Sources:
PDF:
Audio:
Part 2:
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/178994788?objectPage=2
Archive.org back-up: 2 Files
Steve Saul Interview Part 1:
Steve Saul Interview Part 2:
https://youtu.be/zyWjL7aA9ww?si=S4HmvaKVuJ1Mivmi
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/178994788?objectPage=2
Archive.org back-up: 2 Files
Video:
Steve Saul Interview Part 1:
Steve Saul Interview Part 2:
https://youtu.be/zyWjL7aA9ww?si=S4HmvaKVuJ1Mivmi
Steve Saul - Enjoy the Silence...
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/2609845
Archive.org back-up & transcript
Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of the Interview of Steve Saul (Saul, Steve) of the Federal Aviation Administration Conducted by Team 8
NAID: 2609845
Produced: december 16, 2003
1 File
Transcript:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDEvent: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York TRACON (N90)
Type of event: Interview with Steve Saul
Date: Tuesday, December 16, 2003
Special Access Issues: ID Check
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: N90, 1515 Stewart Ave., Westbury, NY 11590
Participants – Non-Commission: Mary M. McCarthy (Office of Regional Counsel, Eastern Region, FAA – One Aviation Plaza, RM 561, Jamaica, NY 11434: P 718-553-3259, F 718-995-5699)
Participants – Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown
Background:
Saul was a pilot and flew commuter airplanes prior to becoming an air traffic controller (ATC). In 1982, after the air traffic control strike, he was hired as a controller in the Islip area and as a training specialist. He worked as a procedure specialist, a controller in the LaGuardia sector, and then went to Islip Tower for two years as a supervisor. He returned to N90 as a specialist at the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), and then became a supervisor for Liberty sector. He has been a supervisor at Liberty sector for 13 years.
Saul was a pilot and flew commuter airplanes prior to becoming an air traffic controller (ATC). In 1982, after the air traffic control strike, he was hired as a controller in the Islip area and as a training specialist. He worked as a procedure specialist, a controller in the LaGuardia sector, and then went to Islip Tower for two years as a supervisor. He returned to N90 as a specialist at the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), and then became a supervisor for Liberty sector. He has been a supervisor at Liberty sector for 13 years.
September 11, 2001 (9/11):
American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11):
Around 7:51 AM on 9/11 Saul began a shift as supervisor for Liberty Sector. Around 8:40 AM Saul was training a controller, and there was a Controller in Charge (CIC) for the sector. The CIC called him over and pointed out American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11) which they believed was a hijack. Saul had just recently heard that a hijacker from an event from over twenty years ago had just been caught, so it did not surprise him that “someone” had “gotten the idea” to hijack another flight.
Since the flight did not originate in New York Center airspace, he could not pull up any information on the flight. This was normal, since the flight originated in Boston Center airspace. Saul was told that the last known altitude for the flight was 29,000.
Based on his experience, Saul guessed the flight had a speed of approximately 300 or 400 knots. Below 10,000 feet, aircraft are only allowed to have a flight speed of 250 knots, and thus this was alarming. Saul advised the floor that there was a NORDO flight, and did not spread news of it being a hijack so as not to alarm the whole floor.
Saul watched the radar at the “main bang” – the four mile gap directly above the point of a radar – for AA 11 to reappear on the radar. Saul expected to see the aircraft fifteen or twenty miles west of New York considering the speed at which the aircraft was traveling.
Saul heard a report that the World Trade Center (WTC) was on fire, and realized that AA 11 had hit the WTC. Saul thought initially that a disgruntled company pilot had done this intentionally, but not as an act of terrorism. He had not heard of the threatening cockpit communications. From the time he heard of the hijacking to the point of impact was approximately three minutes at the most, according to Saul.
Saul recalls that the pilots on the frequencies were conferring through the controllers and they had started to put together that it might have been a commercial airliner. But Saul had begun to think it was most likely a private jet sized aircraft. But the pilots were telling the controllers that it could not have been a small aircraft considering the level of damage to the WTC.
Around 7:51 AM on 9/11 Saul began a shift as supervisor for Liberty Sector. Around 8:40 AM Saul was training a controller, and there was a Controller in Charge (CIC) for the sector. The CIC called him over and pointed out American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11) which they believed was a hijack. Saul had just recently heard that a hijacker from an event from over twenty years ago had just been caught, so it did not surprise him that “someone” had “gotten the idea” to hijack another flight.
Since the flight did not originate in New York Center airspace, he could not pull up any information on the flight. This was normal, since the flight originated in Boston Center airspace. Saul was told that the last known altitude for the flight was 29,000.
Based on his experience, Saul guessed the flight had a speed of approximately 300 or 400 knots. Below 10,000 feet, aircraft are only allowed to have a flight speed of 250 knots, and thus this was alarming. Saul advised the floor that there was a NORDO flight, and did not spread news of it being a hijack so as not to alarm the whole floor.
Saul watched the radar at the “main bang” – the four mile gap directly above the point of a radar – for AA 11 to reappear on the radar. Saul expected to see the aircraft fifteen or twenty miles west of New York considering the speed at which the aircraft was traveling.
Saul heard a report that the World Trade Center (WTC) was on fire, and realized that AA 11 had hit the WTC. Saul thought initially that a disgruntled company pilot had done this intentionally, but not as an act of terrorism. He had not heard of the threatening cockpit communications. From the time he heard of the hijacking to the point of impact was approximately three minutes at the most, according to Saul.
Saul recalls that the pilots on the frequencies were conferring through the controllers and they had started to put together that it might have been a commercial airliner. But Saul had begun to think it was most likely a private jet sized aircraft. But the pilots were telling the controllers that it could not have been a small aircraft considering the level of damage to the WTC.
United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175):
Don Krizohlavy took over for Steve Vollaro, and received a “point out” of an aircraft. That aircraft was descending into Krizohlavy’s airspace. Krizohlavy was anxious, and Saul walked up to Krizohlavy’s radar, pointed at the target, and told Krizohlavy to consider it a “terrorist aircraft”. Saul remembers that the aircraft was descending from 16,000 feet and was traveling at approximately 400 knots.
Krizohlavy calmed down, and continued to monitor the aircraft.
Saul went to the TMU desk, and told Ron Regan, Bob Birch’s superior, that there was another flight incoming, and requested for there to be military assistance. Saul noted that his comment was out of frustration because he knew that there were no fighters close enough to respond.
Saul noted that he was alarmed because he held the opinion that if the aircraft was landing at one of those airports, it would not have been descending at such a quick rate.
Saul watched the altitude descend until the target disappeared from the scope.
Don Krizohlavy took over for Steve Vollaro, and received a “point out” of an aircraft. That aircraft was descending into Krizohlavy’s airspace. Krizohlavy was anxious, and Saul walked up to Krizohlavy’s radar, pointed at the target, and told Krizohlavy to consider it a “terrorist aircraft”. Saul remembers that the aircraft was descending from 16,000 feet and was traveling at approximately 400 knots.
Krizohlavy calmed down, and continued to monitor the aircraft.
Saul went to the TMU desk, and told Ron Regan, Bob Birch’s superior, that there was another flight incoming, and requested for there to be military assistance. Saul noted that his comment was out of frustration because he knew that there were no fighters close enough to respond.
Saul noted that he was alarmed because he held the opinion that if the aircraft was landing at one of those airports, it would not have been descending at such a quick rate.
Saul watched the altitude descend until the target disappeared from the scope.
Aftermath:
Within a few minutes all departures out of the New York area controlled by N90 were stopped per the direction of Ron Regan.
Within a few minutes all departures out of the New York area controlled by N90 were stopped per the direction of Ron Regan.
AA 77 and UAL 93:
Saul noted that some of the controllers were upset by the events of 9/11, and clearing the airspace was difficult.
He found out about the AA 77 and the Pentagon attack while speaking with his wife. He believes he was still in the facility when UAL 93 went down.
Bill Allen took over from Saul around 9:17 AM. Saul came back on duty approximately 45 minutes from then.
Saul noted that some of the controllers were upset by the events of 9/11, and clearing the airspace was difficult.
He found out about the AA 77 and the Pentagon attack while speaking with his wife. He believes he was still in the facility when UAL 93 went down.
Bill Allen took over from Saul around 9:17 AM. Saul came back on duty approximately 45 minutes from then.
Other aircraft:
Saul noted that there are general aviation aircraft that are allowed to fly the passage up the Hudson River, and that some controllers thought it might have been a small aircraft, but most of the pilots were certain it was a commercial airliner. Saul told the controllers that it was a commercial airliner. Saul noted that there was less certainty over the second aircraft that hit the WTC (UAL 175).
The Hudson River corridor is a passage through which flights can travel without restrictions as long as they keep their aircraft below 1000 feet.
Saul has no knowledge of the Sikorski helicopter or of ELTs on 9/11.
Saul noted that there are general aviation aircraft that are allowed to fly the passage up the Hudson River, and that some controllers thought it might have been a small aircraft, but most of the pilots were certain it was a commercial airliner. Saul told the controllers that it was a commercial airliner. Saul noted that there was less certainty over the second aircraft that hit the WTC (UAL 175).
The Hudson River corridor is a passage through which flights can travel without restrictions as long as they keep their aircraft below 1000 feet.
Saul has no knowledge of the Sikorski helicopter or of ELTs on 9/11.
Communication:
Saul did not speak with anyone from the Eastern Region FAA office on 9/11. Nor did he speak with Washington Headquarters. Nor did he speak with anyone from Herndon Command Center. Saul noted that the Watch Desk at N90 holds the responsibility for communicating with these entities.
Saul did not speak with anyone from the Eastern Region FAA office on 9/11. Nor did he speak with Washington Headquarters. Nor did he speak with anyone from Herndon Command Center. Saul noted that the Watch Desk at N90 holds the responsibility for communicating with these entities.
Record:
Saul noted to Commission staff that there is a Facility Log and a Traffic Management log, both of which report on air events that take place within N90 airspace.
Saul noted to Commission staff that there is a Facility Log and a Traffic Management log, both of which report on air events that take place within N90 airspace.
Kennedy:
Saul had heard that there was a flight that had been grounded out of Kennedy Airport that had passengers on board that were extremely suspicious. He is thankful that the flights were grounded quickly for fear that there were other hijacks planned.
Saul had heard that there was a flight that had been grounded out of Kennedy Airport that had passengers on board that were extremely suspicious. He is thankful that the flights were grounded quickly for fear that there were other hijacks planned.
Observations:
Saul noted that the airspace routes are so congested that it was extremely difficult to monitor the path of one flight that was off course.
Saul noted that the airspace routes are so congested that it was extremely difficult to monitor the path of one flight that was off course.
Additional Notes:
Saul noted that the aircraft carriers at times allow the passengers to monitor the frequency and communications between the controllers and the pilots. This is done at the discretion of the pilot.
Based upon his experience as a pilot and a flight trainer, Saul believes that aircraft cockpits need to be extremely secure.
Saul noted that there needs to be better security at the smaller airports as well, since general aviation aircraft would be very difficult to stop.
Saul noted that there are times that on the midnight shift he is in charge of the facility. He noted that he feels adequately prepared for that responsibility, and for the methods necessary to notify the military in case of another terrorist event.
Saul noted that the aircraft carriers at times allow the passengers to monitor the frequency and communications between the controllers and the pilots. This is done at the discretion of the pilot.
Based upon his experience as a pilot and a flight trainer, Saul believes that aircraft cockpits need to be extremely secure.
Saul noted that there needs to be better security at the smaller airports as well, since general aviation aircraft would be very difficult to stop.
Saul noted that there are times that on the midnight shift he is in charge of the facility. He noted that he feels adequately prepared for that responsibility, and for the methods necessary to notify the military in case of another terrorist event.
Video
Steve Saul Interview Part 1
YouTube Transcript
Screen 1:
0:00
It is uh Tuesday, December 16th, 2003, about 2:20 p.m. We're at the New York
0:07
Treycon and about to begin an interview with Steve Saul. And I am John Azerella,
0:13
teammate, 911 commission. Miles Kira, 911 Commission. Jeff Brown, 911 Commission.
0:19
Barry McCarthy, FAA. Steve, the FAA.
0:25
And Steve, your last name is spelled S A L. Correct. Correct. Okay. Steve, can you start off
0:30
by um before we get to the events of um September 11th by just giving us a little idea of your background and your
0:37
employment with the FAA, when you started and the various positions you've held and facilities you've worked at.
0:42
Okay. Um prior to uh working for the FAA as a controller, I was a pilot. I used
0:48
to fly commuter airplanes, twin engine trouble props. Um basically the airlines
0:53
I used to fly for owned by American Airlines right now, American Eagle. the series of buyouts as a flight
0:58
instructor. Went to college, got a bachelor of science in aeronautics and management. Um 1981, Reagan fired the
1:06
controllers. There wasn't much hiring going on. I was 26 years old. The hiring was uh basically stopped. So I thought
1:12
I'd try this and I figured get get my foot in the door to the FA or maybe fly for the FAA. If I don't like it, I go
1:18
back to commercial flying again, private flying. Um, I was hired as an air traffic
1:24
controller in uh, 1982. Um, I progressed pretty rapidly because of
1:31
my experience. I was a controller first in the ISOP area.
1:36
After I was also a training specialist, the new controls when it came in the ISOP area. I was a procedure
1:43
specialist. I work down here developing procedures and different aspects of the operation
1:49
as far as uh all all kind of procedures what route they fly with altitude letters
1:56
agreements and such after that I was a controller in the um another area of the
2:01
guardia sector here and then I went to work in I got a supervisor's job at ISO
2:06
tower I worked at ISO tower for two years as a supervisor I came back here I worked as a uh
2:12
traffic management specialist for one year and then I became a supervisor in the
2:18
area. I've been the supervisor in the area I am for 13 years. So I've been working for the FAA for 21 and a half
2:24
years, 19 and a half year, two years in Total and I still have the same position I
2:31
have now as a supervisor called Liberty Sector. Liberty sector. Okay. Is that what have you been a supervisor
2:37
in liberty sector for the last 13 years? Yes. Are you um when you're certified as a as
2:45
a supervisor for Liberty, does that uh meaning you're certified for um supervising the other areas or is that
2:51
separate certification? It's separate certifications. The only there's out of the five areas excluding
2:56
the TMU desk, you stay in one area. You can't go the other areas unless you're certified.
3:02
Have you ever held any of those other supervisory positions in the other four areas here? Um I was actually a
3:07
temporary supervisor traffic management desk for about um two months prior to
3:12
becoming a uh supervisor in Liberty area. I was a traffic manager specialist there and they started creating
3:18
supervisory positions up there and I was one of the first guys up there. So they made me a supervisor early and then
3:24
knowing that I was going to leave and a more senior s was going to take my position up there. So I only worked at
3:29
the traffic management desk and liberty sector as a supervisors but I worked in um you can four out of the six areas if
3:37
you count the traffic management area. Okay. Um if you can bring us to the morning of
3:44
September 11 and tell us um when you started working that day and what position you reported to.
3:51
Um I don't remember exactly if I was working at six o'clock in the morning or 7 o'clock in the morning. It was one or
3:58
the other. Um, so I was getting here at 6:00 in the
4:03
morning. If I wasn't here at 6, I was probably here by 6:30. It says here is at 11:51 uh universal
4:11
coordinated time, which would be um let's seeus
4:19
4 day. So 7:51 local. I was uh working I took
4:24
over as a supervisor in the liberty sector from another supervisor and I worked that position till uh 9:17
4:30
in the morning local. The first aircraft uh impacted around uh 8:45 local and the
4:36
second one roughly 9:00 local.
4:42
So I was there um 55 minutes 50 up about
4:47
55 minutes prior to the first impact. When did you um when how did you first
Screen 1:
0:00
It is uh Tuesday, December 16th, 2003, about 2:20 p.m. We're at the New York
0:07
Treycon and about to begin an interview with Steve Saul. And I am John Azerella,
0:13
teammate, 911 commission. Miles Kira, 911 Commission. Jeff Brown, 911 Commission.
0:19
Barry McCarthy, FAA. Steve, the FAA.
0:25
And Steve, your last name is spelled S A L. Correct. Correct. Okay. Steve, can you start off
0:30
by um before we get to the events of um September 11th by just giving us a little idea of your background and your
0:37
employment with the FAA, when you started and the various positions you've held and facilities you've worked at.
0:42
Okay. Um prior to uh working for the FAA as a controller, I was a pilot. I used
0:48
to fly commuter airplanes, twin engine trouble props. Um basically the airlines
0:53
I used to fly for owned by American Airlines right now, American Eagle. the series of buyouts as a flight
0:58
instructor. Went to college, got a bachelor of science in aeronautics and management. Um 1981, Reagan fired the
1:06
controllers. There wasn't much hiring going on. I was 26 years old. The hiring was uh basically stopped. So I thought
1:12
I'd try this and I figured get get my foot in the door to the FA or maybe fly for the FAA. If I don't like it, I go
1:18
back to commercial flying again, private flying. Um, I was hired as an air traffic
1:24
controller in uh, 1982. Um, I progressed pretty rapidly because of
1:31
my experience. I was a controller first in the ISOP area.
1:36
After I was also a training specialist, the new controls when it came in the ISOP area. I was a procedure
1:43
specialist. I work down here developing procedures and different aspects of the operation
1:49
as far as uh all all kind of procedures what route they fly with altitude letters
1:56
agreements and such after that I was a controller in the um another area of the
2:01
guardia sector here and then I went to work in I got a supervisor's job at ISO
2:06
tower I worked at ISO tower for two years as a supervisor I came back here I worked as a uh
2:12
traffic management specialist for one year and then I became a supervisor in the
2:18
area. I've been the supervisor in the area I am for 13 years. So I've been working for the FAA for 21 and a half
2:24
years, 19 and a half year, two years in Total and I still have the same position I
2:31
have now as a supervisor called Liberty Sector. Liberty sector. Okay. Is that what have you been a supervisor
2:37
in liberty sector for the last 13 years? Yes. Are you um when you're certified as a as
2:45
a supervisor for Liberty, does that uh meaning you're certified for um supervising the other areas or is that
2:51
separate certification? It's separate certifications. The only there's out of the five areas excluding
2:56
the TMU desk, you stay in one area. You can't go the other areas unless you're certified.
3:02
Have you ever held any of those other supervisory positions in the other four areas here? Um I was actually a
3:07
temporary supervisor traffic management desk for about um two months prior to
3:12
becoming a uh supervisor in Liberty area. I was a traffic manager specialist there and they started creating
3:18
supervisory positions up there and I was one of the first guys up there. So they made me a supervisor early and then
3:24
knowing that I was going to leave and a more senior s was going to take my position up there. So I only worked at
3:29
the traffic management desk and liberty sector as a supervisors but I worked in um you can four out of the six areas if
3:37
you count the traffic management area. Okay. Um if you can bring us to the morning of
3:44
September 11 and tell us um when you started working that day and what position you reported to.
3:51
Um I don't remember exactly if I was working at six o'clock in the morning or 7 o'clock in the morning. It was one or
3:58
the other. Um, so I was getting here at 6:00 in the
4:03
morning. If I wasn't here at 6, I was probably here by 6:30. It says here is at 11:51 uh universal
4:11
coordinated time, which would be um let's seeus
4:19
4 day. So 7:51 local. I was uh working I took
4:24
over as a supervisor in the liberty sector from another supervisor and I worked that position till uh 9:17
4:30
in the morning local. The first aircraft uh impacted around uh 8:45 local and the
4:36
second one roughly 9:00 local.
4:42
So I was there um 55 minutes 50 up about
4:47
55 minutes prior to the first impact. When did you um when how did you first
Screen 2:
4:54
Learn about the fact that American Airlines 11 was a possible hijack out of Boston?
4:59
Um like I said around 8:40 in the morning. I was um actually I was actually training somebody on the
5:06
back to be a controller in charge. The controllers have to actually change. So when I'm not supervisor not there
5:11
controller being in charge. So the traffic management specialist uh called Euroch asked me to come to the desk
5:18
he showed me this target that didn't have a transponder. What we see on our scope is little triangle
5:25
and he said that um that's American 11 took off out of Boston and supposedly
5:31
was rrooted over um Albany
5:36
and they believe he's being hijacked. Coincidentally, I heard something on the radio in the way they worked that they
5:42
caught somebody um about who hijacked a Canadian airliner about 20 years prior. So, it
5:48
didn't surprise me. I just kind of thought that, you know, somebody just got the idea to do this. You guys are
5:54
smiling. No, that's the first time we heard on the first time we heard that.
6:01
So, it didn't surprise me. I've been here when uh Lutan's aircraft was hijacked and like I said I've been involved in aviation since uh you know
6:08
you know I was 18 years old so I've been involved in his been very interested in
6:13
you know the whole industry. So anyway, Cole pointed to this target. It was a little triangle which was actually
6:20
pretty much over where we are right now. The center of Long Island was fast moving and uh he told me they thought it
6:26
was American 11 and I thought it was being hijacked and
6:32
keep an eye on him. And I went to they have up there a phal machine what we call we can check the flight plan. So I
6:38
went in there and I full rooted it which it would show me his router flight and
6:43
it showed him not being stored and the reason was because he didn't originate in New York centered airspace. He originated in Boston centers airspace.
6:50
So our we New York we knew nothing about it because our computer is tied. So I didn't know who it was. You know I was
6:56
trying to figure out you don't you didn't get the route of flight because it was not a it it was not stored it the flight did
7:03
not originate in New York Sentennis airspace. It originated in Boston centers. So our computer is not tied
7:09
into Boston centers. So I didn't know what I was just trying to find out what type of aircraft it
7:15
was. What kind of data, if any, could you get uh when you plug it in? I can get his uh is it I can get his
7:22
call sign, his type aircraft, what kind of navigation equipment he has on board, his whole route of fights or where he's
7:28
doing the West Coast, whatever it was. And were you not able to get any of that? Nothing. Nothing. So the flight didn't exist.
7:34
Okay. which is normal. That's a normal thing that would happen. Okay. Um
7:40
did you know anything? Did you and um Carl have any discussions about what altitude he was believed to be at?
7:45
Uh yeah, I think that's from what I read here. I remember I said they thought he might be at flight level 290.
7:51
And did did anybody tell you why they thought he might have been at that level? That was probably his last. Nobody told me why, but that was
7:59
probably his last spot cleared altitude or his final filed altitude, one or the
8:05
other. And if I full rooted that machine, I wouldn't be able to see that. He was moving fast as though he's
8:11
consistent as high altitude because normally an aircraft down low isn't going to be moving at that speeds.
8:18
All 10,000 ft, they're only allowed to go 250 knots. And this guy would he he probably had a ground speed of I'm
8:25
guessing 320 330 340. How did you guess that speed based on
8:30
what from my experience observing the target how fast it moves along the the ground? Okay.
8:37
Um and I basically it was very busy. I uh I told the controller who was working the
8:42
south position, Steve Valero, that uh the aircraft was Nordo. I did not want to tell him it was a hijack because it
8:47
was very busy. And then what's going to happen is you're distracting everybody from everything. And I basically I told
8:53
him, "We don't know his altitude. Stay away from him." Meaning using lateral separation. You know, if he's going this
8:59
way, just go behind him. Don't go underneath him. Don't go above them or whatever you think because
9:06
Right. So if you go behind him and it was just natural he was going to he didn't have to do anything. The aircraft
Screen 3:
9:11
would have passed through his airspace without it being in conflict. Did you um were you able to determine whether or
9:17
not there was uh air traffic at uh Steve's position that potentially in
9:22
conflict with there was nobody who would have been laterally in a position
9:28
conflict with conflict. As it turned out he never entered our Steveo's airspace because of
9:33
where he impacted. He never went through here. So after you um alerted Steve Valero to
9:38
the fact that the American 11 was uh you tell him it was just Nordo. That was it
9:44
with regards to I told him and I told him to stay out of his way and which was easy to accomplish. He didn't even have to do anything.
9:49
Did you tell him what call sign it was or did you say American? No. Did you tell him it was a commercial jet
9:54
versus a general aviation aircraft? I don't remember. Okay. What happened after you told uh after
10:00
you gave that information to Steve? Um I was watching the aircraft uh you know
10:05
and what happens is when the aircraft when any aircraft flies over we call the
10:11
main bang right over the radar site it'll disappear momentarily because the radar does not go straight up.
10:16
Okay. Okay. We have radar sites at Kennedy. That's the one he was using. We have
10:21
radar sites at Newark and Westchester and so and especially a fast moving
10:27
aircraft. You won't see it for you'll see about a couple miles before it hits the depends on the altitude. to hide
10:33
them because the radar goes out like this. Doesn't go straight up. So, I was
10:38
looking and you should have saw I should have seen it come out the other side of them, but we called the main bang and I didn't see it. Can Can we talk about the
10:45
main bang for a moment? That's new terminology to us. And is is this a
10:51
cone? Is it a cone or is it a cylinder? And at at higher altitude, does it take
10:57
longer to trans uh to go across that bang area?
11:02
Well, what happens is the radar will give you some false indications, especially with a fast moving aircraft.
11:08
The speed will actually lie a little bit. It feel like it's going quicker for some reason. And this is common, you
11:13
know, where you all the control are used to it. So, what'll happen is it'll kind of like disappear maybe two miles before
11:19
it gets there and then reacquire two or three miles on the other side. Now, that's now your radar here sweep
11:25
every 5 seconds, right? It goes around, my guess is about every six, six and a half seconds. So you're
11:31
tucking in two miles before it gets in it and goes through the cone and then
11:36
for about two miles there's a four mile gap that put a distribution if you're going right to the main bank
11:42
usually. So I couldn't so I uh like I said I should have seen this aircraft I had a good you know I've seen it was a
11:48
good target when it was over Long Island here. I went up to call I said you know
11:53
who who's told me bad orig I said I can't find American 11 and uh he's so we're looking up I went
12:01
up to the watch desk normally we were here so this is the area
12:07
this is normally where uh the supervisor is and there's a this radar scope
12:13
actually look okay I'm sorry that messed you up pretty good all right so the person we're working it
12:19
was right here right Okay. The uh so I went up to here to call and
12:25
I said, "I can't find him. Where is he? You see him?" You know, I expected to see him, you know,
12:31
um 15 20 miles west of New York at the speed he was moving. You know, I had I had no idea that he was down low. That
12:38
was the last thing I was thinking of. So, he said he can't find him either. So, I started walking back. He we both
12:44
looking at the scope and Carl's a very experienced person also. He couldn't find it and I couldn't. We're looking
12:50
and as I was coming around the corner here, I heard one of the uh
12:55
controllers say that the World Trade Center is on fire. And right then I knew I just said the old death letter word as
13:02
I was coming around the corner here and I I just I said, "Oh,
13:07
at that point there's no reason he should have disappeared for that long." Okay. So you I knew what happened at that point. I
13:13
knew you in your mind you equated that at that point with the crash into the trade center. Oh, no. doubt in my mind. I mean, it was
13:19
a very slight doubt, but I, you know, I just stopped in my tracks. I figured out what happened right then
Screen 4:
13:19
a very slight doubt, but I, you know, I just stopped in my tracks. I figured out what happened right then because he
13:27
should, the airplane should not have disappeared. It was a good target. And again, at high altitude, the higher you're going to see it better. So, I, you know, the lower altitude will be the target will be as well. Did you um
13:42
have any thoughts at that point about uh having concluded that he pro most likely hit the trade center? Did you have any
13:48
thoughts of that? The fact that it was last reported at flight level 29,000 ft. Uh did you think that was an accurate
13:54
report? And if so, that that had to be long before he crashed if he was at at
13:59
altitude 29,000 ft at some point. Well, I knew at that point that he never was. What I think what I was getting in
14:05
my mind quickly was how could this have happened? I'm thinking that a pilot went crazy, which has happened over in the
14:11
Egypt pilot, the 737 took it. You know, I thought I'm thinking that some pilot, you know, one
14:17
of company pilots did something stupid. That was my initial reaction. How could this happen? Not terrorists, you know.
14:24
Were you thinking um at that point that were you thinking um just after the first crash, the report of the fire that you
14:30
equated with the American 11 crash? Were you thinking um intentional act of the American pilot
14:37
or catastrophic mechanical failure? Were you thinking intentional but not terrorism? What were you
14:44
thinking? Terrorism? No, I wasn't thinking terrorism at that point. I wasn't thinking uh I thought that we had to be one of the crew
14:50
members had to do that. You weren't aware of the uh uh threats from the cockpit that uh Boston Center
14:56
had heard earlier? No.
15:06
From the time we were alerted to him probably or I was alerted to him till impact had to be
15:14
three minutes possibly.
15:21
That's what guess you know best I can remember. I'm sorry. Say that again. So
15:26
I said on the time that I was alerted to him till I you know I figured out he he hit the tower had to be three minutes tops.
15:33
I mean the guy was doing more than you know he's doing it had to be probably
15:39
even less if he was doing 300 knots doing 5 miles a minute
15:49
I would say it was no it had to be less than that at that he was doing better than that he was
15:55
moving you know you don't you don't see airplanes going that fast down that low you're not used to you see fighters do
16:01
it you know you're not normal to see that it's just on it's not natural for a controller to see an airplane moving that quick unless he's a fighter doing some kind of air show or something like coming over at the Yankee Stadium
16:13
or something or the World Series. Although well even then they'll be slowed down because they want you to see it. He's
16:20
not going to go zooming, you know, four and 50 knots Yankee Stadium didn't see it. But you know, we've seen other times
16:27
where and not that often around here. So there was no way in my mind at that time that I think he was low altitude.
16:34
And at that point, had you heard anything yet about United Airlines 175 at the point when you first heard there was a fire?
16:39
United 175. That's a call sign on the second air. That didn't enter the picture yet.
16:45
That didn't enter. I mean, I would think that guy would come along. And my at that point again, I'm thinking it's a
16:51
you know, it's a pilot. That's a very disgruntled pilot. Did something stupid. Well, did you share those thoughts um
16:57
with anyone else here? any be there anybody in management uh above you in the chain of command or for that matter
17:02
below you in the chain of command um at that point? Yeah, at that point no I we knew that that I mean they have
17:09
a lot of reports on the frequencies from the other pilots and they started saying I think uh some of the controllers were
17:16
saying maybe a little airplane hit it and then the pilots saying that wasn't a little airplane. They were figuring it
17:22
out. The pilots on the frequency were figuring it out kind of and the controls on the position was starting to figure it out that it was an airplane
17:29
and it was an airplane. An airplane. Um, was there still a debate as far as what you remember hearing about whether
17:35
it was a large or a small aircraft at first? No. I thought in my mind I started thinking that it was like an American
17:41
Eagle like a small jet like a uh that they have, you know, umbrella jet Echo 135 or 145. I just couldn't believe that it'd be, you know, you didn't think it was a jumbo jet.
Screen 5:
17:46
Eagle like a small jet like a uh that they have, you know, umbrella jet Echo
17:52
135 or 145. I just couldn't believe that it'd be, you know, you didn't think it was a jumbo jet.
17:57
No, not at that point. Again, I had no information on the flight. But, but uh I
18:04
I just couldn't, you know, like I said, I didn't People see all this stuff and it's like
18:09
a football game. It should have, could have, would have. You know, there's nobody in this that we know of who
18:15
this information say, "Well, why didn't you think of this?" Like, well, you know, we know the facts now. And a lot
18:21
going on quickly then. Plus, there's a lot of other airplanes flying. You have to still have to keep order and not, you
18:28
know, let something else happen. And what do you recall happening then after uh this event where the fire at the
18:33
trade center was reported and you were uh concluding that it was probably that
18:38
primary target American Airlines or whatever. Um like I said, there was a lot of
18:45
questions. The controls asking what's going on, what's going on? And then they started piecing it together. It
18:51
was actually I think a couple of people even said it was a small airplane that crashed into the towers and the they were getting it from the other pilots
18:58
saying no there's no way that was a small airplane. Um, you mean some of the pilots were saying
19:03
that? The pilots that saw the fire come out of World Trade Center was saying that wasn't as you know a lot of questions
19:10
going on. Um later on well later on when the second airplane I was kind of sitting at the desk so opening in
19:15
trying to you know try to figure out what happened and what what's going on. Um,
19:22
we heard uh I don't know if it was I think it was Washington Center talking to another child controller that Steve
19:28
Bolero was no longer there and there's another controller named Don Creali got him out and he was uh I heard him talk
19:36
about taking the point out which is a normal procedure from um I'm almost positive talking
19:41
about this second one. He says about 15 minutes late, I heard the south controller don south controller and he
19:46
would have taken over from he took over for bolero and his name is Don lobby.
19:52
K R I V O H L A V Y.
19:59
He took over Steve and I heard him take a point out from the center from uh I
20:04
almost positively watch him which is a normal thing means that the aircraft is going to enter the airspace but we're
20:09
not going to work it. All right. he's going to borrow our airspace momentarily. Mhm.
20:15
Okay. And I heard it and you know say to point out and then the aircraft was
20:21
doing a lot more than what Don expected him to do. Now he was descended more
20:28
into his airspace. So Don was getting uh upset because he has his aircraft descended in his airspace and uh he
20:34
didn't know exactly what was happening. I heard him call the center and he's getting anxious because he was worried about his other traffic. And at that
20:41
point, my wife talks a lot about terrorists in the Middle East and that and she says, "I was so lucky in that
20:45
point." I kind of put two and two together. He was upset and I just walked over to him and I said, I don't
20:52
see my exact words. Oh, I pointed to the target and I said, "Consider that a terrorist aircraft." I didn't know.
20:57
thought in my mind I thought maybe it was a fighter. You know, maybe it was a
21:04
fighter. But again, the way the guy was the way the guy was descending and at his speed, you don't fly a commercial
21:10
jet that way. Okay? A fighter you would see doing that. So at the rate of his
21:15
descent, as a speed, it's not a normal, they wouldn't do that. They they don't want to mess with the pressurization
21:21
system in the aircraft. So the transponder was on. So you could altitude. He's at an altitude.
21:27
And by the time I came over and saw him, if I remember correctly, he was descending out of about 16,000 ft. And
21:34
he was doing he was moving quickly about 400 knots was going he'd be slowing down if he's coming in first. You think it
21:41
was an airplane possibly going to Newark or Auadia but if he was it would have start bringing it back to even if they
21:48
weren't talking to anybody it start slowing the airplane down because takes a while to slow the thing down.
21:55
And where did you think from what you could observe where it appear to be headed at that time as he was descending it? from the area he came from. The only
22:01
he would be either a Newark area or Laguadia airport arrivals meaning in Peterbor, Morristown, Carwell, Newark or
Screen 6:
22:03
Laguadia the way he was coming in the area. So he was headed in that those general
22:08
direction of those airports. Yes. He'd be like off course slightly for those arrivals into those airports.
22:16
Did you um make any observations at at that point in terms of trying to
22:21
determine whether he was headed in the same direction as the World Trade Center where the he was heading eastbound towards the
22:28
city. Like I said, it would look like a normal look Newark area or Laguardi airport arrival. And like I said, he was
22:35
getting upset when I said that to him. He calmed down and you know,
22:41
accepted that he was coming in. And then I walked up to the TMU desk and the traffic manager at the time, Ron Reagan,
22:48
was up there and I poured into the target and I said, "Here comes another one. Get some military airplanes to shoot the bastard down."
22:54
Was he already when you were up there, was Reagan already looking at his scope or did you He was He was up there
23:00
scope, but he didn't see the airplane's alive. Told him about it. Was Bur there also?
23:05
I don't know. Ron was Burch's boss. So, and he was
23:09
looking at the Ron Reagan at the time was He was he was Burch's boss.
23:15
Now Tom White is Oh, okay. Right. Bur Ron Reagan retired and Tom
23:21
White took his job. Okay. But Right. Reagan is is the chain of command goes from Birch to you to
23:27
Birch to Reagan. Me to Burch to Reagan. But at that time he went straight to Reagan because he was there,
23:32
right? He was there. He was looking at the scope. I walked I pointed to the target. I told him, "Here comes another
23:39
one. Get some military plans to shoot the bastard down." That's what I said to him.
23:44
Did um do you know if there was any military assistance requested? I knew there was something around.
23:49
Do you know if there's any request at that point? Yeah. Um in response to either the first or the secondary?
23:54
I don't know. You know, I don't know. I knew there was, you know, just frustration. There
24:00
was I knew there was nothing going to be immediately airborne in the area. I knew the military aircraft. There's nothing based around here.
24:07
What did you get airborne equipped on that on that on 911? What do you think was the nearest active military base to respond to fighter pilots to respond? Fighter pilots. Yeah.
24:12
Um I didn't even think about it at the time. You know, I didn't uh I think I
24:18
I said it just as my frustration, you know, that just get the get the plan out. Well, at that point I'm you I
24:23
was not I I when I the second guy was coming and like I said, who knows
24:29
who it was? I mean it could have been the military. Nobody at that point. They didn't say it wasn't an an airliner. We
24:36
didn't know who it was. We didn't know that was United Airlines.
24:41
Did you Did you know that it was a little commercial aircraft? I I assumed it was. I was hoping it was a military aircraft.
24:47
Military will do things on their own and not talk to you and just do it. All right. They'll just show up, you
24:53
know, especially after and do what they have to do and then talk about it later.
25:00
So now you're observing the target as it as it heads towards New York City. Is that correct? Mhm. And can you tell it's continuing to
25:12
descend? So you can see the alpha descend right into the ground. And what happened when it got descended into
25:17
the ground? Disappears. Disappears from the scope. It disappears from the scope. Uh just
25:23
like if an aircraft lands in an airport, airport land, it lands, you'll see it. If you want, you can blow the scope up.
25:29
You can see them taxiing on the runway. um when you when you lost radar contact with it. What assumptions, if any, did
25:35
you make as to what happened there? I knew he crashed. I don't know what he crashed into and then there were
25:42
people that were watching on TV and they came in from the break room and they said that they saw it, you know, they
25:48
shot you over and over going in. John, can I I'd like to replay what we just
25:54
went through, but I'm using a uh for the record, I'm using a draft sequence of events prepared by New York Treycon, and
26:02
it approximates what you just said. There's some abbreviations and so forth there. And I want to make sure we got straight and who is who. And
26:09
approximately 1259 UTC, N90 Liberty South received a call from ZNY pointing
Screen 7:
26:15
out a target in the vicinity of Robinsville. ZNY did not know the identification of the destination of the
26:20
target. Now, as I understand it, you said that was no longer Steve Bolo, but that was Don Kalabi. Don was there as in Ni Liberty South.
26:28
That was Don. That's why he's getting upset. Well, who's this guy? We don't even know who he is. And I I said, "Well, we don't
26:33
know who he is. He's greet him as a terrorist now and see what happens." You know,
26:38
N90 Liberty South observed the point out proceeded uh proceeding on of course toward the New York City rapidly
26:44
descending at a speed before 450 and 500 knots, which is consistent with what you said. the Liberty South CPC certified
26:52
professional controller. That's 11. Tag the aircraft as P020.
26:58
When we get a point out, we just put a tag on it, a number. I can type in I can type your name on it. I can type almost
27:04
anything I want. P stands for point out. Okay. So, we just hit P and hit zero. And what it is, it just makes it easy to track
27:11
the aircraft. Okay. You're still going to see the same what you're going to you're going to see the same information. You're going to see a
27:16
fulltime altitude and ground speed and that that designation that P 02 Don
27:22
decided to put that right. You can put anything. Does that does that signify to you if
27:27
you saw P 020 on the screen uh you were looking at? Would that tell you who tagged it? What position tagged it?
27:34
So how does that tell what what's the because each position each radar scope
27:39
has a different symbol. Okay. Okay. A letter or a number and that corresponds to a frequency like this. Liberty South
27:47
would be a eight. 58. 58. Right. Okay. You probably won't see it. Okay. If you
27:52
look at the position next to it, it's 54. So anyone working on that radar scope,
27:58
they're talking to would be a 58. Over here be a four.
28:03
But how does that call sign? Um showing a blank piece of
28:08
paper. Oh, it's part of the data block. A data block. Exactly. You each
28:14
basically you're going to see a primary target for an aircraft. Uhhuh. Okay. That's an old transponder.
28:20
Mhm. Okay. You got a transponder, you're going to see a line through it. Mhm. Okay. Okay. So, if I turn everything off,
28:27
that's a raw radar. Mhm. When you saw uh the American 11, no
28:33
transplant, you saw a little dot. Mhm. But the computer superimposes a little triangle on it over it for us to see it better. Okay. Okay. Does it do that automatically or automatically? So that's why I say
28:45
American 11 triangle trucking along quickly. All right. This what you would
28:51
see over here. He's an eight. So his symbol will be an eight and there be a
28:56
line. All right. And so it's a P 020. I can say anything I want. So the
29:03
eight is associated with the symbol and then a line off of that will tell you to point out, right? It's called a leader line. So the
29:09
first time I saw him, let's say he was 116,000 ft and then over here it'll show his speed.
29:15
You say it was 450. I'd say let's say 450 knots. That's what we're going to see. The
29:21
center information if you look at Boston or New York is a little bit different. So when you see this on your scope, you
29:28
know that it is Dawn that did that because of the eight, right? And then the P is a point out and it's a unique
29:33
identifier gave it and you pick up the speed and the normally this would be the call sign. It would normally be the eight you know and
29:39
you see the target right underneath and was it United 175? That call sign. Yep.
29:44
United 175 16,450 knots. Okay.
29:50
That's what a transponder would look like. Right. That if we knew that if that was him, that's what he probably would have
29:55
put on it. The transponder is this line. Mhm. That's the transponder.
30:01
Transponder and that's it. So basically you also see a splat on these aircraft.
30:07
All right. Say if there's nobody talking to them. You see what's called a splat like this. Okay. And then if you
30:14
had you can set your filter limits how low you want to see how high. He would have been looking at this when I saw it at 16. So you'd see that splat little line 16,000 ft. Okay. So,
30:26
If I had an airplane flying this way, obviously I wouldn't climb. And he's going This guy's going this way.
30:32
Obviously, I wouldn't. He's climbing in a conflict at this guy. Even though I was He could be a VFR airplane flying
Screen 8:
30:32
Obviously, I wouldn't. He's climbing in a conflict at this guy. Even though I was He could be a VFR airplane flying
30:37
around. You're going to move him. I'm going to go. Yeah, he's going this way. I'm just not going to let him climb into him, especially if he descended.
30:43
I'm going to maybe give him a little right turn and go behind him. Okay. And make sure there's no even though I'm
30:49
not talking to him. Uh, continuing here, it says that um,
30:54
okay, he tagged it up as P 020 and we know he did it because there was an eight associated with it. Then the the
31:00
Liberty 06, that would be you. Mhm. Overheard South's conversation with ZNY
31:05
reference and point on them and observed the aircraft proceeding towards New York City, which is what you had already told us.
31:12
And having known of the first aircraft striking the World Trade Center, the Liberty OS went to the N98 TMO
31:18
management officer TMO. That was Ron Reagan. Uh, no, that was that was Ron Reagan.
31:23
Ron Reagan. Okay. And pointed out the P2 tag to Reagan and
31:28
indicated to the N90 TMO that this aircraft may be a second aircraft headed for the World Trade Center.
31:34
I said that to you Reagan. I said that basically exact words. Here comes here comes another one. And then I
31:42
said the thing about them to shoot him down. Then the N90 TMO that would be Reagan observed the tank aircraft
31:47
descending at approximately 4,000 feet per minute at approximately 500 knots. But you had to observe the same thing
31:52
essentially. And again, you wouldn't see them do that. If if they were landed at Miracle, Laguadi or Tito, they wouldn't
31:59
be you're not coming down unless you had an emergency, right? Which is outside. If you're on fire and
32:06
for some reason your radios aren't working and you're always heading for Kennedy, you're just going to do it.
32:11
And remember, I was a pilot. I got airline
32:18
transport rating ain't going to work 5,000 hours of uh flying. You know, I used to be a captain in these small
32:23
airplanes. Um you're going to do what you have to. You don't talk to anybody. You I'm going to put that airplane on
32:29
the ground. I don't care what anybody says, you know, and that's the outside chance, but it's too coincidental here, you
32:34
know. And again, I'd rather error on saying it was that and if the guy landed and Kennedy had a fire in the cockpit,
32:40
that's fine. the N90 Liberty South CPC. Again, that's
32:46
uh observe the target of the tagged aircraft disappear from ACD. That's the radar scope.
32:51
that's what it's called. That's what it's called. The uh something display something
32:57
other scope display or something.
33:01
Now, in the next bullet, it says the N90 operations manager in charge. Now that's
33:06
different from the TMO was Reagan. Uh that would be Bob Burch. So Bur was the OM in this sequence of events and Reagan is the TMO. So does this establish that both both of them were there at that time?
33:14
Yes, they were both there. Okay. That that's the point I was getting to is that both Reagan and Bur were were present in
33:20
Bur is in charge of the operations on the floor. There's the five areas,
33:26
right? Burch is in charge of the five areas plus the traffic management units that the six are
33:31
and Reagan normally works here but he's he whenever when uh he was alerted he
33:36
immediately came upstairs I imagine so he was Reagan was probably off the floor and uh
33:42
probably I don't know his office is down here downstairs down by the manager's office but at some point in time he is on the
33:48
floor probably he was definitely on the floor you went straight to him with the information you have okay
33:53
Bur might even been on the phone with other conversations and uh and Reagan is
33:59
as Burks, they're both very very competent in their job, you know, very
34:04
proactive. Sorry, John. I just wanted to replay that with this piece of information.
34:19
after um what do you recall happening after the second target of the P2 target
34:25
disappeared and then there's a the statement is within a minute less than a minute later people came in the radio
34:31
room and said that the second the other tower of the world was hit by an aircraft and they saw it on TV what
34:36
happened after that um within a few minutes I know uh I think we stopped all the forces out of
34:42
the New York area I think I don't I don't know the exact time that occurred
34:47
um that we stop the the traffic arrive early. That was Ron Reagan's decision to
34:52
stop everything to let everything settle down and see what that's happening here.
Screen 9:
34:59
Bur might even be on the phone with other conversations and uh and Reagan is
35:04
uh as Burks, they're both very very competent in their job, you know, very
35:09
proactive. Sorry, John. I just wanted to replay that with this piece of information.
35:19
after um what do you recall happening after the second target of the P2 target
35:25
disappeared and then there's a the statement is within a minute less than a minute later people came in the radio
35:31
room and said that the second the other tower of the world was hit by an aircraft and they saw it on TV what
35:36
happened after that um within a few minutes I know uh I think we stopped all the forces out of
35:42
the New York area I think I don't know the exact time that occurred
35:47
um that we stop the the traffic arrive early. That was Ron Reagan's decision to
35:52
stop everything to let everything settle down and see what that's happening here.
35:59
And I think that might have been the impetus to uh shut them down throughout the country.
36:05
So the first thing was I guess more people knew what was going on with the other two airplanes.
36:12
What first thing you recall action being taken was a decision most likely by Reagan to ground all departures but there's a
36:18
in the actual facility log will say when right when it was stopped probably was wasn't much longer maybe five after the
36:24
most this reconstruction said approximately 1307 which was very shortly thereafter the TMO
36:30
would have been Reagan instructed the to stop all in non- arrivals and departures
36:36
and sterilize uh the terminal air station. Now that when they say stop arrivals and
36:42
departure and sterilize at saying they don't want anything coming through there's a there's another log up there
36:47
called a traffic management log. That's where you're probably going to get that exact information from.
35:53
On September 11th each day all all air traffic things that we do are recorded. Okay.
35:58
There there's actually two logs up there. There's a facility log. I'm sure you've seen those. the yellow it's the original yellow was it 8020 11 whatever
36:13
it is and then there's another log separate from that called the traffic management which takes care of traffic
36:18
management initiative went into a hold for Newark wanted to put out restrictions 20 miles
36:23
and trail in Newark stop with all the arrivals to uh airports and gridlock you know Kennedy's a lot of goarounds
36:30
changing you know explains what happens all the responsibility is to maintain those
36:35
logs the uh traffic management log is maintained by the traffic management coordinators and then the area managers
36:42
while facility log is maintained by Bob Burch. Bob that log would be more involved in
36:49
equipment, right? A radar scope failed. When the radar failed uh something where the electric
36:56
went off and the engines anything unusual, somebody fell down the steps. You know what I'm saying,
37:01
right? The separate log is traffic management initiative. So the questions you're asking, you're probably going to get out of the traffic management log.
37:08
That's um you know, and when you use the terminology TMC, traffic management coordinator.
37:13
Yeah. That's different from that's the person the person is the traffic management coordinator, right?
37:18
That's the person call the guy who showed me. Oh, that's Carl. Okay. That's Carl originally. And there
37:24
probably were others up there. Okay. That was I was just distinguishing who the TMC would be that would have been Carl, right? Or maybe another person. Or maybe another person, right, who was working with car. I don't
37:30
recall who was working with him. Um, and they would say exactly what time they stopped his departures and maybe they
37:35
they went into what's called the ground stop maybe, which means stop everything coming in to the city, stop the, you
37:44
know, if you're if you're number four to take off of Washington, you're not coming out. You're sitting there until but the
37:51
airplanes that are coming in what's going to take poss.
37:58
Yeah. I mean it's you're 8 minutes 7 minutes from landing might as well let you land. We're not going to send you somewhere else unless the airport's
38:05
closed, you know. So that's that's where you get that information as far as the traffic
38:11
management we call initiatives were taken care of. Did you um did you hear anything later
38:17
that morning about the uh the flight to hit the Pentagon, American 77? Uh yes. What did you um about that and when?
38:31
Um now
38:41
take a break to drink.
Saulteve Saul Interview Part 2
34:59
Bur might even be on the phone with other conversations and uh and Reagan is
35:04
uh as Burks, they're both very very competent in their job, you know, very
35:09
proactive. Sorry, John. I just wanted to replay that with this piece of information.
35:19
after um what do you recall happening after the second target of the P2 target
35:25
disappeared and then there's a the statement is within a minute less than a minute later people came in the radio
35:31
room and said that the second the other tower of the world was hit by an aircraft and they saw it on TV what
35:36
happened after that um within a few minutes I know uh I think we stopped all the forces out of
35:42
the New York area I think I don't know the exact time that occurred
35:47
um that we stop the the traffic arrive early. That was Ron Reagan's decision to
35:52
stop everything to let everything settle down and see what that's happening here.
35:59
And I think that might have been the impetus to uh shut them down throughout the country.
36:05
So the first thing was I guess more people knew what was going on with the other two airplanes.
36:12
What first thing you recall action being taken was a decision most likely by Reagan to ground all departures but there's a
36:18
in the actual facility log will say when right when it was stopped probably was wasn't much longer maybe five after the
36:24
most this reconstruction said approximately 1307 which was very shortly thereafter the TMO
36:30
would have been Reagan instructed the to stop all in non- arrivals and departures
36:36
and sterilize uh the terminal air station. Now that when they say stop arrivals and
36:42
departure and sterilize at saying they don't want anything coming through there's a there's another log up there
36:47
called a traffic management log. That's where you're probably going to get that exact information from.
35:53
On September 11th each day all all air traffic things that we do are recorded. Okay.
35:58
There there's actually two logs up there. There's a facility log. I'm sure you've seen those. the yellow it's the original yellow was it 8020 11 whatever
36:13
it is and then there's another log separate from that called the traffic management which takes care of traffic
36:18
management initiative went into a hold for Newark wanted to put out restrictions 20 miles
36:23
and trail in Newark stop with all the arrivals to uh airports and gridlock you know Kennedy's a lot of goarounds
36:30
changing you know explains what happens all the responsibility is to maintain those
36:35
logs the uh traffic management log is maintained by the traffic management coordinators and then the area managers
36:42
while facility log is maintained by Bob Burch. Bob that log would be more involved in
36:49
equipment, right? A radar scope failed. When the radar failed uh something where the electric
36:56
went off and the engines anything unusual, somebody fell down the steps. You know what I'm saying,
37:01
right? The separate log is traffic management initiative. So the questions you're asking, you're probably going to get out of the traffic management log.
37:08
That's um you know, and when you use the terminology TMC, traffic management coordinator.
37:13
Yeah. That's different from that's the person the person is the traffic management coordinator, right?
37:18
That's the person call the guy who showed me. Oh, that's Carl. Okay. That's Carl originally. And there
37:24
probably were others up there. Okay. That was I was just distinguishing who the TMC would be that would have been Carl, right? Or maybe another person. Or maybe another person, right, who was working with car. I don't
37:30
recall who was working with him. Um, and they would say exactly what time they stopped his departures and maybe they
37:35
they went into what's called the ground stop maybe, which means stop everything coming in to the city, stop the, you
37:44
know, if you're if you're number four to take off of Washington, you're not coming out. You're sitting there until but the
37:51
airplanes that are coming in what's going to take poss.
37:58
Yeah. I mean it's you're 8 minutes 7 minutes from landing might as well let you land. We're not going to send you somewhere else unless the airport's
38:05
closed, you know. So that's that's where you get that information as far as the traffic
38:11
management we call initiatives were taken care of. Did you um did you hear anything later
38:17
that morning about the uh the flight to hit the Pentagon, American 77? Uh yes. What did you um about that and when?
38:31
Um now
38:41
take a break to drink.
Saulteve Saul Interview Part 2
YouTube Transcript:
Screen 1:
0:01
I don't see this moment. Okay, we're back on after the break with Steve. So soul um Steve, we're just talking about
0:06
after um after the first report of the fire at the trade center was if you remember
0:13
hearing any discussion that it might have been something other than a large commercial jet that hit the first world
0:18
trade center. Um I just heard some of the controllers
0:24
talking about it assuming that it might have been a small aircraft you know but uh the pilots at that point they didn't
0:32
uh you know they were saying there's no way it was all the fire was too large and at that point um if I remember
0:40
correctly at that point I told them that it was a commercial airplane and we don't know exactly who it was if I
0:46
remember correctly that they were told that the control was in at 15, you know, maybe
0:51
between the first and second, you told them the span time frame between the first and second crash.
0:57
okay. What about after the second crash after 9:03 between then and when you were relieved the duty roughly around
1:03
10:03 or so? Well, everybody knew what was happening. I mean, people come around the corner and say, "We just saw, you know, another
1:10
plane hit the second tower and the second one, as we now know, was captured on many news media,
1:16
right?" They were saying they were saying that and then people are going, you know, seeing the replay over and over that guy coming around the corner whacking there.
1:21
And that that obviously is the United that was United 175. We didn't know it was United. Um there was some talk that
1:28
possibly uh Newark Power saw it and they thought it was Continental Airlines because of paint jobs or similar. I
1:33
think there's some I don't know if I'm right or wrong. This is this rumor that uh I try not to follow anything because
1:38
you see it gets me upset, you know, afterwards. After the fact after this?
1:44
Yeah. I don't get and read anything I get involved in. How about um were there any rumors
1:50
that persisted on the floor anywhere at the tracon after the second impact that debate or discussion that it still might
1:57
have been the first impact caused by something other than a commercial jet or by a smaller aircraft? No, at that point I uh we knew the call
2:06
sign. We knew right off the bat that was United 11 American 11. American 11. American 11. The second
2:12
one, we had no idea what company it was. I mean, like I said, I think there was some talk that Newark Tower saw him and
2:19
since it's a white with a gray belly that similar paint job as Continental that they were thinking and Continental,
2:25
we work all the time. So, it's at Newark because it's a big hub for them. They kind of assume when it was uh
2:32
they were off, you and I were talking about who had relieved you. And just to put it back on the record,
2:37
Bill Allen relieved you and then what about 45 minutes later, you came back on. I'm I'm guessing. I'm not exactly
2:43
sure. It may have been about. And was Bill talking with you about a thousand feet aircraft can fly the Hudson
2:49
corridor. The Hudson corridor, that's like at the base of class Bravo. You know what that is? Okay. The Hudson corridor is a
2:55
term used when they talk about aircrafts that want to go up and down the Hudson River between Kennedy and LaGuardia
3:01
elsewhere in a different context that that's referred to as quote the Hudson River tour unquote. Does that terminology ring a bell? Well, it's a cor through them right down the Hudson River where the aircraft can
3:06
go. As long as they stay below 1,000 ft, they can stay below the class Bravo airspace. Totally legal.
3:11
And DFR VFR common practice done today, done every day. Um, this car is through uh
3:19
all over this car. This they used to be I'm not sure if this village is right through Los Angeles. So the airplanes can go through without having to go uh
3:28
talk to the controllers that specific corridor the Hudson River north to south or south to north. Uh you don't recall
3:34
or do you recall the terminology Hudson River tour quote unquote being used? Well, sometimes the pilots will request
3:41
to go up. They want to go up the river. They call up the river want to tour and we've culminated them. I've done
3:47
hundred times myself. I mean I've gone up and down the river and uh I've flown in that Kennedy numerous you know
3:54
hundred times. Hundreds of and I've seen it but it's a common thing. Okay.
4:00
that John that took us a little bit off and while you're looking there uh specifically did you ever hear anybody
4:06
refer to a helicopter out of Pipsy or Sakorski helicopter that might have hit the first tower?
4:12
No. Do you recall any discussion about an ELT, an emergency locator transmission
4:18
uh shortly before the first impact? None of that information got here.
Screen 2:
4:25
Do you know who um gentleman by the name of Marcus Aoyo is?
4:30
Marcus Aoyo. And we believe he was in uh Eastern
4:36
Region Security. The name is familiar. I've seen the name. Okay. I don't know who he is, but I think he may have been in the uh
4:43
You know, do you remember having any you or anyone else you having conversations with him on 911 as to what was?
4:49
I did not know what you did. Did you at your position talk to anybody
4:55
in either Washington Center or Hearnden air traffic control center or FAA
5:01
headquarters? Did I? No. Did you recall anybody from the TMU area
5:05
or the watch desk area? I I wasn't up there. I couldn't hear. I mean, I went back to my main concern is
5:11
to uh keep order here, you know. So, and and other than just going up briefly to talk to Reagan or Birch or Jurus, you
5:18
spend the majority of your time down focused this direction. Yeah, basically I had eight people working and I had to
5:23
get them and it was busy. That was a busy time in the morning and it's I don't I don't need any more problems
5:30
we all already had. So you you were focused where you should be which is down. Right. Exactly. I'm not worried
5:36
about you know this is my main concern is like I said it was very busy. There was uh
5:43
um there was a handoff person on each one of those position on the on the west position. the uh west control was little upset and so you had to watch and make sure that they were still going to do their jobs and not do more damage.
5:55
Okay. Um and I have one other I'm still looking. I got one other briefing. I'm
6:02
going to take you a little out of context here. You mentioned that you were aware of the Lefansza hijacking.
6:07
What do you recall about that? Um let's see. Handra Hogwart and I was here that day. We knew I he knew from
6:15
the day shift he was coming in. Uh I was working the night shift and we knew that he was coming about 3 hours in advance
6:23
and we worked it out. I had a couple of controllers briefed that we're just going to work that aircraft. They knew
6:29
about I had them ready. um is coming in from overseas being handed off to us
6:34
from uh Boston Center and uh we were supposed to get him and
6:40
and somehow I got screwed up. He uh he wound up on Farmville Towers frequency instead of our frequency on
6:47
the Liberty Escope which was going to work him and I had a radar control and a handoff, you know, and they were
6:53
that was they knew at least an hour ahead of what they were going to do and they were briefed what to do with the airplane to bring them inbound. If I
7:01
remember correctly, he was being shadowed by a couple of fighters. Um, and the guy showed up on Farmdale Powers
7:07
Frequency and the pilot was very upset and then they switched them to the
7:12
New York controllers who we would get them and then we gave them to the Kennedy controllers. Farmdale gave them to him and they worked them in the rest
7:18
of the way. So, in essence, we never worked them. Where's Farmingdale? Is that a sector? Uh, no. The Kennedy sector works
7:25
Farmingdale airport. this position right here. 2K Robver. Okay.
7:30
And uh that's pretty much it. Uh we never really talked to him in my area. They
7:36
can't I knew the pilot was I heard he was very angry, you know, say what's going on, you know, Dennis Farmerdale maybe gave me a runaround. Maybe they know what was going on. No, you were uh just just to to conclude on that maybe positive point. New York Tracon was well aware of that situation and was
7:54
well I was in I knew before I got here and you were prepared to take him in Liberty area but he showed up for some reason he showed up in
8:01
not even in his building and talking to the control tower. Somebody helped him out. He got the wrong frequency and but
8:06
if I remember correctly you know this long time ago and he landed without incident and the guy gave up immediately
8:12
and that was pretty much it. Okay, that's all I remember. Um I apologize to your uh miles as this while I was
8:18
looking at some notes but did um did anybody did you think anyone from the east regional operation center on 911
8:24
No negative. Nobody did anybody call Okay. So no one called there all asking you for information.
8:30
Um no we nobody called here. We've not uh we would not um if they did we're not
8:37
going to give them any information. If anything we're just going to refer anyone to the uh um
8:42
you go up line that came in. um added a bit of public affairs in the region. Okay. No, we're not even going to No, nobody,
8:50
you know, other than uh controllers, you know, they called here, you know, people that work here. But I mean,
8:50
you know, other than uh controllers, you know, they called here, you know, people that work here. But I mean, any of the supervisory
8:56
personnel at the regional operations center be in the security branch or air traffic branch, did anyone in those
9:01
position sort of call here and ask you for information? Not from me. Okay. From you. And to your knowledge, they call did they speak to anyone else
9:07
here for information? Not that I'm aware of. because my our understanding is that they don't have uh spokes there. So they wouldn't have sort
9:15
of some of the normally everything would go through the watch desk through Bob Burch.
9:20
That's his normally it should go through Bob Burch and normally he would go to public
9:25
affairs. I mean that's well the same hold true if Washington headquarters FA headquarters wanted information would they normally call the
9:32
watch desk to your if you know well I don't know what I would give him unless I knew the person because who would I know who was calling you know if I was at the watch desk you know is that to your knowledge is that where the information would generally come
9:44
from if they if there was information flowing from the Trayon to Washington headquarters would it generally go to the I GE the information would go in from the watch desk it might go to the com
10:01
center in the region or might go right to the air traffic division manager in the region.
10:07
Yeah. I don't think I don't think any information would leave unless it went through the manager. That's what I think. I wouldn't you know no one gets
10:13
anything unless it's information to solve the problem right now which
10:18
um how about command center? Did you talk to Honda? No. No, I didn't. Um and that's where they would go through too. The ch we would go through the command center through the watch desk to the watch desk would go through. I do
10:25
not talk to the command center ever. Right. I don't talk to the command center. I go to the watch desk and they will, you
10:31
know, if I did, I would talk to the command center right there. Right there with Bob Burch, you know, saying
10:38
let's say there's something going on, which would be rare. I'm the expertise in the area rather than me tell him, he
10:44
tell them, and a lot of questions. You'll be you stand by to answer my questions. Okay. I don't have any other questions.
10:50
No, I don't either. uh recommendations and uh oh let me just the catchall question we've asked you a lot of questions is there something we haven't asked you we should have or you know something that we don't know
11:03
like I said it's uh you know I mean they were asking us talking about I don't know if they say if we're reading the paper we're hiding I don't think anyone's hiding anything you know I mean no and no we don't we don't perceive
11:15
it's when there's nothing but we do give everybody the opportunity since we don't know what we don't know we give everybody the smartest thing we
11:21
uh is stop the torches because allegedly there was another guy on the ground at Kennedy,
11:27
a flight at Kennedy ready to depart. Um that there was. We had some information about that that there was a somebody ready to depart and then they they taxied back to the gate and there was some discussion in the back of
11:39
aircraft and they were told to get off and they wouldn't get off. You know, did you hear what were the the final
11:45
outcome was of that? No, the people in the back disappeared, you know. Did you hear that there were
11:51
I don't know if it's true or not. You know, I don't know. It was just like hearsay. I don't even know where I heard it to be honest with you. You know, I
12:03
have no clue. It's But okay. But I wouldn't have been surprised if there were others.
12:08
Do you remember what airline that was associated with the aircraft that was don? No. My theory is they after American
12:16
goes America and United for United States. That's my theory. That's an interesting theory. It's the
12:22
first time I've ever actually heard that voice because they want those words out throughout the world that
12:29
American Airlines in the United States, you know, we're not going to, you know,
12:35
procedures changed at all as much changed on the floor after 911. Well, what happened everything is things
12:41
changed rapidly at the time. Maybe tell you he came to work things were different. It was very strange coming to work at first with no airplanes and the
12:48
military and the fight is overhead. You know, you know you know
12:54
the the bottom line is uh you know which is supposed to comply with the pilot's request that something like this happens
13:00
and you know it's any recommendations
13:06
things that need to be changed things that could be done better.
Screen 4:
13:12
One of the problems with a people with this flight or the guy that the United 175 is in the New York area here or
13:19
Washington anywhere in the north in the east coast from Richmond on up to Boston
13:24
the airspace is so congested. So when an airplane gets off course they immediately trans go through so many
13:30
people's area and so many different facilities. That's why they couldn't track that guy because when he turned around he was going through he just established roots out and established roots in and he just kept cutting across
13:43
before people realized what the heck was going. That's my opinion is all my opinion. And is there a solution to that? Yeah. Well, you can't forget about one airplane, you know, where the controllers, you know, that's what I
13:53
questioning the controllers. You can't forget about them. Somebody at least should have known. But even if we known,
13:58
we couldn't do anything. And even if there was a fighter there, who's going to make that decision to
14:04
to pull down an airliner? Did you ever have any discussion about that? Did I? Yeah. About to shoot down orders or the authority to shoot down that day? Well, we may had it. I never heard any discussion, but we've had uh when uh the
14:19
guy got ahead and you get a guy just you know, where he shouldn't be and uh, you know, going down the wrong way going
14:25
to make the order that's going to be some big someone to make that decision is going to have to answer for. that I didn't
14:32
didn't never heard any discussion uh on any frequency or otherwise. No, I no I never heard anything like that and I'm just curious to see who's going to make that decision if it happens. And uh I mean if these guys really want to do damage, if you think
14:46
about it, they should have hit the Empire State Building because now you have a disaster here and a disaster here.
14:53
Not in the same spot. Not in the same spot. Look back, you know, not that I'm a terrorist, but but I'm a pilot and I
15:00
always said if I was flying for, you know, when I was younger and flying the, you know, 19 passenger turbo props, it
15:06
was different than a jet. But I always said that you're not coming to my cockpit unless I know you because we used to fly in the cockpit and if I'm a nut, they wanted to show them my ID and my paperwork, which can falsify real
15:19
easily. and that airplane's starting to rotate off the ground. I could just take those fuel levers on those engines and
15:24
turn them off and there's nothing you're going to do. those engines are stopped or shut down who are going in or
15:31
know so I always said that I mean as a flight instructor I teach people to fly bigger stronger people than me person freeze on the controls what do you do you always thought of that right and then
15:43
right below the belt so
15:45
as I know you I know I'm don't think let me ask you um a question at the end
15:52
do you the pilot because the pilot but we want is um were you aware that um American Airlines um allow you to monitor frequency frequency.
16:05
American Airlines. How about United? Do you know whether they on 911 allowed you to monitor frequency?
16:10
I don't know. I don't know. But there's no American. What do you know about that? They did. United
16:16
United I think still does at the pilot's discretion. Oh. Okay.
16:21
Yeah, I've been on Yeah, they can turn it off. I've been on United flights where
16:26
you know, they'll say that they have it on and then there's some you can go to channels and listen. Um, also American used to show the takeoff and landing on the screen, right? Yeah. Years ago. I don't know if they do that
16:37
anymore. I don't think so. I haven't seen them either. I ask. Yeah, I was actually on a recently on a United flight this past fall. I could I was able to monitor channel 9 FAA frequency
16:48
and the conversations with the pilot and I wouldn't have known but for you know
16:55
my involvement in the 911 commission and familiarity with the FAA speak that it was our plane that they were talking to what to do. I have a pilot question for you.
17:01
Let me ask but before we get do you know if American does did American on 911 and beforehand did they allow you to monitor at the pilot's discretion the frequencies? I don't recall. I I only
17:20
know that United did still do occasionally. Still Yeah, it's on at the pilot's discretion. Um only because I've flown United. Um I do know that on 9 on September 11th, um I've spoken to someone who was on a United flight and was listening to
Screen 5:
17:32
11th, um I've spoken to someone who was on a United flight and was listening to
17:37
the frequency on 911. Yeah. Yeah. I think I think she said that it was shut off as soon as it
17:45
became clear that there was something going on. They shut it off for the passengers. Makes sense.
17:50
I think that's what she said. What about on an American? Do you know? I haven't flown American lately. I have
17:56
Is there any way you'd be able to find it out um through the through the FAA or whether or not on on that day? American.
18:04
The uh CMO might know. Yeah, if you can. Sure. Okay. I'm going to ask you to speculate.
18:11
Um, three of the four hijacked aircraft shut their transponders off. One did not. United 175 left the transponder on,
18:19
but coach changed twice. Were you aware that that happened that there was coaching on 175?
18:25
No. How easy is it to turn a transponder off? That's it. So,
18:33
the fact that one of the four pilots, if if if the game plan for all planes was to turn it off, that was a no-brainer.
18:40
He could have done that. And he had in order for these guys to fly these things, first of all, in my opinion, right, they had this flight simulator thing. So, they had them on their computers. All right.
18:52
Okay. The ever fly these things. That's that's where they got a lot. That's my opinion. I don't they've done the flight
18:58
school, too, but they've gone to flight school, but they were fly supposedly 727s,
19:07
and 757 is a much different airplane. It's got a glass cockpit. 727's got old round dials. You know, right? And 75 is a 1969 car compared to 1984.
19:18
a 1984 car. What if they had a 747 simulation? 747. Some of them have old round dials
19:25
and other ones have called glass cockpits. Okay, the glass cockpits it's different presentation of all your flight
19:31
instruments. Um the these guys they can fly that airplane. You just I mean when
19:38
you if you're moving at that speed even though those buildings are big it's hard to hit. So they knew the the hijack pilots knew
19:45
what they were doing. They would knew what they were doing. I mean other than you know he should have known that he knew he knew he knew that turn that transpond off is harder to track in my opinion
19:56
But he didn't turn his off he changed the code screwed up maybe he you know they're all different airplanes you know you know he
20:04
just somehow he just turned the code just thought it would be hard he couldn't turn it off and he did it twice you know unless he couldn't turn it off in that you know what type airplane he was a he a 767 was the second
20:16
it's the same as 116 76 76 you know again different carriers
20:22
might have it differently too I don't know much about it you have to you know look at the United 76 and see how it's
20:27
you stay with me for a minute on that turning the transponder off on 11 caused one set of problems for air traffic
20:34
control 175 by not turning it off but by
20:39
changing it twice created a different set of problems does that provide to an air traffic controller he's easy the guy without the transponder as hard as it's find. It's harder than a guy with the transponder,
20:49
but with the guy with the transponder change, code changed. And I know this
20:55
isn't in the root center, but doesn't that put two targets up on the stream where there were one before, you got coast track on the what was 175 under its old, but the track already dropped off a long time ago? There wasn't any
21:07
track entering our airspace. There wouldn't be a track because he's not supposed to come here. He took off at Newark and he turned around. No, no. I think in one second the second one out of Boston
21:21
the guy the guy who hit Okay, I see. Okay, the guy southe
21:26
I I don't even follow all I know I know I don't suspect but this is a technical point that you can help on. I think he would the guy didn't know how to turn it off or maybe it might have been wire
21:38
that stays on unless the wheels are on the ground at which point it turns off.
21:44
It might be why the different companies are going to have different ways of doing it. So what happens is when he is
21:51
may be automatic that once the landing gear is up the transponder goes on
21:57
when the wheel when the gear is down but he would know that might be I don't know anything about a 76 you got to get a 76
22:03
pilot. Yeah, I actually did. I said in the cockpit that the 76 76 transponder is different than the uh excuse me, the
22:09
United transponder is slightly different than the American but not that much different. You can still turn it to
Screen 6:
22:15
standby. Standby. Yep. Which was the easy thing to do and apparently three of the four of them did it. And I was
22:21
just curious from air traffic perspective if he he doesn't turn it off but he changes the code does that cause
22:27
more problems? No, because you're going to see him. What happens when he changed the code?
22:32
You would see it and I don't I don't know about the center. We would see it that he changed the code, you know,
22:38
became what they call a mode C intruder. You familiar with that terminology?
22:43
Mode C intruder. Yes. Is basically a um it's like an unknown target. It's like
22:50
that guy I said before. If I see a guy descending like this and I go walking VFR, which is a VFR code, and I have an
22:56
IFR airplane, I'm going to get a conflict alert on this guy. Okay? because he has an altitude of OC. I'm
23:04
going to get it. The conflict alert is going to go off that these airplanes are converted. If he has no transponder,
23:09
then it's a he doesn't know what the altitude is. That no transponder is a worse problem for air traffic controllers than a uh
23:17
trans plane just frequency. Yes. Okay. Yes. No transponder is much much much
23:23
lower much harder do you have to have a transponder if you fly above 10,000 ft
23:27
within within a large anywhere around this area Washington Philadelphia Boston any of the big areas. Let me ask you
23:34
another speculative question. Controllers at uh Enroot controllers
23:40
have told us that there's no evidence because American 11 was not transponding
23:45
as they did not know altitude. There's no evidence that he was ever in New York center's airspace that he went straight from Boston's airspace to Trayon's
23:52
airspace. Is that possible? Yes, because the airspace over here
23:58
for a map um is not owned over New York center.
24:04
All right. The airspace over us is owned by Boston Center. There's a line and
24:10
there's a chart. You might even have one here.
24:23
and and you did you give me the short answer which is the real answer is that it's it is possible to do that.
24:30
Yeah, he never entered the liberty. [Applause]
24:36
All right, [Applause]
24:40
Kennedy, right? Here's all right.
24:43
London, New York right here. Okay. Newark airport. These lines are the
24:48
boundaries. See this side is Boston Center, right? This side is New York center. Okay. So, this airplane came from what I can see or what I was told. Came down this way. This is Boston
25:02
center over here. See Boston and New York. This aircraft he took off
25:07
Boston Logan Airport. I don't know where he turned over Albany. Albany. Okay. Turned over here
25:13
and then came down the Hudson River basically. Well, he basically came this way when I saw him. First time I saw him.
25:18
is the Hudson River. This is the Hudson River right here. He is right on the boundary. If he comes down the river. Here's New York and here's Boston.
25:23
He came right he was he's coming down like this. And probably what happened
25:39
was he came down here, he was probably already down at 3,000 ft. 4,000 lower.
25:45
Here's a sparter. Spartans right here.
25:51
So what happened was when he came, he took off with Logan this way and he's climbing out. He's probably going to when this is a low altitude jet. High altitude. He's up here at altitude. He's at about 29,000 ft to about here.
26:04
And he actually, if this is the Hudson River, he actually comes down the river
26:10
and then comes out a little bit and then comes in. When I saw him, he was in here in there. Okay. Right around in here. And then, like I
26:17
said, as he's getting closer to here to the main bang, he kind of, you know, disappeared.
26:23
So, he was spit out right around here. Even though CBW made a hand off to ZNY,
26:28
there's no evidence that he was ever in New York space. He could have could have conceivably gone from Boston to Traycon.
26:34
Well, let's see. Where's Albany again? Albany, he has to be they're getting close to the uh right here. Here at handoff. So, the handoff probably be taken somewhere around here if he went past. You see the back?
26:45
Still in Boston. He's still in Boston, right? Boston was way up here. So, no, he in my opinion he wouldn't have gone ever in New York Airspace. His or unless he touched here, which he'
Screen 7:
ben lower, which was our airspace. We own 17,000 ft below here.
27:03
I think what happened is I don't know asking the quality assurance people here
27:08
was departing off runway 13. He may have come close to a guardian departure. He
27:14
got to 17,000 at uh
27:19
8:40 and he's at 4117348. Do we have latl long? Can we pick off
27:26
latl long on 11? Yeah. Yeah.
27:32
When did that's when he turned the transport off at 17,000? No, he uh that's when he dropped into your altitude. He dropped below 17,000
27:39
at that point. Oh, you got that from Department of Defense at that. Yeah. See, we don't see we never knew they had
27:45
that until we would find the most seas and they would tell we have a guy with no transponder after September.
27:51
They couldn't pick him up. See and say, "How are they doing this? We can't do that." No. And
27:56
we never knew that until after post 11 saying, "How the hell they know that guy at you know 3500?"
28:02
the same data that they gave to the NTSB. So we had this obviously data from both NSB and the 8 a lot more. You see the boxes you can say was this. Yeah, we will. Okay. Okay, I see it. I pick it
28:12
up. Okay. Okay. Yep. And this is about like you say right around here is where I saw maybe a
28:18
little bit more on the first time I remember seeing the airplane. Maybe he was up in here somewhere
28:23
probably before you lost him and he was heading like this. The south controller you talk to owns the airspace
28:33
over here way down here by cult. So he never entered our airspace. Liberty South Liberty South never entered.
28:40
what he really did was he descended in my opinion down through the LaGuardia sector's airspace then turned into Kennedy's airspace and then cut down when he went past Laadi in my opinion
28:51
had to be down to 2,000 ft. Now, when you're flying an airplane that fast and making those turns, it's not like it's I mean, there sharp turns there. Here's almost a 90° turn and then turn. It's
29:04
not that easy to hit that building. Where is the World Trade Center on this map?
29:10
All right. This is the Hudson River, right? Yeah. Here's New York. All right. So, this has got to be Manhattan right here. Probably
29:17
right here. This is LaGuardia Airport is here. New York airport is here.
29:23
my opinion is somewhere like right here. Right in there. Okay. So for this guy, he had he went south to LaGuardia. He had to come around like this and then there was that flight attendant on the telephone, right? Who was talking to the
29:36
supervisor saying they see buildings of water and then that's it. And then she's gone and done.
29:42
Okay. You know how fast to go from here. I mean these guys move. He was moved. You know, you're estimating.
29:47
If I was going to do that, I would go here from down. Okay. [Applause]
30:01
I want I want
30:15
recommendation. I'll be honest with you. I can get myself a King, you know. You're not going to hear anything on a recorder later on. You can get me a tiny 4,000lb airplane
30:21
and I can take it off of a little airport south of here and get there, you're not going to know anything or you're going to see the explosion,
30:27
you know, going to see the, you know, if that's what you want to do. There's no way you can catch me. There's a little
30:34
airport out there right there in New Jersey. I could, you know, if I had to, there's no, you're not going to stop. I
30:48
could take off ISIL. You're not going to stop me. There's nothing here to stop me.
30:54
You have to. It's for security issues, you know. You can't walk around the airport. I can't go to Brook Haven airport and walk on the ramp. They're not going to let me anymore. You look at airplanes cuz I like, you know.
31:00
and that's that's the only way you're going to stop it. Like I said, if they really want to make a mess, if they did two two spots in New York City, then it would have been done. Where do you put the resources?
31:19
You know, who would have thought the towers fell down? Who would think they would have fell down? I said, "All right, well, that's what Well, I thought, well, okay, they hit the building. All right, they'll fix it." That's what I was thinking after the first one. They hit it. They did damage. They'll fix it,
31:30
you know? They'll fix it, you know, and then the second one and then people are coming in the first the tower just fell
31:37
down, you know, and it's like, "Oh my god, what's going on?" You know, it's like we're under test. That was my We're all being attacked.
31:44
And I knew in my mind I knew it was terrorism because who else could it be? Right. It couldn't be two pilots.
Screen 8:
31:50
So, you you we too, you know, you two pilots to defend and one within 20
31:55
miles. Yeah. Well, one, maybe, but two is a real stretch. Did you um do you have an understanding
32:02
on terms of asking for military assistance that day as to who that would fall to that?
32:07
I wouldn't know who would come. I was thinking, you know, Jets and Andrews, you know, there's nothing right around. I know
32:11
Maguire doesn't have fighter jets. I know Stewart doesn't have fighter. I know Suffach doesn't. Resky right here in the line. There's nothing real close. There are no f close checks. Who? How about who here at the FAA Treycon here? Who would be um does that responsibility fall to a particular position uh at the TMU?
32:28
The people would be the person who's ultimately in charge of the building would uh I would say relay to the command center. The command center is going to make the call. That would be what I would say. If I was in charge, sometimes we're in charge. I can be in
32:39
charge of this building right now and they're going to the ones that make the call. You know, now they have this den
32:44
that they talk to. domestic event network. Let's say pre 911. If you were the person in charge of the building, say we were pre 911 and now you're in charge of the building and you think that we're under attack and you need
32:56
military assistance. Would you have what what would you have done to get the to request? Uh We don't have any military office
33:02
here. I would call the command center or the center has a military liaison office. So you would have called either
33:07
currently command center or New York center and call them. The senators are really the bosses and all the facilities fall underneath them. They have the supposedly had the resources far as what I
33:18
root centers and root centers. They have a military I don't you know here we're not trained exactly who to call how about and what they would do. Has that changed today? Like let's hypothetically you're in charge today
33:28
and there's a terrorist attack with aircraft. How would you obtain military assistance if you were in charge?
33:34
I'd go through the command center command center. How about the den? Would you go use that domestic event?
33:38
Yeah, we'd give them the information. Yeah. Um is it the case that say today um that you could be left in charge at some point in the building and be the highest ranking person in the the midnight shifts we work as a uh
33:57
supervis where we're in charge of supervisors whenever work midnight shift the area supervisor then right the people who like Bob Burch who
34:03
the area they're not in the building okay one of the supervisors in charge normally during the day it's very rare
34:10
that one of us is in charge now it's possible it could happen if they don't show up and there happens to be two supervisors in
34:16
my area and they need someone to death and then I'm in but that's very that hasn't happened in years.
34:21
Do you feel that on a midnight shift if something were to occur and there were to be an attack with aircraft that you're adequately prepared and trained
34:28
to know how to seek assistance from the military or would you I'd go right through that command
34:34
center. That's all that you know off through then. I'm asking something a little different not where you would go. Do you feel like
34:39
you're adequately trained and prepared with what the procedures are and the protocol to obtain a military assistance? Yeah, I would be fine. Okay. I'd be fine. I'm not going to wait. You know, I got to error on the side of uh
34:51
make you make a mistake. You make a mistake. I'm going to go for it. You. You know, you can't uh
35:01
I don't have any other questions. Um thanks. Thanks for your time. It's around extremely helpful. We appreciate
35:07
All right.
