David Bottiglia - 911 Audio Interview 1 Oktober 2003

 

Sources:

PDF:

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2610771

Archive.org back-up & Transcript 

Audio:

Part 1:

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/178994844

Part 2:

https://catalog.archives.gov/id/178994844?objectPage=2

Archive.org back-up 2 files

Video:

Part 1:

https://youtu.be/F68FcwDuuoI?si=sUewcp1bZovkl7S4

https://rumble.com/v6y5p7k-david-bottiglia-911-audio-interview-1-oktober-2003-part-1-of-2.html

Part 2:

https://youtu.be/MG62C972yfY?si=caNHkEM9PfPj8TuG

https://rumble.com/v6y5p1o-david-bottiglia-911-audio-interview-1-oktober-2003-part-2-of-2.html

PDF

Commission Sensitive 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center interview 

~ with David Bottiglia 

Type of event: Recorded Interview 

Date: Tuesday, October 1, 2003 

Special Access Issues: None 

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles Kara 

Team Number: 8 

Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York 

Participants - Non-Commission: FAA General Counsel Representative Sandy Lane and 

Julio Enriquez, NACDA Representative 

Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown. 

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of 

the interviewee. Please refer to the recorded interview for a complete account. 

Background: 

Bottiglia started with the FAA on April 1, 1982 in Oklahoma to train and has been at 

ZNY his entire career. He was originally assigned in Area G, which is now D, and first 

worked the oceanic side of the operation. He is certified in all north Atlantic sectors. 

Bottiglia moved over to area B and has been a “Full Performance Level” controller in 

that area for at least 10 years. 

Events of 9-11: 

-= There are no specifically assigned sectors in Area B. ZNY controllers are assigned a 

sector when they report to the radar area. He had just returned from a break, and took 

over as controller at Sector 42. On any given shift controllers rotate areas with breaks 

which are variable and occur every one-half to two hours depending on the work load. 

His shift started around 0630-0700 and was scheduled until 1500. 

Sometime after 0800 Bottiglia was sitting at R42 (East Texas) when Mark Merced , R56, 

Kennedy High Sector — which is adjacent to R42 — asked Bottiglia to put on all limited 

(all primaries). Since Positive Controlled Airspace (PCA), space above 18K feet altitude, 

only monitors transponding aircraft, it takes a specific action to display primary-only 

targets. 

American Air Flight 11: 

Mark pointed to a target on the scope and informed Bottiglia it was AA11. Merced also 

told Bottiglia that Boston center thought it was a hijack. Bottiglia started a primary track 

on the target, and named it “AA 11a”. The “a” distinguishes for the computer a track 

different from the previously established track (AA 11). A controller starts a track on a 

primary by going to the target on the screen and then typing in information at the 

keyboard. : 

Since there was no altitude data associated with the AA 11a track, Bottiglia asked other 

airplanes to verify AA 11’s altitude. He specifically questioned USAIR 583. Normally a 

pilot would not have his TCAS (traffic collision avoidance system) display set for ten 

miles out, but the USAIR Pilot changed his TCAS range to check for the target. He did 

not see AA11. [Staff Note: this is 1240:49Z based on the FAA R42 transcript. ] 

UAL 175 “checked in” on the same frequency as AA 11 “a bit” earlier than this point, 

but did not mention anything at the time about hearing unusual transmissions. UAL 175 

later informed Bottiglia of suspicious transmissions. A Supervisor had taken everyone but 

UAL 175 off the Boston frequency that was isolated for AA 11, and UAL 175 did not 

want to broadcast on the same frequency as AA 11 since then he would be heard by those 

in control of AA 11, according to Bottiglia. His explanation of why UAL 175 delayed in 

relaying the information he had heard from AA11 was that once R42 was heard searching 

for AA 11 the pilot of UAL 175 would feel more comfortable broadcasting what he 

heard. 

Bottiglia immediately called Boston; he had not heard any of the suspicious broadcasts 

from AA11. He also told his supervisor, Evanna Dowis, what was transpiring. His main 

conduits of information to others were Dowis and Merced. i 

At this time he recalled that two airplanes were broadcasting ELTs (Emergency Location 

Transmissions). An ELT can be set off manually but usually happens in case of a crash. It 

is always difficult to determine the origination of an ELT. The hi gher up the target the 

further away it can be heard. : 

Bottiglia was trying to relay the ELT information to Dowis, but then AA 11 disappeared 

altogether as a primary track. Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that it was his opinion 

at the time that AA 11 was no longer at high altitude. He explained that once an airliner 

goes too low en route controllers lose the track. So when AA 11 disappeared he did not 

think anything about it hitting a building. . 

Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that Mike McCormack was standing nearby, and was 

on the phone. Dowis was relaying information to McCormack. Thus Battaglia is sure 

that McCormack had been informed of the hijacking. | 

After Bottiglia lost the radar feed on the primary track on AA 11, Bottiglia thought AA 

11 was flying at a low level, but had no real idea what it was doing. After this point he 

started getting reports about a fire at the WTC. Even with this new information, his 

thought process was still that AA 11 was hijacked and was flying low level. The last 

confirmed altitude on AA 11 was Flight Level 290, and Bottiglia attempted to verify that 

altitude. Merced had vectored an Eagle flight right over the AA 11 track to try and get an 

altitude. Delta 2433 reported it could not see the airplane. Bottiglia believed D2433 

passed overhead AA 11, and this served to support his thought that AA 11 was 

proceeding south at low altitude. This information, the ELT si gnal, and the report of the 

WTC fire were all suspicious; but Bottiglia notes he did not know or think that AA 11 

had crashed. Bottiglia heard someone say that the WTC fire may have been caused by a 

small commuter aircraft that struck the tower. So, even with all these factors plus the 

“disappearance” of AA 11, he did not associate AA 11 with the impact at the WTC. 

Battaglia explains this to Commission staff by noting that just prior to the impact he was 

only relaying information out. He had no awareness of any information regarding 

military notification, or of what Boston was doing, or of what was going on away from 

his screen. Once he realized that there was no apparent traffic conflict with AA11 he 

dealt with other traffic that needed to be handled. 

A few airplanes reported smoke from “good distance” away from the towers, and 

Bottiglia overheard McCormack in a conversation saying a small twin engine aircraft had 

hit the WTC. In Bottiglia’s opinion, a person would have to be very familiar with 

airplanes to tell exactly what caused the first impact. 

United Airlines Flight 175: 

According to Bottiglia, it was right around the time of the confusion about what first hit 

the WTC that UAL 175 went into a “Coast” track. Bottiglia tried to raise UAL 175 on 

the correct frequency. He also called Kingston Sector to see if UAL 175 was on the 

frequency there. Bottiglia noted that despite the Coast track and lack of communication 

he did not think anything was really going wrong with UAL 175. According to him, 

sometimes pilots “just don’t listen”. The mind set at the time was controllers very rarely 

considered a lack of a pilot immediately communicating back to them as a problem. 

Normally a pilot is probably “just doing something more important”. Pre-9/11 the actions 

of UAL 175 were not unusual; and it was not unusual for transponders to change code 

during a flight. 

Bottiglia checked his frequency to see if it was still working — a lost transponder code 

could also be a technical problem at the controller end. He also called Kingston Sector to 

check if UAL 175 was still on that frequency, it was not. 

Bottiglia then saw a change of altitude with the frequency change on UAL 175, and he 

talked to Sector 10 (the sector he would normally hand off UAL 175 to). He had been 

“flashing” (a method of alerting controllers on other scopes) UAL 175 to Sector 10 to 

inform the Sector 10 ATC that he believed flight UAL 175 was broadcasting a 3321 

code. 

Bottiglia became frightened when the code changed to 3321 and he saw the target 

climbing. Bottiglia did not think at first that UAL 175 had been hijacked, but when the 

code changed to 3321, and the flight started to shift its altitude without proper direction 

from its controllers, he started to think UAL 175 might be another hijack. [Staff Note: 

When UAL 175 went into “coast” track it was not squawking 3321. There was an 

intervening code change that lasted about one minute before UAL 175 squawked its final 

code of 3321.] Other factors, such as the hijack of AA 11 and the WTC fire — though 

Bottiglia stated he did not know it was AA 11 — caused him to be more concerned 

regarding UAL 175 than he normally would have been. 

Bottiglia told McCormack the uncertain status of UAL 175. McCormack immediately 

said into his phone “we might have multiple hijacks”. Bottiglia does not know who 

McCormack was speaking with. 

On the radar scope at this point Bottiglia views only the information he has associated 

with UAL 175 — the data block in the coast track. He explained that the coast track does 

not immediately disassociate from the target. Even though a target switches to an . 

unknown squawk the coast will stay with it for a number of radar sweeps. But if another 

plane squawks the same code, the information of a code that was associated with the 

target in question drops off. On the radar screen the call sign UAL 175 stayed on the data 

~ block of the track that was on the correct heading. 

When Bottiglia “flashed” (gave notice of a target) UAL 175 to Sector 10 he did not feel 

a need to speak with UAL 175 again, and was intent on looking for AA 11. There were 

many imperative air tracks near Kennedy, so he was not necessarily worried about the 

western portion of the sector [where UA175 was]. 

Back to American Air 11 and questioning in conjunction with the transcript: 

After 1250 there was no AA11 primary, and Bottiglia had heard about the fire at the 

WTC. He again stressed he was not thinking AA 11 was the plane that impacted the 

tower. He had heard that it was a small aircraft and had heard of an aircraft in question 

that departed from Poughkeepsie - both overheard from Mike McCormack. US Air gave 

a report that it might have been a commuter plane that impacted, which was based on a 

radio report. So, again, at that point the information that was informing Bottiglia’s 

perspective on the air traffic situation at the time led him to continue thinking AA 11 was 

a hijack and was south of the city at a low altitude. 

Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that in his career he may have experienced one 

hijack, and he believes that hijack landed in Atlantic City. Despite this one memory of a 

hijack, Bottiglia noted that, in his mind, hijackers always went south to the Caribbean. 

Eventually, as the events of the day progressed, he associated AA 11 with the plane that 

struck the Pentagon. He did not know definitely until media reports confirmed AA11 had 

hit the WTC. He heard that information after it was confirmed that UAL 175 hit the 

WTC. He did not change his mind about AA 11 hitting Pentagon until after the media 

broadcast, and stated to Commission staff that at that point he might have been home 

already. Bottiglia told Commission staff that the Management of ZNY removed the 

controllers from Area B ten or fifteen minutes after the events of the morning of 9/11. On 

that morning Bottiglia thought it unbelievable that a commercial airliner could have hit 

the WTC. 

Back to UAL175 and questioning in conjunction with a copy of the transcript: 

Bottiglia recalled that around 1251z he asked UAL 175 to recycle its transponder; it did 

not respond, or do so. He tried numerous ways to contact UAL 175 and thought there was 

something seriously wrong after speaking to Sector 10. He was thinking UAL 175 was a 

hijack in his 1253z comment (from the transcript of his position) and told the facility 

chief he “lost” UAL 175. | 

At that time he did not equate the 3321 code with UAL 175. 3321 was climbing 

abnormally. He had an altitude from 3321 data block and it was climbing higher than the 

assigned UAL 175 altitude. There was no call sign on 3321 and he saw the call sign for 

UAL 175 on the screen as a coast track. The coast track data block showed UAL 175’s 

altitude, but coast altitude would not be the real altitude; he then flashed Sector 10 the 

information. 

Bottiglia did not know if the transponder code 3321 and UAL 175 were two separate 

planes. “Sometimes” controllers lose targets on planes for periods of time; so Bottiglia _ 

noted there could have been a radar technical error. 

The factors that caused him to conclude that UAL 175 might be a hijack were: the AA11 

hijack, WTC on fire (two separate events to him), and the “missing” transponder 

information on UAL 175. 

The Boston Center information that there was a communication from the cockpit of AA 

11 that indicated the hijackers were controlling “more aircraft” was never passed to 

Bottiglia. He did not know about that information until Tom Brokaw brought it up in an 

interview with Bottiglia recapping his participation in the tracking of the aircraft on 9/11. 

When Battliglia first saw the 3321 code, he did not know what was happening, but 

realization of the seriousness of the course deviation occurred when the target started 

turning towards the city. He realized there would be a conflict with traffic and attempted 

to separate traffic. Delta 2433 identified the code 3321 from a visual as a United B767. 

Battliglia then was “95%” sure the aircraft transmitting a transponder code of 3321 was 

in fact UAL 175. He relayed that information to McCormack. 

Battliglia tried to clear other air traffic from the path of UAL 175. He was supposed to 

verbally communicate to the traffic but.did not have the time to perform his usual air 

traffic control functions, track UAL 175, and try and establish communication with UAL 

175 all at the same time. Handling of all planes except for the function of tracking 

transponder code 3321 was taken from Bottiglia and distributed to other controllers. 

According to Bottiglia, it was either Laurie Barrett or Jimmy Kurz who called NY 

TRACON and informed them of the situation. 

According to Bottiglia, New York Center personnel were active in the area, and evolved 

in the process of clearing air traffic in response to the deviation of AA 11 and UAL 175. 

He noted to Commission staff that there was almost a collision with an aircraft in Sector 

55. Bottiglia continued to watch the 3321 target turn north towards city. At one point the 

target 3321 descended and then gained altitude. Bottiglia hoped this was a sign that the 

pilot was attempting to control the flight of the aircraft. But then it descended ten 

thousand feet in approximately one minute. Bottiglia monitored the descent of the aircraft 

he believed to be UAL 175, but that was eee 3321 until it dropped below the 

radar field at approximately 2200 feet. 

Bottiglia heard someone say “oh my God he’s down on the next hit” — which means that 

someone who monitored the rate of descent knew the flight would be at ground level by 

the next radar sweep. Battliglia stated that he is “pretty sure” that “everyone” (the ZNY 

staff) was watching UAL 175 when it hit the WTC. Bottiglia noted to Commission staff 

that he believes he knew the aircraft was headed towards the WTC when it went off his 

screen. He noted that “someone” came in who was in the cafeteria watching CNN and 

said a second airplane hit WTC. He immediately equated that report to UAL 175. 

Area B stopped taking traffic after the second collision. 

Military Procedures: 

Battliglia was not aware of procedures to notify the military, or of procedures to ask for 

military assistance in the case of a hijack. His only training was to tell his supervisor in 

the case of a possible hijack. Bottiglia understood that the Traffic Management Unit 

(TMU) had responsibility to make decisions regarding procedure and contacts in the case 

of a hijack. At the working position his job was to relay information through command. 

He is “pretty sure” that TMU was communicating to the military information and 

awareness regarding UAL 175. Bottiglia postulated that after UAL 175 disappeared TMU 

might have known AA 11 was the first collision at the WTC. Bottiglia noted that he was 

not getting all the information that the TMU had, and still assumed it was a smaller 

airplane. Dave LaCates was in Area B as a supervisor and Battliglia did not speak with 

Bruce Barrett. . 

UAL 175 factors prior to crash: 

Bottiglia noted to Commission staff all three factors that led to his concern over UAL 

175: he was not speaking to the aircraft, and then he associated the new code 3321 with 

UAL 175, and then noted it had significantly deviated from course. He reiterated to 

Commission staff that he probably would not have said it was a hijack without awareness 

of the other factors that day. He had previously worked an incident of an aircraft that lost 

all power, and that experience influenced his thought process on the morning of 9/11: 

When a B767 loses all power there is not much time to get the airplane on the ground. 

The pilot would not speak with ground for fear that communication would take away 

power. Therefore, in the case of UAL 175, Bottiglia had previous experience that 

informed his thought process that UAL 175 was experiencing some mechanical error. He 

also thought the flight may have lost hydraulic fluid, so the heading towards the city 

might be for an emergency landing at Kennedy. 

Training: 

Training on Dynamic Simulations involves airplanes that squawk hijack code 7500, 

inferring that the airliner pilot is in control of the aircraft. Bottiglia continued his point 

by noting that controllers were never presented with a scenario or practice exercise that 

was more challenging than this. The procedure that he had learned was 1) to see the 

“hijack” warning flash on the scope; 2) to verify with the pilot that he is “squawking 

7500”; and 3) then to tell the supervisor for the area.

Bottiglia noted to Commission staff that he has never been involved in a real life military 

intercept on a hijack and has never participated in a simulation that would vector a 

military aircraft towards a target. He noted to Commission staff that he understands 

usually HUNTRESS and/or GIANT KILLER are contacted by the FAA to coordinate air 

traffic controls for the warning areas. He knew of the Northeast Air Defense Sector 

(NEADS), but did not know that the call sign HUNTRESS was for NEADS. He was not 

familiar with a number to call other than NEADS. He was not aware of how to contact 

NORAD. 

Bottiglia explained to Commission staff that his training was not to continue contacting a 

hijacked aircraft, and that FAA ATCs were trained not to verify a hijack unless on a 

signal from the pilot. 

Other Comments 

After the second impact his supervisor ordered a “shut down” of the air space and 

instructed the controllers not to allow any aircraft to transfer into ZNY airspace. This is 

referred to as being at “air traffic control zero” 

After this point Bottiglia recalled meeting with Martin Fournier and other staff from Area 

B. Bottiglia noted that “everyone” was “in shock” and management attepted to get 

statements on the day while events were still “fresh in mind”. All attendees made verbal 

statements on tape as to what happened on their scopes. Bottiglia stated the he does not 

have an issue with Commission Staff requesting and reviewing that tape. 

When questioned regarding the UAL 175 turn to the right on its southwest leg, Bottiglia 

answered that this turn was most likely the aircraft’s auto-pilot returning the aircraft to a 

heading in J80 (the air route “jetway” it would travel on) over the Sparta VOR. Once 

“Sparta” is programmed into autopilot as a point en route the plane itself would self 

correct in order to turn back to the correct route. Bottiglia commented to Commission 

staff that he does not believe UAL 175 went off route until it started to climb and turn 

southeast; Bottiglia opinioned that the hijack pilot probably did not enangg the autopilot 

until after the turn. 

Recommendations 

Bottiglia noted that it is his understanding that Boston Center has the capability to pull its 

voice tapes (recordings) quickly, but that it takes time to do that at ZNY. He noted that he 

did not hear a pilot ask if UAL 175 was still flying until after reviewing the SATORI. 

Bottiglia believes there should be a passive mechanism on aircraft that triggers a hijack 

alarm at the appropriate agencies. He offered the suggestion that pilots could log on and 

off of the flight controls when they leave the cockpit. 

Video:

David Bottiglia - 911 Audio Interview Part 1

0:01

Okay, it is uh October 1st, 2003, approximately 8:20 a.m. Uh I my name is

0:06

John Azerella with the 911 commission and we're about to begin an interview in the New York center in Rankon, New York

0:12

with David Betiglia. I'm Miles K 911 commissioner

0:20

supervisory attorney FA Legion. Julio Henrique is vice president.

0:26

David, air traffic controller. Jeff Bound, 901 Commission.

0:35

David, if we could just sort of start off by you telling us a little bit about when you started with the FAA, how long

0:41

ago, what various positions you held leading up to uh September 11th, and tell us what position you held on that

0:46

day. Uh I started in uh April 1st of 1982

0:52

uh in Oklahoma. When we came back here, I was originally assigned to area G, which is now area D. I was a full

0:59

performance level controller at the time in area G when I was moved to the

1:04

oceanic sectors because I needed two radar controllers. And it just fit in

1:10

with my seniority at the time that I was moved one of two people that were moved to the oceanic. I was certified in all

1:17

the North Atlantic sectors and sectors 66, 67, and 68 at the time. And what

1:24

happened was I don't remember when we moved over to area B, but I came over

1:30

when we moved radar sectors to area B. And that was 66, 67, and 68.

1:36

And uh I've been in FPL in area B for at least 10 years, I would say.

1:42

Is it 10? Yeah. just full performance level controller.

1:48

Okay. And so you think for approximately 10 years prior to September 11th, you were in area B. That is correct.

1:53

And you were in area B on September 11th. Yes, I was. And um were you assigned to a particular

2:00

sector on September 11th? There's no assigning sectors. What we do is as you come back from a break, I just

2:06

returned from a break. Uh the next person to be relieved, I do not recall

2:11

who it was, was at sector 42, which is uh the sector that I was working at the

2:18

time when this happened. So if I understand correctly that you're assigned to really an area and you rotate through various sectors in that

2:25

area. That is correct. On a given shift. Yes. Okay. How often do you take breaks by the way?

2:30

It depends on staffing. It can be anywhere from sometimes over two hours to

2:37

maybe every half hour. Okay. It it can it can really vary depending on the day, the amount of traffic, the

2:44

amount of sectors that are open uh varying by the time of

2:50

day or the hours. Do you remember when um your shift started that day on September 11th?

2:55

Like 6:30 in the morning, maybe quarter to 7. I can't remember what time I signed in, but it was a 7 to3 shift.

3:05

Okay. If we can sort of focus in on a time frame then on on the 11th, say

3:10

roughly sometime after 8 a.m. um you're working sector 42.

3:15

42. Yes. And is there a name for that sector? East Texas.

3:21

East Texas. Yes. And are you made aware at some point in

3:27

time um on the morning of September 11th while you're at sector 42 that there's

3:33

some difficulty being encountered by um an air traffic controller somewhere with

3:40

regard to American Airlines flight 11. Yes. Tell us about

3:46

I was sitting in sector 42 and Mark Meret was working at sector 56 which is the Kennedy high sector. They're right

3:52

next to each other. He stands up and walks over to me and he says, "Um, can you put on your all

3:59

limits?" So I go to hit the button on the the keypad and nothing comes up. And

4:05

he goes, "No, you can't do it that way." He goes, "You have to do it off the radar scope." They've since changed

4:10

that. What is all limited? What are you doing? I don't know what all limit. Well, not all limits. It's all primaries. Uh when you work in a high

4:17

altitude sector, sector 42 happens to be a high altitude sector. You do not watch primary targets nor um

4:26

uh anything that's really below your strap because it you don't want a lot of

4:32

things up there because they're not pertinent. If they don't have a transponder, they're not supposed to go above a certain altitude.

4:38

And basically when you're working what we call PCA, which is positive control airspace, which is 18,000 ft and above,

4:45

uh they all have to have transponders unless they get a certain requirement that they don't have to use one like it

4:50

fails in route. So I didn't have that on in the sector. So that's normal to filter out primaries

4:57

to avoid clutter on your screen. That's correct. At the high altitude. at the high altitudes when most planes are required

5:03

to transform and both sector 56 and 42 are both high altitude sectors. I'm just I was looking at the map just

5:10

so I can get the visual map behind us and I see 56 and 42 high sector to the

5:16

right that map that would be oh actually 42 extends almost over all of sector 55 and 39. What happens is 56

5:23

is over there and this that goes all the way down to there. Okay. So 42 overlays 39 and 55. Yes.

5:32

At a higher altitude than 39 and 55. Yes. Okay. Okay. Understand. So you're at 42

5:39

and Mark Met is at 56 which is the adjacent sector as we look at the map to

5:45

the right of section 42. Correct. East of 42. Correct.

5:51

What is the name of US sector? 42. East Texas. Okay. And how, if you can, for the record, what altitude does East Texas

5:58

begin and end at? At the northern sector portion, it's 25,000 ft and above until that line.

6:06

Then we own 29,000 ft and above. Okay. So,

6:12

where it overlaps 55 and 39, you own 29,000 ft and above. Yes. And then above section 55, it's 24,000

6:20

and above. Yeah. 25 and above. 25. Oh, no. It's 24 and above this section. Yeah, it's 24 and above.

6:26

The northernmost section is 23 has 23 and below. Is it saying is 39? This this whole

6:32

piece is 29 and above. Yeah, 29. Okay. So, Mark comes over to you and

6:38

tells you to uh put on your primaries. All primaries. All primaries. Yes. And did he tell you why he wanted you to

6:44

put on all primaries? Uh, not at the time. I turn it on and he points to a target on the scope and he says, "This is American 11." He goes,

6:51

"Boison center thinks it's been hijacked." So, because I've worked in other areas,

7:00

we don't do it in our area, but I've done it in area G, uh, I know how to start a track on a primary target. So, I

7:07

started an actual track on the primary using an American 11 A or Alpha. The

7:13

reason I did I put the A on the end was in case American 11 was actually a

7:18

flight plane in our computer and I didn't really want to look at the time. I just wanted to start a track on it. Um

7:25

I just put the A on there just so that it wouldn't conflict with maybe somebody else having sometimes we get flights

7:31

that two come out with the same call sign and you actually have to put an A on the end until they one drops out of

7:37

the computer or whatever to distinguish the two. Well, yeah. So, I just started a track

7:43

on it and we were watching it. And how do you start a track on it? Just just

7:48

on a on a primary what you do is you slew over the target. You hit pick on

7:55

the track ball thing. You put in P. Primary.

8:00

Yeah. And what that does is it'll track a primary target and a space and then American 11A.

8:07

And what kind of data um does that give you if any at all when you Nothing. Nothing. You don't get altitude. Is that correct?

8:13

Not on a primary. If Well, that's unnecessarily true. If the

8:18

they've shut off, let's say, their altitude encoding ability, you won't get

8:23

an altitude. If they shut off their transponder, you only get a primary target. And apparently, they shut off

8:29

both. So, when you shut off your transponder and you're tracking a primary, you you

8:35

don't get altitude. Correct. It depends. If they happen to have the altitude encoding on, it can sometimes

8:41

show an altitude on and off. I did not see one. It has nothing to do with the track

8:47

starting the track on the primary. If who had the altitude on if the the airplane they could actually

8:54

lose the transponder but still have altitude protein, it can happen sometimes where you can actually be

8:59

tracking a target and an altitude will come up periodically. That's a primary only. It usually does

9:05

not happen if they shut off the whole thing in an altitude. Just so I understand, if that happens and the altitude comes up

9:10

periodically when the transponder is off, then it's something other than the transponder that's sending that

9:16

altitude. I believe so. I I'm not real familiar with that, but I know that it can occur

9:21

on occasion. Has it ever occurred on your watch, so to speak? Uh, it might have. Not not not at this

9:27

particular time. I did not see an altitude. Not on American 11 on September 11. Okay. So, you

9:34

you tag it as a primary I think is the word you use. Okay. And what kind of data is in the data block if any at that

9:41

point this we just put it we we didn't really know an altitude. Uh at the time uh what

9:48

I did was is I asked a couple of airplanes if they could look off I asked the one airplane at least look at my

9:54

statement because I'll make sure of what I said.

10:05

informationational type. [Applause] Yeah. Well, just the transponder

10:14

is there basic transponder and then a transponder with what they call state aling capability. So normally if you

10:22

turn it off that's that's different but normally when he's talking about we see the altitude it's because one part is

10:27

not working the transponder part is not working but the mode see part is still working. Okay they turn the whole thing off

10:33

they turn it off wouldn't get you're not going to get altitude. Correct. When we see it it's because one

10:38

part just like the other way around. It happens as routine for the mode C to be off you know not working or it's

10:44

invalid. So if it's left on but it's it's malfunctioning in part then you may get an altitude. Okay. But that's not

10:51

the situation on September 11th with American 11. Um what happened was I had an aircraft

10:58

from J75 J75

11:05

coming down in here. Okay. Now, the American was tracking down here and I asked him to look off to the left or

11:11

actually originally I said uh uh if he had ever seen

11:18

an American aircraft and he told me the US Air 583 told me that the previous

11:23

controller had asked him to look for it and he thought the airplane was at flight level 2 niner 0 which is 29,000

11:29

ft. And I said 29 and he look good and he says yes. And then I said, "Could you

11:34

please?" Then I told Mark at the time that it looks like 29,000 ft. Good on

11:40

the American. And then we went I asked the US Air to look back again off his left to see if

11:47

we could still see it. Now it was 10 miles away approximately at the time. And it was a beautiful day. It's a very

11:53

hard 10 miles is a long way. These airplanes are big, but 10 miles is a

11:58

long way to look. And he said he didn't see it, nor did he see him come up on the Tcast again. And what I said was it

12:07

looked like they had turned off their transponder. Can you explain what the Tcast is if you know?

12:12

TAS. Do you have more information? I can tell you what it is. It's what is the

12:18

TAS stand for? Traffic collision avoidance system. Normally that's something that's in the cockpit

12:23

that attack. Okay. basically to avoid a a collision to avoid an air collision or a

12:29

collision. So, normally they wouldn't have it set that far out, you know, like 10 miles. They're not I mean, it varies

12:35

as as they get closer in the terminal environment, they'll they'll settle set it a lot closer distance, but otherwise

12:42

it's uh it's probably not 10 miles. So, he did say, I think the pilot that he would uh he would look again, and that's

12:49

probably what he meant was he would he would change the range to go further um to see if he would this. Yeah. Target

12:56

this American Airlines 11 on his PS. Yes. So Dave, was that US Air 583?

13:02

That's correct. Okay. So you ask him to sort of do you a favor and see if he can and get a visual point out of where this American is and

13:09

find out approximately what altitude he thinks American 11 is flying at? Yes. And I think I if I heard you correctly,

13:15

he thought it was fairly um I'm sorry. Did he see him actually? No, he did not see him at that time.

13:23

And then what ended up happening, if I can just Oh, sure. Go ahead. See if we can assign a time for this.

13:28

This is a transcript showing dating May 8, 2002. Um, which appears to be from your

13:35

secretary position 42. And I guess at some point prior to today, over the last two years, you had an opportunity to

13:41

look at this for some. No, I've never seen the trans. No. Oh, you listen to the Oh, I listen to this makes me sound much

13:50

better. This is um I just want to I'm trying to point down to um the time Zulu

13:57

8 12:40 which would be approximately 8 which would be 8:40 a.m. 49 seconds R42.

14:03

That would be your position, right? Yes. And you're talking to the US Air 583,

14:08

correct? Uh yeah. Well, yeah, De I don't remember

14:13

exactly my words where he said, but I guess these are it and about 10 miles heading south. last we put out was 29

14:20

and nobody's not sure what might be going on. Yeah, we talked about him on the last ring and see this is exactly

14:26

when this happened. We're not picking him up on the Tcast. I look again to see if we can spot him once more. So he

14:32

looked on the Tcast. He also looked out the window and did not see anything. Okay. So

14:38

then the United 7175 checks on and tells me that they heard the threatening

14:43

transmission, but go ahead. We'll pick up with that after after you talk to the US Air and who doesn't spot the um

14:49

American Airlines 11. You say you make contact um well the United 175 apparently had checked on the frequency a little

14:56

earlier. Okay. Uh he did not say anything at the time

15:02

and I see you have the Tom Broco interview, but I learned some things when I was in on that that made a little

15:09

more sense at the time of why United said what they said to me. And I'll I'll

15:14

explain that. But what the United says after I've been speaking to the US Air was that uh we figured we wait till you

15:21

get on your center and they heard suspicious transmissions like everyone stay in your seats.

15:27

Now I didn't understand what was going on when I went in for the bro call

15:33

interview. One of the things I was listening to the Boston Center controller tell us was that they had

15:38

taken everybody off the one frequency because they wanted to just hear the American

15:45

except for one airplane, the United 175. He was on that one frequency the whole

15:52

time. He was on the same Boston frequency that was isolated for American 11.

15:58

Yes. Okay. I don't know if you knew that. We that's the first we had that that was something that came up

16:04

when I heard them talking about it on there and what happened was is I when they shipped the United over

16:12

uh he came up on my frequency and he says we'd wait till your center because he did not want to talk when the American was on.

16:19

So the United pilot didn't want the American uh the American 11 plane that

16:24

was potentially being hijacked. If it were, what I'm what I'm hearing is that the United Power probably didn't want

16:29

the hijackers in American 11 to hear him telling the control one of the control centers that he overheard this

16:35

threatening communication. I'm surprised that didn't come. I don't know if you were up in Boston or not, but that was

16:40

I heard that in the actual interview when the Boston Center controller was talking and that made a lot more sense

16:47

to me as to why he said that to me when he came on. I mean it was a thought that we had had prior to being

16:54

you Dave as to why would if you had important information you being the United pilot why would you delay

17:01

relaying there such important information now it's making going over it at the

17:06

time it was a guess that he was he wanted to confirm that the American was not also now on base frequency

17:13

and once you heard him talk about it he felt safe that that the American was just not

17:18

but that made a lot more sense to makes more sense to us. Okay. Thanks. Thank you for that

17:24

clarification because we didn't have that clarified until this interview.

17:29

Okay. Okay. So, he tells you that he overheard this transmission and you understood him to

17:35

be referring to American 11 when he said that or Yes. Okay. So, tell us what happened. Oh, I immediately called up Boston.

17:43

Did he tell you what he overheard by the way? Oh, he just what I have in my notes was it looked like uh everybody stay in

17:49

your seats. That's what he said he heard. I don't know how much they were broadcasting. I did not hear any of

17:55

those tapes. The boss. Yeah. Okay. So, I really have no idea what was

18:01

saying. So, I immediately called up boss on on the line and relayed the message

18:07

and I also turned and told the supervisor that they had heard these.

18:12

And who was your supervisor at the time? It was a she was the CIC at the time.

18:17

Okay. Now, she was what was going on. I was trying to relay as much information as I

18:24

possibly could as as these things were transpiring. I was talking to Mark and I was talking

18:29

to Aan. I was just trying to be very vocal about everything that was going on. So, we were just talking about

18:36

everything that was happening at this time. You trying to pass the information? as much as I whatever I was getting I was

18:42

here to pass. Okay. Okay.

18:47

So, you tell Boston about what the United 175 told you he overheard

18:53

and uh what action do you take next? Uh well, at the time all I did was pass

18:59

on the information. There's nothing else I can do about it. But at the same time now and th this is one reason why and I

19:07

I watched it the uh the sator yesterday

19:13

two airplanes are reporting ELPS and which is the emergency locator

19:20

transporter. It usually has to be set off. You can set it off manually but it usually is done through some type of a

19:26

crash or some type of an impact. But you can manually set up.

19:32

Yes. But two airplanes report an ELT

19:37

and the American was still flying and he was still tracking at the time.

19:43

That's why when the American disappeared, I did not think anything about him

19:49

having hit the building. Matter of fact, right at during this period of time, as ELP is going off, I notice Mike

19:56

McCormack's in the area standing next to me. and he's on the phone

20:01

and I'm not really sure who he was talking to, but at the same time I was

20:07

relaying out to a man as I'm talking to him also and telling him what's going on.

20:14

And I was figured he was up there because I figured maybe they notified him that there was now a hijacking going

20:20

on. So I figured as as a chief he would be up in the area. That's what I would

20:26

be. So, I'm trying to relay this information. I'm saying that the ELTs

20:32

are going off and then the American disappears. And my I just turned to Mark

20:38

and I said, "Well, we know the American's not high altitude because we just lost the train." You know, our

20:44

system is not really set up to do primary targets. We

20:50

only see down so much because of our radar. So if they go down

20:55

too low, we lose the primary targets. Sometimes we can see them on the water. You can see boats on the water

21:00

sometimes. And that varies on Yeah, it varies on weather conditions

21:05

and stuff like that. It also varies by the ground conditions, buildings, anything like that.

21:10

So it's not a computer setting that puts a war on your primary target basically

21:16

radar. So you get caught from buildings and stuff if you set it very well. And some sometimes it can be

21:23

You can get it real low. So we just follow that thought. You you say you get a at least one or two

21:28

reports of an ELT in the area from other air. I get two two reports of an ELT. Is it in the area

21:35

of where the the American those Well, it's hard to say sometimes because

21:40

uh you can hear ELTs for miles. The higher up you are, the further away you'll hear an ELT. It's it's just the

21:47

way it works. it spreads down and depending on who's listening to it. Now, you said when you heard the reports

21:53

of ELTs, was it shortly after that the American 11 primary dropped off your screen? Yes.

21:58

And I think you said, Dave, you didn't think at that point that it ran into a building, right? Right. I did not.

22:04

What were you thinking that happened to it at that point? I just figured they were flying low level. Did you think it was trying to land

22:11

somewhere or at the time? I had no idea. I I really had no idea. It was right then though

22:18

that I started getting reports from aircraft of what was going on in New York. It looked like the trade center was on fire.

22:25

Before we get to that um for a second, you thought it was flying at low level. Um we you get a report from Boston prior

22:32

to that, right? That they think it's been hijacked. Are you assuming at that point we're thinking that it's been

22:37

hijacked or are you thinking something? No, I'm thinking it is hijacked. Okay. Hijacked flying at low level headed southward.

22:45

Well, yeah. Well, maybe I should go in some more. Maybe we missed some things

22:50

here. Once we deemed that the airplane prior

22:55

to this was at flight level 2 niner zero, we attempted to re try to get the

23:01

altitude. So, Mark Merrced brought an eagle flight and I I forget what altitude right over

23:08

top of the primary target to try to spot.

23:13

And as he's doing that, I'm trying to help him. I had another aircraft coming down that I had to end up turning pretty

23:19

hard out of his way because these two were had on I think they were both a 31. The Eagle and the other plane.

23:25

Yeah. And I don't remember which one it was. So Oh, here it is.

23:30

Is it the Delta 20 2433? And I called Kingston up to try to turn

23:36

him and I ended up turning the Delta to the right to get him away from him. Uh, he does not report and he cannot see

23:42

the airplane. That doesn't necessarily mean, you know, the eagle can.

23:48

At night, it's much much easier to spot an airplane. I don't know if you've ever flown. Yes. But when you're sitting up in the

23:55

cockpit and you're looking out on a really sunny day, if the sun's in your

24:01

window or anything like that, you're looking for a target that's moving very fast. Both of you are comp closing at

24:07

probably close to 1,000 knots. That's that's very fast to try to spot one

24:12

thing for even if you're passing sometimes, right? If he's a little bit off, you could be looking right here.

24:18

It's it's hard. Those windows aren't that big. He could have missed it. But when he passed him right overhead of it,

24:23

I I pretty much thought he was not there any longer. And then when the target fell off, I said, "No, he's not high

24:30

altitude anymore." That's that was my feeling at the time that he was. Okay, understand you. Now, let's come

24:38

back to these for a moment. Yeah. You heard two distinct. I did not, but two airplanes reported

24:45

it. Um they reported they heard it actually. The US Air 583 and also Delta

24:53

2433 both reported hearing in E10. Now that now that the hearing of that ELT can't be associated with any plane.

25:01

I didn't it was prior to the the American was still flung right. So when the two ELTs went they two of

25:08

them reported it. I reported the supervisor, but that was why when

25:14

I'll get into it. Why when I was originally informed that it was a small airplane that flew into the trade

25:20

center, that's all I thought. Let me just show you the the time just so we can get a little reference. Your

25:26

tra the transcript again of the communications um from your sector that day. Um

25:31

8:44 a.m. and 4 seconds, USA 583. Yeah, I just picked up an ELT

25:38

on 1215. It was brief, but uh it went off, right? And then uh R42, this is you responding

25:45

right immediately. Okay. They said it's confirmed, believe it or not, as a thing. We're not sure yet, but so we're

25:52

still trying going on another aircraft right now. And they're trying to see what the altitude he's at, meaning the

25:57

American 11. Right. Right. Okay. So that's we now know or do you agree that we now know I guess that the

26:03

impact in the trade center occurred um approximately 2 minutes after it was like 2 minutes after that that's

26:10

why even when the American disappeared I did not associate that with the impact

26:18

of the trade center and I I'll delta I just wanted to share

26:23

the delta that's about a minute later 8:45 and 7 seconds Delta Airlines lines

26:28

2433. Uh we picked up it says delta 2433 at

26:34

290. Now that means the delta was at 29,000 ft. Correct. We picked up that ELT2 but it's uh very faint and that's

26:42

approximately a minute before the impact of the north tower. Correct. Right. Okay. Just wondering if you had any thoughts,

26:50

not then but now in hindsight as to whether or not you think that was an ELT

26:55

that knowing what you know now that the American did crash into the North Tower. Do you think based on your experience

27:01

that that was probably an ELT they were picking up or was it too hard to determine from? It's too hard to determine. It could it

27:10

set at 46, right? We've got

27:15

846 846. The NTSB is established impact time

27:20

at 846. Example, the target was still there. Can

27:25

only go off at the impact. The activator by somebody in the car. We got a little confusing some

27:31

conflicting information on that. They can test it. Some people say it could be set off only

27:36

on impact, not manually by the pilot. But I think he said yes, it can be done. That's what I was going to when you were

27:43

questioning uh as far as why it would go off like you it happens routinely with

27:49

ELTs and and I guess nine out of 10 times it's a little plane on an airport that's playing around and testing it or

27:55

repairing it plus they're allowed to test it five minutes before to five minutes after the hour every every hour

28:01

basically we person time and you know we disregard the ones five minutes before five after unless

28:08

do you ever do you ever get one if the plane has a hard landing. Does that ever set it off? I mean, as a real,

28:13

you know, I don't know. Somebody said that

28:19

um and this was just rumor and conjecture. I don't know if this is true or not. I just happened to hear this

28:25

that somebody said if you're doing really hard turns like the way these airplanes may have been

28:32

being handled, it may have set off the ELT. I do not know. So that's something we would address to the tech person.

28:40

Okay. But just to clarify, so yes, it can be it could have been manually been set off before the impact.

28:46

Okay. My point was you can't you can't say that that came from my particular plant.

28:52

There's no scientific way to link that. What we do is we try to get multiple reports and narrow down who's not

28:58

getting it, who's getting it, and try and get close. Fair enough. normally, and this is just

29:04

something, uh, they'll get reports, there's satellites in the air that actually zone in on ELTs, and they'll

29:12

come around periodically and ask us, could you check for an ELT in the vicinity of Kennedy? Would you check for

29:18

an ELT in this? Uh, both us and I believe uh the Russians monitor ELTs. I

29:24

don't know who else does, but it's just these satellites monitor the ELPS

29:29

because it's worldwide. It's an emergency worldwide emergency. Yes. Now, let me take you back to this time

29:36

frame around 8 just before impact just 8:46. You've made some attempts to get other

29:42

aircraft in the area to fly in the vicinity of American 11 to give you a visual on.

29:48

Actually marked it. You marked it on your screen. No, Mark Morse. Oh, sorry. Okay. pass actually eagle

29:54

flight right over the target. So there are attempts by uh at least one of your colleagues to fly other aircraft

30:00

into the vicinity of American 11 to get a visual approximation of American 11's altitude. Yes.

30:05

But so far we haven't gotten a reply that someone has seen in the air. No visual. No visual report. You get a report from two

30:14

aircraft that they hear an ELT. Yes. You don't know yet obviously about any

30:20

fire or smoke by the trade center because the impact hasn't occurred yet, right? Okay. Now, if we could just stay with

30:27

this time frame for a second, let me ask you, do you based on Boston saying that they think it's a hijack? Do you have

30:33

any understanding at that time right around just before impact as to whether or not military assistance has been

30:39

summoned by somebody? No. When I'm sitting at the sector, the only information I'm doing is I'm trying to relay what I have. They're not

30:45

relaying other information back to me. I have no idea what else is happening.

30:51

Okay. I do know of I told Aana and I know that she has run around the corner

30:58

because she has told me that she has informed whoever it was at the time and

31:03

also now the chief is in the area prior to the impact of the American. He is actually in the area standing right next

31:10

to me and uh I'm trying to talk to him at the

31:15

same time. Together at the same time. Oh yeah. A lot going on.

31:20

Well, you know, it it is a lot. We're trying we're really zooming in over here. We're trying to do as much as we

31:27

can. One of the things as a controller that I do is that once I deem that an

31:32

aircraft when you you accept the handle everything is not in conflict. It's not as imperative to keep looking at those.

31:40

We were trying more to look at over here to get everything done. I'm looking at a conflict with the Eagle Flight and the

31:46

Delta that I have now and only because we were still looking

31:51

for the American. Okay. Let me ask you before we move forward. Yeah,

31:57

from 8:45 a.m. There's two entries on the transcript at 8:45 and 37 seconds

32:03

and then at 8:45 and 44 seconds from Huntress. It says, "Heads up New York Amos AMIS. Huntress ID." And the second

32:12

uh You want to know what that is? Yeah. You know what that is? Amos is in the ocean.

32:17

Amos Huntress ID is Huntress monitors actually the whole United States. that

32:24

from my thing in the ocean, they're usually monitoring aircraft that are out over the water. Now, what's happening is

32:31

as aircraft starts coming in, New York tells them to squawk a code.

32:37

Now, what they're asking for is an ID is normally Huntress is made aware of what codes and who's on them. Sometimes they

32:45

may not get that information or somebody's not coming up on a code. So they'll call up Huntress ID

32:53

and now they'll ask for who's approximately at 54 and 40 or you know

32:58

certain positions that are out over the who's there. So they're not is they're not talking Huntress is not talking to your

33:04

position. No, but we actually have a line. We'll hear them call. You hear them call all the time. Huntress ID

33:10

and Amos stands for you know what Amos actually stands for? I I'd have to if you give me a phone I

33:16

could call the Oceanic and That's right. It's a sidebar to this.

33:21

Okay. Now, Huntress. Um, okay. So, they're not talking to you. Okay. Now,

33:27

what happens after uh if you can bring yourself back to that time frame after

33:32

you get the report of the two ELPs? What happens after that? [Music]

33:43

Well, I noticed that R56 was vecting the Eagle flight at 31 northbound to look for the American.

33:50

And then I told him, I said, "Watch my delta 2433

33:56

because these two were he had them on a pretty tight turn to try to get them over the American."

34:02

And by turning the Eagle, he put him in jeopardy with the Delta. Well, we had a lot of room still. I mean,

34:10

it wasn't to the point where it's like an imperative thing, like an emergency thing, but I called Kingston up and I

34:16

asked him to turn the Delta. I didn't know how long he was going to have the Eagle Flight on head. And other things are happening. We're not It's not just

34:22

one airplane. You're you're dealing with a lot of airplanes. You know, it may not look that busy and anything like that,

34:28

but a lot of stuff is happening at this time. So all I did was is I turned the

34:34

Delta west just to get him away. I didn't know what he was going to have to do with his

34:40

and he ended up turning the Eagle Flight back up on course. So it ended up I got the Delta right back on course right

34:45

after that. And at some point after that, did you

34:51

hear anything about smoke coming from? Oh yeah,

34:57

quite a few. At least a few. Um,

35:02

right after that, an aircraft I do not know who it is on the frequency states that it looks like there's a major fire

35:08

in Manhattan. It looks like the World Trade Center. No, these airplanes are like 50, 60, 70 miles away and they're

35:16

seeing this. Uh, I asked the aircraft who gave the report and I believe I don't recall on

35:23

the thing who it was, but I believe it was the 1043. you're not um are you thinking now when

35:29

you hear about um there's a fire in the World Trade Center, are you thinking at all about American 11 and whether or not

35:34

Well, right as this is going on, I'm also hearing a conversation from the facility chief. He's on the phone

35:40

standing right next to me. That's McCormack. Yeah. Okay. And he's saying it looks like a small

35:46

twin engine aircraft hit the World Trade Center. Well, who's this? Is Mike? Yes.

35:52

Um, and at the time with the ELTs going off,

35:59

I thought maybe he had it. It has happened in the past. And I just I'm I'm just thinking that

36:06

some somebody had to work trade center. You're thinking a small Yeah. smaller aircraft than American 11.

36:12

You know, it's interesting that when you look at the tapes on it, if you don't really know what an airplane looks like,

36:19

those buildings are massive. They look small compared to those buildings.

36:24

And it wasn't really until, you know, if you just kind of looked up and saw an airplane go in it. It's hard to tell

36:30

sometimes unless you're really familiar with what the airplanes are. They saw two

36:36

engines on it. Okay. It's a small engine. Matter of fact, I'm pretty sure somebody stated that they were listening

36:41

to the news, too, and they were reporting it as a small twin engine airplane also that went in. Do you

36:47

remember um you say you heard Mike say this as he's on the phone next standing next to do you know who he was talking to?

36:52

No I do not. Let me see if I could uh find that other report that you just called. You think

36:58

another aircraft you're saying came on your frequency and said that they were listening to a report about it being a

37:05

smaller plane. Right. I think I found there's I'll just show you for the record. It's around there's an entry

37:11

here on the transcript at 85 4 and 7 seconds from United US Air 583.

37:20

It says, "Yeah, getting uh reports on over the radio of a commuter plane

37:27

hitting the World Trade Center. Is that a Nordo 76 still in the air?" Now when

37:34

he when USA Air is 583 is saying there's the Nord076 doing here he's referring to American Airlines 11 right

37:40

yes so here now you have some other aircraft relaying to you that they hear some

37:46

radio report that it's a computer they sometimes listen to the the radio because a lot of times they'll ask us

37:52

how the Yankees are doing I'm I'm just trying to give you some thing and uh

37:58

they have the ability to tune in the AMFM yes no I don't I think it's happened, but I

38:04

believe it's that they can tune into. So, they must have tuned right away because they're seeing the fire. That

38:10

was a big fire. And I'm sure now they're all wondering. I was trying to also relay the information to the air to the

38:17

pilots to let them know what was going on because I was only I whatever information I had,

38:23

I was trying to give to everybody, the pilots, the supervisor, Mike, everything. As I got it, I related and I

38:30

related to everybody. It didn't matter who it was. I thought everybody should know we have a hijacking. We have this.

38:37

I didn't specifically say hijacking, but everybody's hearing this now on the frequency of threatening transmissions.

38:43

This and that. So, whoever was on my frequency kind of knows that something is going on. And I guess the one

38:50

airplane that asked the Delta, he must I think it was the Delta asked whether the

38:55

767 was still flying. They must have had it in the back of their minds that maybe

39:00

this went into the trade center. Yeah. Actually, the US Air 583. Yeah. That asked if he's still in the air.

39:07

To be honest with you, when somebody told me that the airplane had said that, I don't even recall him saying that

39:12

until I've since listened to the tapes saying this because something was going on right at

39:17

that time that I went and did.

39:23

Okay, let's let's come to that in a minute. Well, what is it? What is it to do with I I'm thinking that it's the

39:31

um that the 179 175 is in the coast track.

39:36

You think that occurred prior to this USA? No, it was right around that time. So, let me let me see if I can just find

39:42

something in the transcript and see if I can help you out. I'd have to watch it up there again. I mean, we watched it briefly. I one time

39:49

was enough for me to watch it, but if we have to watch it again, I understand you guys want to go up and ask me some questions about it. That's fine. Let me

39:56

see. Well, let's see if we can sort of be able to do that. See if we can help you out without putting you through the story again.

40:01

Oh, I don't mind. You know, you guys need to do your job. That's fine with me. I appreciate that, Dave. That's all right,

40:07

Dave. Um, just to see if I can give you some time reference here. We've marked on the transcript here. Well, it says

40:13

854 is when the US Air asks you if the American 11 is still in the air, right? 854. Oh, yeah. Transcript 854 in 7

40:21

seconds. Now, if we go a few minutes before that, it appears here there's an entry at 851.

40:29

Okay. And 43 seconds. R42, that's you speaking, correct? Mhm. United 175 recycle your transponder and

40:36

squawk code of 1470. Right. Is that refresh your recollection as to

40:42

when you uh were trying to raise 175 on the right trans on its intended

40:49

transponder code? Oh, it must have been at 8:51. And I don't know when I was uh

40:54

when I got the report from the thing. Certain things are going on. I was trying to do that. Um I was calling

41:00

Kingston at the time. Right now, I don't think anything's wrong with the United

41:06

to be honest with you. Well, let's follow through what happened. You call United 175 again, correct?

41:13

That's correct. You call United 175 a third consecutive. Sometimes they don't listen. Do you read New York? Sometimes they

41:19

just don't listen and you try them a few times and then you get a little bit ticked at them because they're not you

41:25

got to listen up. So it in other words when when you're not when they're not responding to you that's referred to as Nordo, right?

41:33

No, I I very rarely consider that a Nordo at the time. I a lot of times I

41:38

mean you'll call an airplane sometimes five times before they respond.

41:43

They could be doing something in the cockpit. um that my call is not as important as

41:49

what they're doing. Just like when we're working, somebody could be calling you, you know, Kennedy Kinks on the 93 line

41:56

and you're trying to separate two airplanes. It's their phone call to me is not as important as perhaps

42:02

separating these two aircraft or you have to get something done before you answer their line. So at the time maybe

42:09

they just had something they were doing and I really don't know but I don't I don't get worried about it the first

42:15

couple of calls now I do a little bit. But pre 911 it was not what you're saying is it's

42:21

not unus was not unusual prior to 911 uh to try to raise a pilot on a radio and

42:26

not have them respond immediately. Also not unusual that sometimes the transponders change you know they hit

42:32

it. They could be doing something they hit the button it changes. It can happen.

42:38

Okay. And now let's let's see if we can follow through your your subsequent um efforts here. That's at 852. And then

42:46

immediately you raised delta 1489. Correct. Just to make sure that my frequency is

42:52

still working at something might have happened. I mean maybe I have to change the

42:58

um transmitter. It can happen. You can lose a transmitter. Something happens to

43:03

it. Maybe my headset broke. So, you're checking whether or not you're not hearing back from United 135 because you

43:10

have some sort of technical problem on your end. That's correct. And then you take another step, it appears here at approximately 852 and 30

43:18

seconds, you're calling Kingston on. They're the ones that turn the airplane

43:23

over to me originally. Sometimes what happens, it's only a little switch button in the cockpit. Normally they

43:31

when they change to one frequency to the other, what they'll do is they'll put in

43:36

the new frequency and switch over to it. And the reason why they do that, some pilots write down all the frequencies.

43:43

Others don't. It just depends on the airline, depends on the pilot, and they have just a little toggle switch. So

43:50

what may have happened is they hit it back and they went back to Kingston. That has happened in the past.

43:56

There two radios. So you're just now you're checking back to the sector it came from when it end prior to entering

44:03

your sector to see if he forgot that if you or maybe you hit the button and now he's back on their frequency.

44:09

These things happen. People will call you. You'll turn an airplane over and the guy will say, you know, I was talking to this airplane, see if you

44:15

went back to you, and you'll call and go, "Hey, go ahead or hang it." They don't do that on purpose. Also,

44:21

when they they they have the two radios, they when they get a new frequency, they put it on the other one. They leave the

44:27

old frequency in. If anything goes wrong, they go back to the old one. Okay. Great. Now, you get a reply. appears uh

44:35

from Kingston SE section up in Boston. Well, what happens is I asked him, "Do

44:41

me a favor, see if United 175 went back on your frequency." He goes, "United 175." Now, he doesn't have any

44:47

information there. I believe that's a different controller now than had been the one who was working these.

44:52

Okay. And then as the reply at down at the bottom of the page here, page 13,

44:58

yes, 853 and 14 seconds, it is he is not here. East Texas.

45:03

Yes. So that's Boston Kingston sector telling you that he's not on our

45:08

Yes. At 853 and 14 seconds.

45:13

Now I am a little concerned because now I see a change of altitude

45:21

with the a code change on this United. And I asked him if he might have seen

45:28

that United 175. Maybe I'm missing a target. Sometimes things can happen. And

45:35

I said, "Do you happen to see anything?" And then I told him about the code. Who you talking? I'm talking to sector

45:40

10. Now sector 10 is the sector that I would hand off to on United 175. United

45:47

175 was coming down to just like here. His next thing would be coming to sector

45:52

10. Okay. Matter of fact, if you notice on this tutorial, as soon as I get him, I start flashing the sector 10 because we

45:58

have a lot of stuff going on. I don't want to not make a handoff. So,

46:03

what I do is as soon as I get him talking to him, I flash him right on to sector 10. To me, he's already done. I'm

46:10

just going to wait until 10 breaks the hand off to ship him on over. But you when things are happening like a

46:16

hijacking or anything that's out of the ordinary, you try to take the duties

46:21

that you can do right away and take care of them so it's not something that you forget about. So I'm flashing him right

46:28

away to sector 10. And you're telling sector 10 that that there's a 3321 code. That's a

46:35

transponder code, right? Yeah. And that's on um

46:40

that's not the that was not the original code. 915. Correct. No. As a matter of fact, when the code

46:46

changed like that and I saw him climbing, I got scared. I I didn't know what was going on at the time. I really

46:53

didn't know. But something scared me then. I actually got scared.

46:59

And I'm I'm watching this guy now. I'm I'm talking to 10 and I'm saying, "Do you see this United 175? I see this

47:06

target climbing. It's on a different code." And

47:11

I guess you're hearing my voice. I got scared. I'm thinking one hijack. I still wasn't

47:17

thinking hijack, but now I am. You're thinking one hijack meaning American 11 already.

47:22

And then as soon as I saw this and now I'm thinking I think we might have another hijack.

47:28

It it just somebody asked me one time why was I so

47:33

quickly it when I was hearing all the reports everything that was going on the

47:39

trade center is now on fire even though at the time I'm still nothing in this American 11 I'm going something's going

47:45

on today we have the trade center hit the American 11 gets me now all of a sudden this thing is going off and I

47:51

just thought this was hijacked. Let me ask you a question about that. You say um he's climbing this code 3321

48:00

3321 code is at 35,000 ft climbing. Don't know who he is, but you're

48:07

concerned about the US Air 583. Yes. Now, so you're not Is it fair to say

48:13

then you're not certain yet that this code 3321 is is actually US Aired? I'm

48:18

sorry, United Airlines 17. No. As a matter of fact, I wasn't sure who he was

48:24

at the time. Okay. You now and you say we may have a hijack also in

48:30

that same conversation with RA10. Which are you referring to the American 11 there?

48:35

No, I'm thinking the United at that time. Okay. So you and you're saying we may have an additional

48:41

hijack. He didn't know about the first one. Okay. And it was right at this time I turned

48:46

the facility chief in there and I said to him, I think I just lost United 175.

48:53

you tell Mike McCoy this and he goes right on the thing he says I think we have multiple things going on

48:59

here right now and I I can remember vividly hearing him say that who he was talking to I don't

49:06

know he was on the phone maybe with the command center but he was on the phone with somebody right there and I heard

49:12

him say that but right away I just said I think I lost United 175

49:19

what is on your scope at this time and you You're not sure uh

49:26

not sure who he was. What what what do you have visually that informed you about 175 and it previously

49:35

thing I have is now a data block that's in the coast track.

49:41

What happens is when they go off the right code, the data block goes into a coast track or it it can sometimes still

49:49

track with it for a while. And that's why I may or may not have seen it right

49:55

away, but I believe the target was coming away from it now. And that's when

50:01

I started to ask United. I even think he might have even stayed on course for a little bit. And then I noticed that he

50:07

was climbing and making the turn. And that that's when I got a little worried about it.

50:13

You don't coast track or from the 3321? Well, actually from the coast track

50:19

because the track can sometimes stay with it. Sometimes it doesn't go right off the target even though they change

50:24

their code. Sometimes sometimes the target the track because we use

50:30

um you you'd have to go to the technical things but even if um the target goes

50:37

into a track sometimes the the the data block will stay with it because that's

50:42

what it's supposed to do originally

50:48

and it will it will move along and sometimes it'll jump off especially if somebody else squawks that same code And

50:54

this one's no longer on. It's um it's just the way the computer does it.

51:01

Um but it will stay with it for a while. At some point there's a separation.

51:07

Yes. When it goes in the coast, what information on the coast track for

51:13

United 175 would you have seen that? Well, it just comes up as saying coast.

51:18

I might have lost the altitude on it. I don't really recall what I lost or anything like that, but The call sign U1

51:25

175 stays stays stays up there. Yes. And where does that where's the data

51:33

block coast towards? Does it coast towards the track that United 175 is projected to have gone on?

51:39

It can for a little while that way. When he says separates, that's

51:44

when they would get your attention. It's kind of hard to explain. When I I I watched yesterday the sator,

51:52

one of the things I did and I because I was wondering why I didn't notice it earlier was I was flashing the hand off

51:58

to sector 10. That's the same thing that shows 10

52:03

coming up on the scope as where it would say coast. I'm sorry. You said repeat that. That's

52:10

what I was going to show actually because if you can visualize it, the targets here, the little data block

52:18

when he flashes into T early because there's basically nothing else he's going to do with this guy. He can take care of everything else eventually down

52:24

here. He's going to just turn over turn the guy back over. So there's nothing. So So if I can ask you something. Okay. So

52:31

when you flash it to 10 prior to the transponder being code being changed.

52:36

Yes. You flash it to 10. Is it your intent at that time and is it the at that point in time that you don't have any need to

52:42

speak with the United 175 again between that time and the time when he enters? Yes. There was no traffic between him

52:48

going on J80, no nothing. As as far as I'm concerned, he checked in. It's everything's done.

52:55

There's no conflict with him. I just I did what I have to do with him. I And I

53:02

I just flashed it right away to sector 10 because now I don't want to be worried about me looking up and all of a

53:07

sudden he's in secret 10's airspace with no hand off.

53:13

Uh, I know Jimmy Brennan was on the H and I think Mike Fellow she might have been on the R.

53:19

Um, so what I know Jimmy Brennan was on the H because I I recognized his voice when we

53:25

talked cuz he used to go hijack and I think you heard that. I'm not sure if you heard that because they were all

53:32

kind of shocked when I said hijack. So now just for the so we clarify this

53:37

on on the interview here. What then was the first thing that drew your attention uh to United 175 when you first noticed

53:45

that change of transplant? What caused you to to notice that?

53:50

I think as I was scanning the scope, we had just finished like moving the delta around. I I finished a couple other

53:55

things as I looked over because you try to keep scanning the scope, but when your attention's really focused on one

54:00

thing like looking for the American, it it takes your attention from scanning on the other side. That's

54:07

and so I wasn't really looking at that portion of the scope constantly.

54:13

Normally you're you're looking around the whole scope constantly, especially for conflicts and anything like this. But at the time we had a lot of

54:19

imperative things going on near Kennedy, not 50, 60, 70 miles away.

54:26

So you had a situation with American 11, which was the eastern part of your set, right? And this United 175 is the western most

54:34

part of your set. Yes. And he's got a clear path when you ask them to go all the way to second 10.

54:41

And you tried to ask him, you asked United 175 at around 851. We saw in the transcript to recycle it trans,

54:48

right? I don't know what time he actually switched. I'm sure they have that in the thing, but

54:53

it's in the soutori. And I guess um you don't have to check the

54:58

representation from us, but we could tell you that we think looking at the thing was around 46.

55:03

It's like a No, the change.

55:13

Yes, I was told about that at the position. I did not. I have 84646 on the change.

55:21

But at some point, you're you become well aware of code 3321.

55:26

Mhm. So 846 and and and and change is when uh

55:33

United 175 apparently according to Satori first changes it transponder code and approximately 5 minutes later you're

55:39

asking him to recycle to a code of 1470. Right.

55:45

But it was still on course. Not that it was anything at that point. He was still on course. It was right after that I

55:51

believe he started to climb. Or maybe that's when I noticed he was climbing. I really don't know.

55:58

Dave, if we can um I want to get into a little more into the detail on 175, but

56:03

before we do that, I sort of want to go back to American 11. And I know it's hard to separate the two because they were both going simultaneously.

56:09

That's right. But um I want to see if I can go back to um American 11 for a moment.

56:16

I want to bring you to the point in time after 8:50 give or take a few minutes

56:22

where um at that time you don't have American 11's primary target on your

56:28

scope anymore. Correct. Correct. And at that time shortly after 850 you hear from other aircraft in the area

56:34

that there's a fire in trade center. Correct. Yes. And I think you previously stated that

56:40

at that moment you're not thinking that American 11 crashed into the Washington. Right. That's right.

56:45

In fact, you're hearing from Mike McCormack, who's standing next to you, something about a small aircraft with a twin engine may have hit

56:52

small aircraft, he said. And and I heard him say something like it looks like a an aircraft off of

56:57

Pikipsy might have crashed into an aircraft off of Pipsy, meaning

57:03

departing. Yeah. Pipsy. Okay. Now, how how they knew that or he was talking

57:10

about I don't know. So, you weren't privy to his conversation. I just just from what he was talking about, we

57:16

were trying to do a little bit of verbal. I was just I was trying to inform him of anything that was going on

57:21

in my sector at the time and of Anna at the same time. We were I was being very

57:28

vocal. I told them everything. Looks like there's a fire. Looks like it's this. As I got transmissions, I related

57:34

to them immediately. And the US Air is also reporting to you on your frequency that he heard some radio report of a

57:42

commuter plane hitting the center. Yes. At that point in time, if you could take

57:47

yourself back to September 11th, where if at all are you thinking that American 11 may be at that point?

57:52

South of the city. So you think it has passed the city? Yeah. South of it at a low or high altitude.

57:58

Were you having I was thinking low altitude, but I really have no idea. In my mind, I was

58:04

thinking low altitude, but they were fine. Maybe to avoid radar, whatever. Who knows what they were thinking.

58:10

And you believed it was hijacked also at that point. Is that thing? Did you have any thoughts if at all? I

58:16

mean, because there was a lot going on, but did you have any thoughts of where they may be headed then if they were low altitude to avoid radar? Did you ever hear me in there? My

58:22

initial thing was I thought they were heading for Cuba. I've been here for so many years that years ago when they

58:30

there's been a few hijacks since I've been here. One a guy hijacked an airplane to Atlantic City.

58:37

You might remember that. You wanted to go lose his money. I don't know. I don't know if you

58:42

remember that, but he actually hijacked the airplane and landed in Atlantic City.

58:48

But always they always went south into the Caribbean like Cuba or something like that and they would land.

58:54

Fortunately now with our things they don't do that usually anymore but you never know. So I'm still going back to

59:00

we haven't had a hijack in years that you figured that's where they were going. Now, did there come point later

59:07

in that morning where you changed your opinion as to whether or not American Airlines 11 was still airborne and

59:13

heading south of I thought honestly that that was the

59:18

airplane that went into the Pentagon. Okay. You thought 11 had potentially hit the Pentagon. So when when did you when

59:26

did you first think if you can recall as best as you can I know it's been two years but at what point did you change

59:32

your mind and say to yourself you know what I don't think American 11 is flying south in a little alpha anyway I think

59:38

it's crashed somewhere after the reports came out that it was the American that went in I really still

59:43

thought it was the commuter or the smaller airplane that actually had hit

59:48

the trade center you you just said after the reports that the American went in where to the world trade trade center that

59:54

they actually confirmed that it was the American that went into the trade center. See, we that wasn't even

1:00:02

initially I I don't think they knew that it was the American 11 that went into the trade

1:00:07

center. They were still thinking it was the smaller airplane until I don't even know how much further after that did

1:00:13

they decide it was the American that actually crashed into the trade center. They're asking

1:00:18

Julia. Yeah. Yeah. Uh I think they guess you know somewhat fairly quickly looking

1:00:24

at So you're saying when you heard you at some point later on heard somebody

1:00:30

report then subsequently that they did think the American 11 hit the trade center. Yes. Did you hear that after the United

1:00:37

Airlines 175 was determined to have run in to have crashed into the second?

1:00:43

Yeah, it was after that. So it was after 9003. We now know that 903 was a point approximately of the second impact.

1:00:49

I was pretty sure at the time when the American descended down there was a lot of talk on the area

1:00:56

because now everybody was watching this target and

1:01:01

uh I know I'm I'm moving ahead on this a little bit, but one of the comments was,

1:01:08

"My god, he's in the ground on the next tip because he was descending so quickly." And then somebody just yelled

1:01:13

out, "Oh my god, that's the trade center right there." This is the American 11. No, this is 175. Okay.

1:01:19

Yeah. 175. Okay. And that's

1:01:26

Let's go back to the 11 is something you said there. You said at some point I asked you at what point did you change

1:01:32

your mind and say I don't think American 11 is is I don't think it's any longer flying south at a low level. I think it

1:01:38

actually has crashed. And I think you said you thought it went into the Pentagon. I thought that was the plane that went into the Pentagon when I heard the

1:01:43

report. When you heard the report that the Pentagon has been hit. Yes. And how did you hear that report

1:01:49

from the news? Where were you at that point? We were the Pentagon. We could have been upstairs.

1:01:56

You weren't at your scope though. Was that Thursday? No, they they removed this from the positions

1:02:01

maybe 10 minutes after 15 minutes after this occurred. Okay. So, I'm just trying to get a a

1:02:09

time frame reference um because you said then at some point though when you heard confirmations of the American 11 hitting

1:02:16

the trade center and then you realized that it was probably American 11. Was that after then you thought it was it was American 11 hit the Pentagon?

1:02:22

Yes, I was after that sometime after the point of impact of the Pentagon. Did you then start to

1:02:28

think, oh, American 11? Well, not not thinking that's that was finally said it was American 11 that hit

1:02:34

the trade center. Who said you ran it? Could have been on the news. I might have been home already. I I don't recall

1:02:40

when that information got to me, but it was only it was after the Pentagon had

1:02:46

been hit. Okay. So, it was after the Pentagon was hit would be the first time that you would were thinking that American 11 may

1:02:53

have hit the trade center. Well, it was confirmed. Okay. Is it fair to say that prior to that

1:02:59

though, you didn't think that American 11 had been the aircraft that hit the first one? Yes, that's correct. prior to hearing the confirmation.

1:03:05

Yeah. At some point after the I never And you want to know ju just your thing

1:03:13

at that time now I can say it. It was I couldn't even believe that a commercial

1:03:19

airliner could have actually hit into one of the towers. I I wouldn't have

1:03:24

even believed it even if told you say well no after I was told. Yes. I mean,

1:03:30

now that we know everything at the time, no, I would never until I actually witnessed the United descending down

1:03:36

into it. And then it's so then I started to believe that it could happen and it

1:03:42

did. Okay, I understand what you're saying. You would not have prior prior to seeing

1:03:48

the United 175 descend down into the towels, you would not have fathom that such an event would occur. Yeah, that's right.

1:03:54

Okay, let's go to the 175. Do do you understand what I'm I'm

1:03:59

talking about that as far as even in my mind I just could not even fathom it was so far beyond belief that that could

1:04:06

happen. I it never even occurred to me that that was American 11 that actually went into the treatment.

1:04:14

Sure. I understand what you're saying. Now let's look at 175 if we can.

1:04:21

Sure. Um, and again, I know it's hard to separate because you sort of had both of

1:04:26

these planes on your scope at the same time. Um, and both of them obviously

1:04:32

were, you know, determined to be hijacked at some point. Let's focus on the 175 now. You, uh, you

1:04:40

asked the 175 at around 851 to recycle its transponder code and it

1:04:45

doesn't, right? You've tried already numerous times to raise 175 on the radio

1:04:50

and you get no response. You've tried numerous other ways uh to contact 175.

1:04:56

Correct. You go back to the previous sector, right? You um also uh tried

1:05:04

other ways to raise 175, but you don't hear from That's right. At what point in time uh do you say to

1:05:11

yourself, I think there's something really wrong with 175? When I called sector 10, I was pretty sure that

1:05:17

something was wrong. I I don't remember exactly when I turned and said it to the chief, but I I think I said it after I

1:05:23

couldn't raise him any longer. I just turned and said I think I lost United 175. And that's in here. I call

1:05:32

Oh, it's when I call sector 10. That's around 853. We talked about your earlier um comment

1:05:39

to sector 10 where you say we have some problems over here right now. We may have a hijack. Right. You're thinking 175. You may?

1:05:46

Yes, I am. Okay. Okay. Fair enough. Tell us what what is your mindset then

1:05:52

going forward from that point coming when you first are thinking at 853 we may have a hijack of 175. What do you do

1:05:59

then? Uh I just like I said I turned and told the facility chief. I said I I'm I think

1:06:05

I just lost United 175. I told them but I I did not know that was actually

1:06:10

United 175. I did not see the two code changes

1:06:16

because they weren't responding and the airplane was climbing. I really didn't know whether that was

1:06:21

United 175 or another airplane. So when you look when you look for one

1:06:28

United 175 in that area of 851 when you're trying to raise them on the radio, are you looking at a coast track

1:06:35

for 175? Is that right? Well, no. I'm I'm looking for the actual target, the 175. The only target was

1:06:41

that other airplane that was climbing and it was climbing at a fairly good. Normally these airplanes don't climb

1:06:46

like that. And that other target was the code was squawking code 3321. Right. Yes.

1:06:52

Um and you separate from that um from that on the radar screen the 3321.

1:06:58

That that's why I asked sector 10. I said, "You happen to see this other target?" And then I pointed out this one

1:07:03

because at the time I did not realize I had no idea if that was United 175 or

1:07:09

maybe another airplane. Well, let let's let's stay on that. Let me ask you a question about that. You have this 3321 code that's squawking,

1:07:16

right? Right. And does that give you an altitude because it's squawking? Yeah, it did. And it w it was a it was

1:07:22

climbing higher than the altitude that the United 175 was assigned. Okay. So it was climbing higher than the

1:07:28

the assigned altitude and beginning to make a turn. And does it give you the 3321 code? Is

1:07:36

there any um identity of aircraft on it? No. So it doesn't say UA 175. Doesn't say

1:07:42

anything about an airline identity of a particular airline aircraft call number. That's correct.

1:07:47

There's no call sign. Nothing. At the same time, do you see a call sign

1:07:52

for United Airlines 170 somewhere on your screen? Yes. Separate from the 3321 target.

1:07:58

Yes. Okay. What does that look like? The United Airlines 175. It's just it's just

1:08:05

kind of moving on the scope or could have been stationary by that time. I really don't recall.

1:08:13

Yes, it was in a coast track. And the data that you get if any on coast

1:08:18

track again is you getting you mean what's it look like? It's the regular full data block.

1:08:24

Yeah. I want to know if you can recall this. What does it show? It's just it's it can still show it'll

1:08:30

show United 175. It can be xed out for the altitudes. It'll show the altitude

1:08:36

that he was signed. Let's say 31. But the next block will show what the actual true altitude is. That's usually now

1:08:42

gets locked out because it's no longer acquired on the target where you can get an altitude from. It'll still show the

1:08:49

computer number, but in the right hand thing, it should say coast, which is CST, I believe it is, but it was still

1:08:57

flashing to sector 10. Okay. Because you were going to hand them off to 10, right? So, when you look at that screen at that

1:09:02

point, do you think you have two different aircraft there? I did not know. Okay.

1:09:07

And and you're asking me, I I was not sure what was going on. Uh that's why I

1:09:14

asked if sector 10 might have seen the airplane seen the target. Some sometimes

1:09:20

even in our system they can stop tracking for a little bit

1:09:25

and then it'll it'll reacquire on the target. We lose targets sometimes. I don't know if you recall a while ago uh

1:09:32

when the president's airplane we actually lost a target for about 30 seconds.

1:09:39

And what can happen is there can be a glitch in the radar. Little glitches can happen. You can actually lose the target

1:09:45

for a period of time. And then what'll happen is all of a sudden the target will pop up over here and the the target

1:09:51

will now reacquire with it. So I was asking them, you haven't seen the target

1:09:56

around. Maybe I'm missing something. I'm not perfect. I'm I'm sitting there by myself. I said, do you happen to see

1:10:01

this target around anywhere? That's why I asked him. And then I pointed out the other target because at the time I did

1:10:07

not know whether that was United 175 or not. I was I felt it was but it was not

1:10:16

assumed. You had some inkling that it made might have been later on I got it reacquired that it was

1:10:22

the United but at that point before it was reacquired you thought it might have been but weren't sure. That's right. What factors then um at

1:10:30

that point when you didn't know if it was 175 for sure what what were you basing your statement on that we think

1:10:36

you may have a hijack what factors led you to believe that you may have just how how the American was hijacked

1:10:42

the World Trade Center's now been hit by an airplane uh that's on fire

1:10:48

just as all the I was the only one that was getting all this information at once I'm hearing the chief upstairs we might

1:10:54

have numerous things going on it just made sense Okay. Not not anything to do with

1:11:01

anything that was being said. As you as everything came in, you know

1:11:06

how like all the pieces started to come in. As they all came in for me, that's

1:11:12

the only thing that made sense to me. Okay. And then what action um did you take then when you thought that you may

1:11:19

have another hijack? I I said like I told him I I lost 175. Didn't know whether it was a hijacker or

1:11:26

not. I just felt that it was but there was no indication either way just that

1:11:32

this airplane was now climbing now it was beginning descent then it climbed again it just

1:11:39

I didn't know what was going on in the cockpit nobody was talking to us and the

1:11:46

other thing that came out that I didn't realize that in Boston center one of the things that was said was uh that

1:11:52

apparently when they were getting the transmissions they said we had more aircraft that was never passed to us.

1:11:58

You never heard, not to us, not to me anyway. Not to you as a controller. You never heard that Boston at some point verified

1:12:04

the statement from the cop of American 11. We have some planes. It was never passed.

1:12:09

That came up I guess I heard that in the interview. In the interview broker. Yeah. That's the first time you heard it.

1:12:15

Yeah. Okay. Let me ask you this, Dave. I think you said a few moments ago that at some point though um strikes Pat let me go

1:12:23

back to you say when you first see the 3321 code you think it may be an item 175 but you're not sure

1:12:29

right does that then later change after that you then yes

1:12:34

um as this plane is turning towards the

1:12:40

city 175 well the 3321

1:12:46

as it starts turning there was a city. I realized that the 2437 is going to be in conflict.

1:12:52

So I ended up turning him to a 170 heading off of what he was, which was about a 240. It's about a 50° turn to

1:12:59

the left. I tell him about the traffic and I asked if he could take higher because at the

1:13:04

time I think the traffic had hit an altitude, but it's starting down again, but it looked like he was going to be

1:13:10

right at 31 right with this airplane. Uh,

1:13:16

I climbed into flight level three. I climbed to 33,000 ft. Now the target

1:13:21

traffic appears to be descending. I call the traffic to him and he calls

1:13:26

it in sight. Now the traffic's actually underneath him. So I I gave him a hard turn to pass right overhead of the

1:13:34

target. and he reidentifies it as a uh

1:13:39

United Colors Boeing 767200 series which is what United 175 was.

1:13:46

In fact, here's the I'm trying to just give you a time reference. 857 Delta 2433 looks like a United 76200 as

1:13:54

far as I can tell. Yeah. So now I turn around I said this is United 175.

1:14:00

That's when you made a conne 767 United. Yeah. I said, "Here's United 175."

1:14:07

So around 857, you know, now I'm re I I know that that is now

1:14:12

United 175. I am reasonably sure. I'm about 95% sure that is United 175.

1:14:18

There's not going to be too many other 767s up there who came from that one target and now he's here. So now I'm I'm

1:14:25

about 95% sure. You're going to say 100? I don't know. if I'm ever 100% sure of

1:14:31

it. I I call it as United 175.

1:14:37

I actually tell Mike, I point to him. I says, "This is United 175. Here he is."

1:14:43

And in fact, you right after you were alerted to the identity of the that that

1:14:49

aircraft being a United 767, um you then

1:14:54

speaking uh to R9. Is it? Well, yeah. I

1:15:00

I I think remember when I told you how when things

1:15:06

are going on, you want to make sure you get things done. Well, those things weren't getting done.

1:15:12

I'm I'm I'm trying to do it. I don't know if we were flashing the handouts to the wrong sectors. I climbed somebody to

1:15:18

the wrong. Basically, in air traffic control, you have right way for direction of flight and wrong way for

1:15:25

direction of flight. on J75 heading southwestbound. Right. The right way for

1:15:30

direction of flight is flight level 310 or 350. Now I had an aircraft that was

1:15:36

heading down that way at 330. They can have traffic coming up at 33. You're supposed to verbally coordinate

1:15:43

traffic. It's right in the book. You verbally coordinate wrong altitude or direction of flight with another. So

1:15:49

they understand that that's coming. Even though it's in the data block, I still do that. this time I really don't have

1:15:56

time and that's why I asked him I said just please take everything because I already have this guy at the wrong

1:16:01

altitude and I give him control or whatever and I just said please just take everything from me because

1:16:08

we were flashing handles right on the boundary this and that and they ended up sending the supervisor around to find

1:16:15

out what was going on cuz they don't know right and when he saw everybody huddled around

1:16:20

the scope at 42 which is I was working he runs back and says just take everything. Don't ask him questions.

1:16:26

So now it's around it's around 857 which is approximately 6 minutes before the

1:16:32

south tower was impacted by by United 175. We now know obviously but going

1:16:37

back to 857 on that day. You now have associated the beacon code 3321 with to

1:16:44

be United. Yes. And it's given you an altitude rate. Um do you does anybody uh call at any

1:16:51

point the New York trade time? It was called and I don't know who called it. I believe it was Lori called the Treycon.

1:16:58

I believe Tony did or Lori being Lori or Lori Barrett. One of them called the Treycon.

1:17:05

Lori Barrett or who was in? It could have been Jimmy V, but do you remember who actually called? Cuz the TCON was watching it. In our building,

1:17:13

people were walking around and handpointing out the airplane to people. Uh cuz

1:17:21

I I like I said when things start to happen everything doesn't go exactly as

1:17:27

planned and that's why everybody helps each other. So they went around, watched this airplane, watch this one, this one, it's

1:17:34

thing. We didn't really know. Now we know it's United 175 again after the Delta Re identified them.

1:17:41

And that's when we almost had a nice collision with the one with sector 55 at the time when they were issuing

1:17:48

clearances like uh you know do whatever you can or whatever. I wasn't privy to all that information because

1:17:54

just pick whatever invasive means. Yes. You need to take to avoid the United

1:18:01

Tell me, well, tell me what happens in those ensuing minutes after you equate the beacon code

1:18:07

3321 with United. Just watched him

1:18:13

turn towards the city. He went back down, then he climbed back up again. So,

1:18:18

at that time, we were hoping that maybe he was just going to land at Kennedy or or or head

1:18:25

up the thing because he did climb back up again. Then they just started to descend and

1:18:30

his last 10,000 feet he went down in about one minute. I don't know if you picked that up on

1:18:36

that thing. I didn't want to watch it yesterday again, but in about one minute he descends to about 10,000 ft. And

1:18:42

that's when, like I said, we just happened to watch it all occurring like the tron screen. What's this guy doing?

1:18:49

Nobody knew. Now you knew he was descending at a rapid rate of speed because you were

1:18:54

getting an altitude from the code, right?

1:18:59

and you see him descending towards the city and you think the tray is going to advise. Yeah.

1:19:07

What happens uh with that beacon code 3321 on your screen? How long does it remain on the screen?

1:19:14

So I think he had 2200 feet and then it disappeared. Disappeared at 2200 ft. I

1:19:19

think it was 2200. When he disappeared from your screen, did you assume at that point one way or another whether he was

1:19:26

continuing to descend? Yes. You assumed he was defending. Like I said, the the words in the area

1:19:32

was somebody yelled out, "Oh my god, he's in the ground on the next hit." Cuz he was going down that fast. And then

1:19:38

somebody else yelled out, "Oh my god, that's the trade center right there."

1:19:44

When you say the statement someone made on the next hit, oh my god, I'll be on the ground on the next radar sweep on

1:19:50

the next out. That's how fast he was descending.

1:19:56

And how often do you get? Uh, it's five sweeps a minute. So every 20 seconds or 12 seconds. So there's 12

1:20:02

seconds. 12 seconds. I don't know if you watched it right to

1:20:09

the very end. Uh, so and yeah, if you watch the altitude,

1:20:14

he's descending at a very rapid pace. the last like five hits. He goes from 10,000. And what you can do is you take

1:20:22

whatever it is, the altitude that changes, multiply times five, and that gives you his rate of decent. And he was

1:20:29

almost doing 2,000 ft each hit. Before anybody had before you heard that

1:20:35

anybody may have seen the second impact on television, did you assume when he

1:20:41

went off the screen that that he was headed for the trade center right then? Yes. That was just Yeah.

1:20:47

And did that was that confirmed for you was by somebody? Oh, yeah.

1:20:53

Immediately or what was the No, not immediately. We were just all kind of in shock

1:20:58

watching this and I turned over I think a Southwest had asked her directly said

1:21:04

no. And um we were just all kind of sitting in shock and then I don't know who came

1:21:10

in and said um the airplane just said the trade center because they were watching on TV outside.

1:21:15

Could it could that maybe Kevin Delaney? Do you remember? Don't remember. Okay. Somebody somebody

1:21:21

came in and went was out of the cafeteria watching TV and said the second the United just hit the

1:21:27

Well, he said a second airplane just hit the trade center and you equated that.

1:21:34

Let me um ask you this. What happened after this after that United 175 hit the south tower? What

1:21:41

happened to uh your sector 42? Is it closed down? All I remember is, you know, we stopped

1:21:47

taking traffic. Tony was sitting on my age and I I forget at what particular time he signed

1:21:53

in. There's a lot of stuff was going on. He might have even made the point out because I remember asking I said, "Is

1:21:58

everybody Washington United?" And he goes, "Oh." He's over calling everybody at the time. And he might have even

1:22:04

asked on the thing. Could you point this out to the Treycon? Because we might not have had lines to the TCON, the high

1:22:10

altitude sector. I don't know if 42 has a line actually, but also I think the

1:22:16

supervisor, I don't was telling them make sure the Treycon's watching this and that. Everybody was kind of working

1:22:22

now that everybody knew that something bad was going on. Everybody was trying to work together to ensure that

1:22:28

everybody was watching this airplane. Not that it made any difference, but prior to 175 hitting the trade center,

1:22:35

was it do you know whether it was declared a hijack here by I don't know. Okay.

1:22:40

I do not know. Okay. You thought you had one though and you reported you said did you report to

1:22:46

one of your either area supervisors or to Michael for that you thought 175 may be a hijack.

1:22:52

The only thing I don't I don't know if I actually used the word hijack to them. I just said I just I think I just lost

1:22:57

United 175. Lost them meaning it could have been a hijack. I didn't know what

1:23:02

had happened. I was thinking it is I think I might have said hijack to them.

1:23:08

You're asking me recall I was verbalizing a lot. I can remember certain things being said to me but what

1:23:15

exactly I said I can't remember that my what my exact phraseology or terminology

1:23:21

was but I might have said hi Jack. I really don't recall if I if if somebody had declared 175 a

1:23:29

hijacked here at the New York center. Are you familiar with any procedures that would be in existence to try and

1:23:35

enlist military assistance? No. As far as from my point of view, the

1:23:41

only thing I I do is I I report it. What they do with the information after that,

1:23:47

I I couldn't even tell you. I don't know who they call, what they do. It's like

1:23:52

certain things we're we do certain things when we have to like when we get an ELT you report it to supervisor. What

1:23:57

they do with it from there on is usually they bring it up to the front and then the front makes a determination meaning

1:24:04

like the TMU unit. So if you think if you think on your watch that you have a hijack, you're you're if I understand it

1:24:11

correctly, your responsibility will be reported to a superior and the superior has the has the uh the duty or the

1:24:18

responsibility to make whatever contact. Yeah. Because really can't do anything. I'm I'm

1:24:23

working in position. The only thing I can do is you relay it up through the chain of command, I guess. Do you know,

1:24:29

David, if with regard to United 175, do you know if any military assistance was

1:24:35

ever requested? And when I say do you know, I mean not only then, but even as you sit here today, I thought so. I I'm I'm pretty sure when

1:24:42

you talk to some of these other people that they were really screaming with the military to get here as soon as possible

1:24:48

with regard to United 175. Okay. What about when you go? I I think some of them up front were

1:24:56

under the assumption it was the American that went in after the United disappeared. I think some of them up in

1:25:03

the TMU unit had been as they were watching my scope and things like this because they knew things were happening.

1:25:09

I think they were under the assumption it was the American that went in initially that went into the first tower. Yeah.

1:25:14

after they saw the United saying then you know that's not what I I think prior to that I I think they

1:25:21

were assuming it was the American that got a few of the guys up there now that might have been

1:25:26

they got they went into the second tower now that might have been hindsight tower is it no the first tower though what what I'm

1:25:32

saying is and that could have also been after they got all information everything like that they're saying yeah

1:25:37

I knew it well I didn't know it was but I wasn't getting everything I was only getting what information I was getting

1:25:45

from the airline airplanes, the targets, hearing the tit was on fire

1:25:52

and hearing what Mike said, I was still assuming it was a smaller airplane. In fact, you say Mike was next to you

1:25:59

when he was mentioning something about a small aircraft from that may have been tower.

1:26:04

So when you say the people up front that he think about people other than Mike who thought maybe American 11 hit the

1:26:09

first tower. Yeah, I think the people uh couple of people might have

1:26:15

uh in the traffic management indust. No, not particularly.

1:26:21

Bab's one of them. No, he was actually in the area. Your area? Yeah. Somebody said to me,

1:26:28

Bruce Barrett, do you remember? I didn't even talk to Bruce. Okay. To be honest, and I do I'm very friendly

1:26:34

with Bruce. Okay. Uh, I don't know if they thought it was the American. Couple of the other

1:26:40

guys said, "Oh, we thought it was when the the target disappeared." But I don't even know if they were sure at the time

1:26:46

cuz I sure wasn't. Well, do do you think then that there was at least some confusion?

1:26:52

There was a lot of confusion going on to what hit the first tower? Yes. After I think there was a lot of confusion to

1:26:58

that. So, was it fair to say that you think some may have thought it was still a small aircraft?

1:27:03

Yes. after the United 175 even impacted that some may have still thought it was a small aircraft. I sure did.

1:27:08

Okay. And some may have thought it was American 11. Yeah. Okay.

1:27:14

Um so and you also think that a military assistance was requested by somebody in New York Senate to uh to with regard to

1:27:22

the United 17. All I remember is Aana was telling me that when she was up in the TMU unit reporting all this that

1:27:30

somebody was yelling for the military to get down there ASAP

1:27:35

from the 175 of the dispute. I remember hearing that there was a lot of vocalization going on in the traffic

1:27:42

management unit. Now you did um

1:27:48

Yeah. I was I I'm only listening to what I heard like behind me like what people

1:27:54

were saying and that might have even been said afterwards cuz sometimes it all starts to run together. Do do you

1:28:00

know what I'm talking about? What I'm telling you I actually heard was when Mike said it to me. I was really sitting

1:28:05

at the second, but some of the other stuff is filtered into me and it's it's hard for me to differentiate whether it

1:28:12

was being said to me right at the time when this was happening or afterwards

1:28:18

when we were talking about it because it all happened within, you know, an hour

1:28:24

or two. It starts to run together some of the stuff. I can remember vividly some of the things that were being said.

1:28:30

other ones. I'm not sure exactly when it was said, whether it was at the sector or maybe it was upstairs when we were

1:28:35

giving our statements because you heard these statements being given. It was everybody else was giving stuff. So, I

1:28:42

might have picked up stuff from there and just put it all together because I can't tell you exactly when the timeline

1:28:48

was when I heard that. Let's look at some of the factors with the United 175 prior to the crash. At

1:28:56

some point, you realize that he he's not contacting you on the radio. not responding to you, right? And then you

1:29:02

at some point associate this new beacon code 3321 with to be United 175.

1:29:08

Correct. And that's when you get the visual from the other aircraft that is 767 United. Yeah.

1:29:13

In the area of that 3321 beacon. So now you've got um a change of a

1:29:19

transponder code and a noro situation with this aircraft. Right. And now let's add the third factor that

1:29:25

it's deviated from its course significantly. Is that fair to say? Oh, significantly.

1:29:31

Is those are those three factors uh together given the mindset of your training and

1:29:37

experience as it existed on September 11th, were those three factors enough in your mind to declare this hijack or for

1:29:45

you to take take the position to your superiors that hey, this is this looks like a real hijack? That that that's what I did.

1:29:52

only I probably would not have except the American been hijacked. One

1:29:58

airplane's already hit the trade center and now this one. And that that was the

1:30:04

mind because we we had an incident where we had a 767

1:30:12

lose all power. They couldn't talk on the radio. Do you remember when that occurred and the guy

1:30:17

made the emergency landing at Kennedy? No. And this happened a few years ago

1:30:23

where and and it's with 767s apparently when they lose all their

1:30:29

power, they they lose something, they don't have much time to get the airplane down on the ground.

1:30:35

And I don't think the guy could really even verbalize much because that little bit of power was enough to drain the

1:30:41

batteries. I don't know if they've corrected that, but we had an incident like that happen.

1:30:46

I don't know if John Hoffman was involved. Maybe it was um Joe George. It was that

1:30:54

long ago. Do you remember it now? So Dave, if I'm Let me just see if I can

1:31:02

follow up on your your answer here then. But they didn't even have a transponder at

1:31:08

the time. You're referring to this other incident. Yes, this one had the transponder on.

1:31:13

So you can see Alvin. Yes. Okay. Let me let's let's stick with this for a minute here. area. So I actually I

1:31:21

said there were three factors at some point before impact namely one that this United Airlines 175 was Nordo no radio

1:31:28

contact two there's a transponder code change and three is significant course deviation you have very correctly

1:31:36

pointed out that at that time you had also heard that American 11 was reported as hijacked by Boston so that's a fourth

1:31:43

factor and number five that some type of plane be it small aircraft or otherwise

1:31:49

had hit the first world trade center. Yes. And that there's a major fire there.

1:31:54

If if you can and I don't know if you can try and go back a time and separate this but if you had not heard and this

1:32:01

is hard to do but if you had not heard that American Airlines 11 was hijacked and if you had not heard that any plane

1:32:06

in the first world trades in other words if we could take those incidents out and assume that they didn't occur that it was a single hijack episode or that

1:32:15

there was a single episode being 175. Do you think that at that point you would have been thinking hijack on 175?

1:32:22

I would not. What would you have been thinking? mechanical failure. I would think some type of a mechanical failure. The pilot can't talk to us. He

1:32:29

did change the code. So maybe implying that there is something wrong. Maybe they tried to put in, you know, 7700 or

1:32:36

one of the codes that tells us that they have an emergency, but he's too busy up there. He did switch and then couldn't

1:32:43

get it in and right and is now trying to just get there. Maybe he's losing. Maybe

1:32:49

that's why the airplane's climbing and descending because he's losing some type of hydraulic. Who knows?

1:32:56

Okay, let me ask you this then. Um, you do and it does look like he's heading towards the city.

1:33:01

So, absent absent the the initial hijack report of American Airlines 11 and

1:33:07

absent uh the World Trade Center being on fire, um you might have thought that United 175 had a serious mechanical

1:33:14

failure, but you might not. Hijacking would not have necessarily entered your mind. probably would not have entered my

1:33:19

mind. Okay. But obviously what happened on that day is we did have the report of

1:33:25

American 11. Well, everything was just coming in through me. I'm listening to Mike listen

1:33:30

everything as it was just coming into me. It's just like a computer filters all the data and then comes out with a

1:33:36

conclusion. That was my conclusion. Okay, fair enough. And I we've

1:33:41

determined or we've learned that um you you you being controllers in general go undergo a training each year on the

1:33:47

dynamic simulation training um and that those training exercises involve simulation of of hijack

1:33:54

scenarios. Correct. Yes. Prior to 911 did you undergo similar training?

1:33:59

Yes. And were you presented with hijacking scenarios that you had No. What we usually are is if you get a

1:34:05

hijack code come up, there's certain things you do. The pilots are supposed to put the hijack code in.

1:34:10

That's 7500, right? And then uh when you see the hijack, you're there's certain things

1:34:18

you can say to them or whatever. If the pilot's still in control of the airplane, hopefully it'll talk to you about the hijack code. They have certain

1:34:24

procedures which didn't work. But somebody did mention to

1:34:30

me, and this might be something that you might want to look into,

1:34:35

uh, I don't know how true it is, but apparently years ago the hijack code was a different code than the 7700 or 7500

1:34:44

and they thought it was in the 30s. Was in the 30s?

1:34:49

Not. This is something. Yes. One of the real old-timers did. Have you ever heard

1:34:54

that? I heard one of the real old-timers say that this I don't know how old the pilot was on United 175,

1:35:02

but if these guys were knowledgeable, he may have been trying to get it switched to the old hijack code to let us know.

1:35:10

And if there's old-timers around, they may have picked it up. I don't know if that's true, but I have heard a few of

1:35:16

the old-timers say it that it was in the 30s was the old hijack code. So your

1:35:22

training exercises though you say were pretty straightforward ones where the pilot would squawk code 7500 and hijack

1:35:28

would in fact flash on your radar. Were you were you ever presented your exercises with anything more challenging

1:35:34

than that where you had to sort of play detective and figure out whether it was hijacked without that code? You don't recall that. Were you ever

1:35:40

presented with a multiple hijack scenario in any of your training? More than one hijack going on in your sector at the same time. Tell them what

1:35:47

the training is. The training is basically Bottom line, the training page, this is the training

1:35:54

that you see hijack flashing up on the scalp because it really comes up. There's there's three things that can

1:35:59

come up. Actually, four that can come up. One, I won't you really shouldn't put in there because it it gets to be

1:36:06

common knowledge. Oh, you mean it's something sensitive? Yeah. Well, we can we'll mark that on the recording and we'll not

1:36:12

I don't know if it's a thing, but it's a suspect code. Like when the DEA puts a actual transponder on an airplane that

1:36:20

they suspicion is doing drugs, it comes up as sus. It could be anything, but

1:36:26

somebody gets something on there and it comes up with a suspect code. So, this will be marked for

1:36:31

and it actually highlights as being suspect. Then you have the hijack code.

1:36:37

You have the emergency code. All these highlight they actually flash 7700 with flash for emergency.

1:36:43

Yes. And then you have radio failure 7600 a day. Right. Okay. And the pilots are supposed to do

1:36:49

certain things. But like I said, in a real emergency, the pilot has

1:36:54

responsibility for his aircraft and his people that are on board. if he deems it necessary that he can't talk to us and

1:37:02

he has to descend that airplane or whatever, that's what he's going to do. So, if I understand correctly, and I

1:37:09

don't want to misstate it, it sounds like you're saying that the the exercises presented to you were not very

1:37:14

creative. Is that fair to say? No, they're not creative at all. and OB. It's fair to say that you also said

1:37:21

something just now too though that they all seem to be based on and I don't want to misstate it. So you tell me if you

1:37:26

agree or if I'm using the wrong words. Are they all the exercises based on the pilot uh maintaining control of his

1:37:34

aircraft? In other words, no being able to do what he's supposed to do, you know, just like we have certain

1:37:40

responsibilities they do. And we haven't had a hijacking in so long. It's just

1:37:46

well that's what I was getting at is our responsibilities. So training when you break down forget about the suspect

1:37:51

radio failure emergency code it is you see a 7500 code you ask the pilot verify

1:37:58

score 7500. So that's step one. Step two is tell your soup we're done

1:38:07

as a controller you're done. Yes. And from his I'm sorry that you

1:38:12

know and then the only other thing could be if depending what his answer is you know how that sounds and then there is

1:38:19

another way in verbal communication that he can alert us to a to a hijack.

1:38:25

So is it fair to say then that prior to 911 none of the simulated exercises contemplated a hijacker actually

1:38:31

physically taking control of the cockpit and getting rid of the American not squawking 7500? No.

1:38:36

Okay, that's fair enough. How about did you ever prior to 911 Dave did you ever participate in any joint exercises with

1:38:42

the military? And what I mean by joint exercise more specifically an exercise where the military was called in say to

1:38:49

escort or identify a hijacked aircraft. No, not not in in my experience. Uh

1:38:57

I I've never seen I'm I'm I'm sure it was done like that one that went to Atlantic City, but uh I have never seen

1:39:04

the military come in. I don't I don't I've never seen it. I don't mean Well, I'm talking not only

1:39:09

real life. I've never been in involved in So, let's let's clarify for the record. You've never been involved in a real life scenario where you had to

1:39:15

coordinate with the military fighter pilot to vector him towards a reported hijacked aircraft.

1:39:21

Correct. And you participated in in a simulation of that scenario? No. An exercise or drill with the military?

1:39:28

I have spoken because I worked oceanic at one particular time. I probably had

1:39:33

more experience dealing with the military than most of the people in my

1:39:39

area, but never anything like this. I mean, you do talk because we work with

1:39:44

the warning areas. We would work military aircraft like this, but never

1:39:49

anything to do with vectoring a man or anything like that. Usually either Huntress did it or whoever um what's the

1:39:56

one down in Virginia? Giant Killer. Giant Killer deals with the warning areas. So you would just bring them out

1:40:04

safely to the warning area, turn them over to Giant Killer, and then when Giant Killer brought them back out, they

1:40:09

either came out VFR sometimes, you know, you know, into Magguire or Atlantic City or whatever they were doing, and their

1:40:16

exercise would be done. I mean, they're fighter pilots. They have a lot better equipment on board. I mean, their

1:40:22

equipment's very good. I mean, they can pretty much zing in right on a target. They even buzz targets sometimes that

1:40:28

we're working. Were you familiar with um what who Niaz is on 911? Like did you know who Niaz was?

1:40:34

No. Okay. Or he's used to that. Northeast Air defense. Oh, yes. Oh, you knew who they were.

1:40:40

I I I've heard the the name. But what did they do? No. I figured they helped

1:40:46

protect us. You knew they existed. Yes. But you didn't know exactly what their role was. Yes.

1:40:51

Did you know they are also huntress? That is No. I mean, I talk to Huntress all the time. I have in the past. you know,

1:40:58

Huntress, you hear Huntress IP when it was in the ocean, you would just, you know, talk to them and stuff like that. Hypothetically, if you thought you

1:41:04

needed to contact these air defense sector in an emergency, would you even have known? Like, was there a number that you were aware of if you had to

1:41:10

contact them from your call just Okay. What about NORAD? Had you ever

1:41:15

heard of NORAD? Yes. And if you had to contact them in an emergency, would you on 911? No, I did.

1:41:22

Okay. Um, and on 911, I think we we probably covered this in

1:41:28

If you were, how would it how would you as a controller have detected a hijacking situation on on as it existed

1:41:35

say on 911 prior to the events that unfolded that day? Like we saying, you would see the hijack

1:41:41

code or uh something like that or but it involves some communication coming to

1:41:46

you from the from the aircraft. Is that fair to say? Yes. Uh like one of the things they can

1:41:52

say is this is American trip 111. Trip meaning that they were hijacked. They don't have to actually squawk 7500. They

1:41:59

can actually say American trip 111 or or whatever it is. United trip 175 and the

1:42:06

trip meaning and then you would respond back with United trip 175. Roger.

1:42:12

And then you would assume at that point that they are hijacking and you would

1:42:17

take no action to bother them. Our job is not to continuously call them, not to

1:42:23

try to verify anything. Are you hijacked? We we do no none of that. Once he says that he is a hijack, you

1:42:31

basically do whatever he wants. And if he just starts descending the

1:42:36

airplane and that's what the the guy behind him tell him to do. But I don't know if we've ever had a case where

1:42:42

somebody else piloted the airplane. Were you prior to 911? If the pilot

1:42:48

didn't tell you in a code word like trip, and that's classified potentially for this this

1:42:54

interview, but if he didn't tell you with a code word like trip or swap 7500, was your training then not to declare a

1:43:00

hijack unless you got some signal from the pilot? Yeah.

1:43:05

Um, I guess lastly, um, had obviously

1:43:11

the events of of of 911 were were startling to to a number of people. Um,

1:43:17

but let me ask you this. Have you ever even heard uh anywhere about such a scenario even being potential? When I

1:43:25

say such a scenario, I mean somebody commandeering a commercial aircraft to use it as a weapon of mass destruction.

1:43:31

Had you ever heard any of your colleagues talk about veterinary or anybody. I would never have assumed it. To me it

1:43:39

was unfathomable just but you know it is

1:43:45

our mindset here is on human life. we consider the individual like I would

1:43:52

find it I find it very difficult when people light themselves on fire or

1:43:57

things like this because in America you look at human life as being the most important thing

1:44:04

and I think their mindset is a little bit different

1:44:11

they don't look at yeah they don't look at human life nor their own lives they're willing to

1:44:17

sacrifice their own lives to do. But we've had that in the past, you know, it's just to bring it up

1:44:25

as a thing when when you look at the military and I I like World War II a lot and you look at the dittle raid. It

1:44:32

actually decimated even though it did very little damage to Japan, it

1:44:37

devastated Japan because they had never been attacked. It actually pulled all their troops back in to protect the

1:44:43

homeland. That was a suicide mission. They basically took that and realized

1:44:48

they weren't going to make it. And thank God I think over we only lost a few pilots in that whole thing. The Chinese

1:44:54

did a great job. So we've had suicide missions

1:45:00

and never were we've done a non-military target. This was

1:45:06

this was like in the past they've always gone against military targets. This was

1:45:11

the first non-military target I think that they ever attacked for us. And to

1:45:16

us, we've never seen anything like this. Still to this day, still devastating to me. And it's it's it still boggles my

1:45:24

mind. Dave, let me ask you um if um after

1:45:31

after the second impact at some point, I guess was set to close down at at the time. Right away, the

1:45:37

supervisor was saying, "Shut off Boston. Shut off all departures." That was before we declared ATC0. our supervisor

1:45:43

in the area actually made that said shut off everything. Just tell them we're taking nothing.

1:45:48

And then subsequently New York went air traffic to zero. Right. Yes. And then I guess that means we're

1:45:53

shutting down the airspace, right? Yes. And then um do you remember then at some point either before or after that being

1:46:00

at a meeting with um thought to be a gathering with other colleagues and Marty Forier where everybody sort of got

1:46:05

together in a room and talked? Yes. Um, when you were in that in that room talking about what had occurred, were

1:46:11

you guys also discussing like factually what happened? Like, geez, how do we get here? Going over the events?

1:46:16

I think everybody was in shock. I I think we were just talking. They didn't We were just talking about what happened

1:46:22

and everybody kind of stumbled. I I don't remember how I got home that day. I know. I got in my car and left and I

1:46:31

was home. Do you remember what the purpose of that meeting was? Did anybody tell you like it was just try to get our statements as

1:46:38

it was still fresh in our minds? Nate, we just took we just gave verbal statements on tape.

1:46:43

Verbal statements as to what occurred on your watch that day with the planes. Yeah. With 175 and American 11.

1:46:52

Okay. That that's what I recall. I I don't recall us really sitting around just I think everybody was just in shock.

1:47:00

But you recall that especially if you recall some effort was made to to try to quickly get some sort of verbal

1:47:06

statement from everybody as to what they could remember before they went home. Yeah.

1:47:13

Um do you Okay, Dave, do you let me ask you lastly for me and then I'll see if Miles

1:47:19

has any process. Lastly, um if you were a commissioner and sitting in the shoes

1:47:24

of one of the 10 commissioners and at the end of this exercise, they're going to report to Congress and the White House and they're going to make certain

1:47:30

recommendations as those recommendations would affect aviation issues. If you were a

1:47:35

commissioner, what suggestions would you make to Congress and the White House as to how potentially to make the aviation

1:47:40

system either even safer or better than what it is today? And I want and I want you to consider everything including

1:47:48

equipment technology that you think might be out there that would help you as controllers that you that is

1:47:53

available that you don't have here as well as procedures that you would suggest changing or implementing. I think there's a couple things. One,

1:48:01

I believe in Boston center they have they can pull the tapes almost immediately. We don't have that ability.

1:48:06

It takes us quite a long time to be able to pull a tape. I don't they have that ability up there to get

1:48:12

well with um part of crew X they'll be able to do that. Actually the voice might not be

1:48:18

there but then we'll be able to replay it quickly. You're talking about the actual the voice tape of the Yeah, because they pulled the voice tape

1:48:25

pretty quickly that we listen to it right at the supervisor's desk. We're not allowed. We can't do that. I would

1:48:32

think it'd be nice to cuz you know sometimes you miss things like I miss things. If I couldn't didn't relisten to

1:48:40

the tape I would have never heard the one pilot ask me if the 767 was still

1:48:46

flying because I didn't hear I had something else I had to do. Even though he said it I missed that and somebody

1:48:53

else told me about it and I just missed it. Um, it was probably up there cuz I did

1:49:00

hear it, but I didn't acknowledge it. And it's just something I didn't want I

1:49:06

didn't even look at. And uh I one other thing that would be

1:49:12

an interesting thing to do is have something on the airlines that if they do happen to get hijacked that they

1:49:19

don't have to do anything physically. it would come up like maybe they have to punch in a code, do something every time

1:49:26

they sit in. So if they get removed from the seat or whatever, it comes up and

1:49:31

something else comes up on that code. I just think that's a you have it as a you

1:49:36

know how your car alarms have passive restraint, you know, passive alarms and and the ones that are passive are

1:49:43

actually better because as soon as you close that door, they aren't. When you when you uh go off break and

1:49:49

come back on, you're logged in. electronic, aren't you? We know it's you and nobody else that's that's sitting at

1:49:54

your controller position, right? Is that the similar type of thing you're talking? I would think so. Yeah.

1:49:59

You know, even if they they get up out of the seat, there's got to be something in that seat that should say that

1:50:05

somebody got out of that seat when they somebody else sits down, they should have to log back in. And if they don't, then something should get triggered and

1:50:10

say, "What's going on here?" Maybe you could transmit to them. Then you know something's wrong.

1:50:16

Anything else? Not that I can think of, Dave. Um, just on that meeting that you

1:50:23

had with the other controllers immediately after verbalize what you could recall, um, you wouldn't have any

1:50:28

problem if we were wanted to to listen to such pain and see if you guys

1:50:35

um, I need to take you back a little bit on 175 if you don't mind on the center chart to your right up there.

1:50:41

Yeah. You're probably the one guy that can help us a little bit. Uh, just looking

1:50:47

at that Just just just looking at the flight path of 175 on its southwest leg.

1:50:54

Yes. There's a there's a need there's a little turn to the right there. Um

1:51:00

and we're trying to to to sort that out a little bit. Explain to me the turns to the right that you're talking about.

1:51:05

This one right here as he's proceeding southbound. That's J80,

1:51:10

right? He's coming he's coming back on to J80. Well, he was he is actually flying J.

1:51:17

That is actual J right there. Uh before you got in, they may have given him directs.

1:51:22

Boston Boston here. I'm not sure if you're aware of this. Let me uh uh play

1:51:27

back a little bit for you to inform me. Uh American Air 11 and 175 Chris

1:51:34

and uh the controller in 20 I think up in Boston turns 175 to the right

1:51:40

precautionary to to make sure he is he is clear of American 11 because they don't have the altitude. as you didn't

1:51:47

hear. And he he puts him off this direction and then turns him back direct to Sparta.

1:51:53

Uh right. That's in our letter of agreement that they can go direct to Sparta. That the that the uh the pilot

1:52:00

themselves can go direct to Sparta without any when you inherit him, you don't have to tell them anything.

1:52:05

No. What the the the problem analytic problem we

1:52:12

have this is at about the same time that the EL transmission is heard this is at

1:52:17

about the same time of the code changes. Okay. All all of that's happening in

1:52:23

this time frame. And the LA question we have is this turn back onto uh the airway

1:52:31

probably just done by the autopilot. And could you explain that a little bit how the autopilot would do that? It

1:52:38

doesn't take the pilot to do that. Is that what you tell me? No. Once they program in the coordinates

1:52:44

and let's say you give them direct to a fix like on their route of flight like

1:52:49

Sparta is on Jane, right? He turns him and says resume on navigation direct Sparta and rest of route is unchanged.

1:52:57

So now he puts in the data block and only because I've flown up there that I know this. They enter Sparta as a

1:53:04

waypoint. They enter it as long as it's on the route of flight. as it hits Sparta, it reps up the flight route that

1:53:11

it's supposed to go on and it flew J. And the plane itself flew J. As far as I would know, usually in those

1:53:18

767s, the pilots don't do very much as far as flying it until they land and take off.

1:53:26

They basically set the autopilot. They do all this prior to it. They know all the things that are going on. So

1:53:33

when when a pilot is up here and he is uh he is deviated and then turned back,

1:53:38

he's turned back to Sparta, he puts that into the automatic product, the autopilot, and then the autopilot will

1:53:43

make this turn. Yes. Irregardless of who's in the cockpit, as long as they haven't disengaged the

1:53:49

autopilot as yet. And up to this point, you would consider

1:53:55

that the direct sper? Sure. Jay's he's going back on course.

1:54:00

Yeah. Here's here's J. You can see it right here. J runs between Sparta, East Texas. This is all of the CJ16 J.

1:54:08

Sometimes they run same airways.

1:54:14

Very interesting the way they do this. Sometimes it's just like roads. You run them and they'll have the same road.

1:54:20

They come down. This is both J80 and J60 down here. But when he turns on here, he's flying J. Jesus, maintains on this,

1:54:28

and then heads out this way. Okay. A lot of times we'll give them direct like over to Larry so they could be off the

1:54:34

route. It just saves him a minute. That's a lot of fuel if you consider 100 airplanes a day saving one minute of

1:54:40

flying time. So once he made the turn, he looked like he was just flying JD. So he's on course. He's not he doesn't

1:54:46

go off course. Go he doesn't actually go. That's why even in this area here, I'm not really concerned. He's still on course.

1:54:52

This this to you on the scope is absolutely normal. But regardless of who's in a cockpit or what the status of

1:54:57

the takeover is, the plane's on autopilot and it's going to make that turn. If it's a sling alpha, which is

1:55:03

nonautopilot, these the 767s have tremendous. All the newer airplanes have

1:55:09

just tremendous stuff on on them. They they'll fly these routes perfect. The ones that won't fly the roots go to,

1:55:15

let's say, a SL alpha where they're manually tuning in these radials. These

1:55:20

are all radials. Here's like the 249 over here. These are all radials that they fly to stay on the airways.

1:55:26

But that's not the case with the 767. No, this guy was right on the course and it was like just flying right down J. So

1:55:33

I nothing was really until he actually started to climb in here that I became worried and then once he started making

1:55:39

the turn. I don't know at what particular time I was trying to talk to him in here.

1:55:46

Was it prior to him? the the recycle I think came right at right at about the

1:55:51

time he turns is when you ask him to recycle but it's it's within seconds when we have the American

1:55:57

Yeah. So I'm still looking at it. This did not look anything.

0:01

Well, was that the spot where the code

0:04

was changed?

0:05

Uh, no, it was about see that's that's

0:07

the analytic issue. It's about that time

0:10

or even prior to that that the code that

0:12

the code has changed the the turn the

0:15

code change and the ELT transmission is

0:18

a little bit before that and then the

0:20

code change and the turn are about about

0:22

the same time. So, it was hard for us

0:24

without having an appreciation for what

0:25

the autopilot and the 767 can do to

0:29

appreciate what you just told us in that

0:31

answer.

0:32

Pete, do you have any other

0:33

recommendations you'd like to make? You

0:34

gave us two uh two good recommendations.

0:36

I guess one was that Boston could replay

0:38

the case immediately. New York didn't

0:40

have the capability.

0:41

Well, I think it's within minutes they

0:42

can they can get it. We don't have that

0:44

capability here yet. It takes long. How

0:46

long does it take to they have to

0:48

actually pull a tail?

0:50

Fast is the person downstairs can pull

0:51

it.

0:53

Somebody's got to call down say what

0:55

time pull the code up now.

0:58

How about And then you talk about being

0:59

able to punch in a code when somebody

1:01

sits in the pilot seat. Any other

1:02

recommendations that you have? No, I

1:05

mean those are just things I I mean even

1:07

if they did punch a code up instead of a

1:08

sidejack, it's nowadays I think things

1:12

would happen a little differently, but

1:14

you know I I look at it unfortunately

1:16

over a major metropolitan area. What do

1:18

you do with an airplane like that?

1:21

I don't know. Not an easy not an easy

1:24

decision.

1:26

Do you know if you remember anything

1:27

after today even Dave that comes to your

1:29

mind about recommendations to make the

1:30

aviation system safer? just give us a

1:32

call direct and let us know.

1:33

I hope I was a little helpful to you

1:35

guys.

1:36

Extremely helpful, Dave. And

1:37

absolutely helpful.

1:39

You know, if you want to go up and look

1:40

at the sator with me and ask me some

1:42

questions, I'd be glad to do that. Your

1:44

your explanation just now resolved, I

1:46

think, a need for us to to run you

1:47

through the story. Again,

1:48

the the other thing too is you might

1:50

want to even talk to a pilot of a 767

1:53

and discuss with them what might have

1:55

been occurring, why this things could

1:57

have happened.

1:58

Sure. and they might have a little more

2:00

because they fly the airplanes all the

2:01

time.

2:02

We have another team just so you know

2:03

Dave too that's looking at um the

2:05

airport security issues how the security

2:06

was breached at the airports physically

2:08

and looking also dealing with companies

2:10

dealing with the companies and trying to

2:12

figure out what was happening in the

2:13

cockpit in the plane. So we're also

2:15

looking the commission is also looking

2:16

at those issues. Um Dave thank you very

2:19

much for your time on behalf of the

2:21

commission. Um and we really appreciate

2:23

this 10:20 a.m. And this concludes the

2:25

interview with David. Thank you.