big airplane. This was this was obviously somebody who had who I mean, the track looked professional almost

2:04:12

except for the descent at the end was rapid because they were high. I have no other questions. And Paul, if

2:04:19

you think of any other recommendations you'd make uh after today, feel free to give us a call. You have our cards. Uh,

2:04:24

that concludes the interview with Paul Thunder. It's approximately 9:42 a.m. Thank you.